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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
Along history, the advances of science and technology have had a direct impact in 
how we organize our lives. How much we live, how we work, how we move 
around, how we communicate to each other, it is all largely influenced by the 
current status of scientific knowledge and its technological applications. In spite of 
playing such an important role, until the second half of the 20th century we 
understood very little about the making of scientific knowledge beyond the 
epistemological debate around it, i.e. the philosophy of science. Since the 1960s, the 
science and technology studies (STS) have inquired the nature and practices of 
science as a socially-determined phenomenon, thus making sociology, 
anthropology, and history the main disciplines for the field. On the other hand, 
despite frustrated efforts, psychology has so far not taken part in the social studies of 
science, leaving the personal understanding of the scientist as a largely neglected 
element. This status should not be surprising given the cognitive and individualistic 
focus that existing studies on psychology of science have had, something that makes 
difficult any dialogue with more socially oriented disciplines. The present thesis 
proposes to bridge this gap through a cultural psychology of science, which 
addresses scientific activity based in two tenets: (a) the meaning-making of 
personal, psychological experiences is something inherently connected, but not 
limited, to culturally-available meanings; (b) scientists create scientific knowledge 
by articulating culturally available theories, methodologies, and data not in a neutral 
way, but rather driven by a personal sense of purpose for creating the best possible 
knowledge according to their own experiences and commitments. Therefore, this 
approach makes possible to understand the personal dimension (e.g., interests, 
motivations, commitments) involved in the making of science without disconnecting 
it from collective elements, like scientific communities, institutions, and socio-
historical backgrounds. At the same it reflects the purposeful character of scientific 
activity for those who actually produce that knowledge. 
In the present thesis, this proposed cultural psychological approach is used to 
explore a very concrete case: the rise of economics and economists in contemporary 
Chile. Following a particular socio-political scenario in the 1970’s, economists–
initially linked to the Chicago school of economics–turned into key social actors, 
holding an influence that spanned way beyond strictly economic issues. Thus, as 
bearers of economics knowledge, economists have been the authoritative source to 
settle debates on educational policy, healthcare, labor relations, among many other 
areas. Existing literature on this phenomenon, mostly historical and sociological, 
have focused in documenting the extent of this influence and also in calling into 
question the socio-political conditions that have made possible this rise of the 
economists in Chile. By doing so, little attention has been paid to the persons behind 
the seemingly unitary term ‘economist’. In order to address this shortcoming, the 
present thesis provides an updated, grounded account of the diversity of views and 
experiences collapsed under this label, based on a thematic analysis of in-depth 
interviews with current graduates, research assistants, doctoral students, and 
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professors on economics in Chile.  
While most of the economists interviewed shared the diagnosis made by social 
science scholars on the massive influence of the discipline, their perspectives on this 
topic varied greatly—from criticism to support—, and were based on very different 
rationales—from political to epistemological. Moreover, the analysis of economists' 
personal experiences and perspectives provided novel insight into a range of topics 
related to the creation, circulation and use of economics knowledge in Chile that 
have been mostly neglected. It was thus possible to observe how concrete 
biographical experiences, personal motivations, and views on the discipline 
(regarding its methodology, limitations, and normative orientations) all were 
interwoven at the moment of defining participants' position as economists within the 
Chilean economics community. Therefore, it seems no longer reasonable to assume 
that every economist in Chile plainly submits to the social norms and procedures 
that organize this scientific community. On the contrary, there was a consistent 
involvement of the participants, which drove their personal work as economists and 
that could not be reduced—yet not disconnected either—to socio-cultural elements.  
In sum, the present thesis looks to complement existing social studies of science 
with a cultural psychological perspective, which is sensitive to the personal nature 
of the scientific activity but also to the cultural conditions in which scientific 
knowledge is constructed, without subsuming any of these dimensions into the 
other. At the same time, it offers a novel perspective on the notorious role that 
economists have had in contemporary Chilean society, a topic that has been largely 
addressed as social and institutional. 
	
	
	 iii 
DANSK RESUME 
Igennem historien har videnskabelige og teknologiske fremskridt haft direkte 
indvirkning på, hvordan vi organiserer vores liv. Hvordan vi lever, hvordan vi 
arbejder, hvordan vi flytter os rundt og hvordan vi kommunikerer med hinanden er 
alt sammen påvirket af det nuværende videnskabelige niveau og dets teknologiske 
anvendelsesmuligheder. Til trods for at spille så vigtig en rolle, så forstod vi indtil 
den sidste halvdel af det 20. århundrede kun lidt om, hvordan videnskab bliver til ud 
over den epistemologiske debat som omgav den, dvs. videnskabsteori. Siden 
1960’erne har Science and Technology Studies (STS) undersøgt videnskaben som en 
socialt betinget fænomen, hvilket derved gjorde sociologi, antropologi og historie til 
feltets hoveddiscipliner. På den anden side, og det på trods af en frustrerende 
indsats, så har psykologien endnu ikke taget del i det sociale undersøgelse af 
videnskab. Dette har efterladt den personlige forståelse af den videnskabelige person 
som et overset element. Dette skulle ikke være overraskende pga. det kognitive og 
individualistiske fokus, som eksisterende psykologiske studier har haft. Denne 
afhandling forsøger at bygge bro over denne kløft gennem en kultur-psykologisk 
tilgang til videnskab, hvilket bliver adresseret i følgende to teser: (a) at 
meningsskabelse af personlige, psykologiske oplevelser hænger sammen med, men 
er ikke begrænset til, de kulturelt tilgængelige betydninger; (b) videnskabsfolk 
skaber videnskabelig viden ved at artikulere kulturelt tilgængelige teorier, 
metodologier og data på en måde som ikke er neutral, men drevet af en personlig 
målbevidsthed omkring, hvordan den bedst mulige viden skabes ifølge deres egne 
erfaringer og forpligtelser. Derfor bliver det gennem indeværende tilgang muligt at 
forstå den personlige dimension (fx interesser, motivation og forpligtelser) 
involveret i skabelsen af viden uden derved at løsrive det fra kollektive elementer 
såsom videnskabelige fællesskaber, institutioner og social-historisk baggrund. 
Samtidig gengiver det den formålsrettede karakter bag den videnskabelige aktivitet 
og dem som faktisk producerer den viden.  
I indeværende afhandling anvendes den kultur psykologiske tilgang til at undersøge 
en meget konkret sag: stigningen af økonomi og økonomer i det nuværende Chile. 
Efter et særligt socio-politisk scenarie i 1970’erne blev økonomer, som til at 
begynde med var forbundet til Chicago School of Economics, gjort til nøgle aktører, 
hvilket bevirkede at deres indflydelse strakte sig langt ud over strengt økonomiske 
anliggender. Således, som bærere af økonomisk viden, har økonomer siden været 
den autoritære kilde i forhold til at afgøre debatter inden for uddannelsespolitik, 
sundhed, arbejdsforhold, samt mange andre områder. Eksisterende litteratur om 
fænomenet, mest historisk og sociologisk, har fokuseret på at dokumentere 
omfanget af den indflydelse og stillet spørgsmål ved de socio-politiske betingelser, 
som har muliggjort denne voksende skare af økonomer i Chile. Grundet dette har 
man kun i ringe grad givet opmærksomhed til de personer bag dette begreb. For at 
adressere denne mangel, vil den indeværende afhandling give en opdateret og mere 
forankret beskrivelse af de diverse synspunkter og oplevelser, som er samlet under 
etiketten ’økonom’. Dette er vil være baseret på dybdegående interview med 
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nuværende studerende, forskningsassistenter, ph.d-stipendiater og professorer i 
økonomi i Chile.  
Mens de fleste af de interviewede økonomer var enige med den diagnose, som er 
blevet stillet af de socialvidenskabelige forskere angående den massive indflydelse, 
som den økonomiske disciplin har haft, så varierede deres perspektiv på emnet 
stadig – fra kritik til støtte –, hvilket også var baseret på flere forskellige rationaler – 
fra politiske til epistemologiske. Dertil gav analysen af økonomernes personlige 
erfaringer og perspektiv indsigt i en bred vifte af emner relateret til skabelsen, 
cirkulationen og brugen af økonomisk viden i Chile, som for det meste har været 
negligeret. Det var således muligt at observere hvordan biografiske erfaringer, 
personlige motiver og synspunkter på disciplinen (omhandlende dens metodologi, 
begrænsninger og normative orientering) alle var sammenvævet og i det øjeblik 
udgjorde deltagernes position som økonomer inden for det chilenske økonomiske 
fællesskab. Derfor virker det ikke længere rimeligt at antage at enhver økonom i 
Chile underkaster sig de normer og procedurer, som er medvirker til at organisere 
dette videnskabelige fællesskab. Helt modsat dette, sås der et konsistent engagement 
blandt deltagerne, der drev deres eget arbejde som økonomer, som ikke kunne 
reduceres til – eller adskilles fra – de socio-kulturelle elementer.  
Opsummerende: Indeværende afhandling søger at komplementere eksisterende 
studie foretaget inden for socialvidenskaben med et kultur psykologisk perspektiv, 
som er opmærksomt på den personlige dimension af videnskabelige aktiviteter, men 
også over for de kulturelle betingelser under hvilke viden konstrueres, dog uden at 
reducere nogen af disse dimensioner til en anden. Samtidig tilbyder den et nyt 
perspektiv på økonomernes berygtede rolle i det nuværende Chile – et emne som 
mest har været adresseret som socialt eller institutionelt.   
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CHAPTER 1. MAKING SCIENCE 
HUMAN, MAKING SENSE OF SCIENCE 
The question for knowledge, as few others, is a timeless question. Since classical 
times we have wondered about our capacity to know things, certain things. In a 
certain way, as human beings we have insistently tried to know more about what, 
how, and why we know. Since the times of the ancient Greece, however, there has 
been a permanent suspicion about our everyday, practical knowledge, which has led 
us to inquire this issue in further depth, beyond our first impressions. Interestingly, 
for centuries these inquiries were focused on high epistemological and philosophical 
debates, guided by the most eminent philosophers of the Classical, Medieval, and 
Modern eras of Western thinking. This was the main trend until the 20th century, 
which represented a dramatic shift in how the issue of knowledge was addressed. 
First and foremost, the questions about knowledge definitively turned into the 
inquiry of science: what is and what is not science; how science needs to be 
conducted in order to yield true results. This turn represented the consolidation of 
the so-called ‘scientific revolution’ (Shapin, 1996) that began with Copernicus, and 
ultimately placed the scientific method as the ultimate source of true knowledge. 
This change, however, was not circumscribed only to the way in which scholars 
approached this issue; the relation between science and society also changed 
dramatically. Maybe the most clear example of how central scientists became in the 
ordinary life of the 20th century is the ‘Doomsday Clock’. Periodically updated by 
the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, this metaphorical clock represented how close, 
according to American atomic scientists, was the world to a nuclear all-out war 
during the Cold War. In other words, if the world was going to end, this was going 
to be announced by scientists. This level of influence and presence in society was 
probably one of the elements that moved scholars since the 1960s to shift from a 
purely rational understanding of science into historical and social perspectives of 
this activity. Thus, the image of scientists as meditative scholars working in an 
‘ivory tower’, completely disconnected from the mundane world, was definitely 
shattered. 
While this renovated approach to science acknowledged the tight connection 
between scientists and the social environments in which they live, it kept an old 
assumption of the philosophical approaches: the neutral role of the person working 
as scientist. In this sense, whereas for philosophical views the scientist is a purely 
rational individual, for social and historical approaches the knowledge created by 
individual scientists is ultimately determined by collective elements. The present 
thesis aims to challenge this assumption by showing that scientists act as purpose-
oriented, motivated persons. Far from just an intellectual exploration, this proposal 
looks to provide a more grounded perspective of scientific activity given the crucial 
role that science has for contemporary societies. For this very reason, this thesis 
analyzes the former topic through the case of economists in Chile during the last 
five decades, which have largely transcended the borders of academia.  
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In the following, I introduce these two topics by describing my own path of making 
sense about them. By doing so, I look to set my position about these topics as clear 
as possible. Moreover, I consider essential to make clear that these issues have a 
personal and existential value that go beyond intellectual curiosity. Hence, I am 
certain that the spirit of this project and its relevance will become transparent to the 
reader. Finally, I close this introductory chapter with a summary of the structure of 
this thesis. 
WHY SCIENCE? FROM EPISTEMOLOGY TO KNOWING 
PERSONS 
In the spring semester of 2006, midway through my undergraduate studies in 
psychology, I enrolled on a seminar with a strange but interesting title, 
Epistemology, which seemed related to my long-standing interests in philosophy. 
After that semester, my views on knowledge and science were forever and 
completely transformed. If such change happened, it was because of a thrilling 
intellectual trip that went from Frege’s (1893/1964) logicist perspective on language 
to Carnap’s (1934/1995) physicalist project; from Ayer’s (1936) verificationism to 
Popper’s (1934/1959) falsificationism; from Quine’s (1951) underdetermination of 
theory by evidence to Feyerabend’s (1975) methodological anarchism; from Kuhn’s 
(1962) scientific revolutions to Lakatos’ (1968) research programmes. By learning 
about the intellectual transitions that shaped the 20th century philosophy of science, I 
realized that what is understood as valid knowledge, and what science is, have been 
in constant transformation along history. Therefore, the question of how to define 
science and objective knowledge has not been answered in a single, unitary and 
consensual way. Ultimately, against (my) received wisdom, even the notion of 
‘truth’ was open for debate.  
Along this major change of perspective about science and knowledge, however, 
there also came a strong personal disappointment with the core of these 
philosophical views. Ultimately, I noted that all these views did not account for the 
affective, motivated side of creating knowledge and making science. In other words, 
I perceived that the philosophy of science was trying to address, in the most abstract 
possible way, how science should be done in order to produce objective 
knowledge—even if that very notion has been in permanent transformation (Daston 
& Gallison, 2010). In doing so, I felt that the whole psychological dimension of 
knowledge-making and scientific activity was missing. Thus, there was no 
consideration about why, in the first place, scientists devote themselves to such a 
complicated activity, or how is their everyday work behind the neat papers and 
congress presentations they make, and also what leads them to pick a specific topic 
within a discipline. As a psychologist–in–training, these questions seemed—and 
they certainly still do—essential to have a proper understanding of the topic at stake. 
How was I supposed to grasp what science and knowledge construction is about just 
by knowing the formal rules of it? When I expressed this concern, the professor 
reading the seminar confirmed my apprehension quite directly: anything said by 
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these philosophical accounts related to actual persons, if scientists were mentioned it 
was just as the epistemic agents required to produce knowledge. Thus, I realized that 
the former elements were not just ‘missing’; they were never intended to be 
addressed because they were seen as irrelevant to scientific knowledge. Therefore, 
while I perfectly understood the relevance of these philosophical accounts to grasp 
the epistemic nature of scientific activity, I also realized about its limitations in 
relation to my own interests, which moved me to begin the research project that 
culminates in this thesis. Thus, if I wanted to further understand what I perceived as 
the ‘human’ side of knowledge and science—as opposed to the epistemic, logic 
angle—, I needed to look elsewhere for answers. Hence, the present dissertation 
stems from this long standing concern, and it represents the best possible answers I 
could find during the last ten years. 
The first, and certainly illuminating, alternatives that I found to the philosophy of 
science were the works of Latour & Woolgar (1979), Knorr-Cetina (1981), and 
Shapin (1994). Through them I realized that, along the philosophy of science, exists 
a whole, thriving field of social studies of science. By combining historical, 
anthropological, and sociological perspectives, these studies offered a critical 
perspective of scientific activity that ultimately led me to question whether scientific 
knowledge could be objective—in the sense of being indubitable true—or not. The 
arguments offered by them were certainly compelling: the influence of private and 
governmental funding over research programmes; the decisive role of micro-politics 
within scientific institutions for deciding which projects are supported; the weight of 
scientific communities for silencing dissenting views; the uses of scientific rhetoric 
to influence social debates; all of them portrayed a critical view of science that made 
the philosophical perspective of science look like as nothing more than a mirage. 
This critical view, however, offered a much more realistic approach to the 
construction of scientific knowledge. Thus, these social studies were not prescribing 
how science should be done but critically describing how it is actually done, by real 
scientific communities, in concrete social and historical environments. 
While this social perspective was much more devoted to understand the actual ways 
doing of science, I soon noticed that, for this approach, scientific knowledge is only 
determined by social elements. In this sense, power relations, competition for 
funding, the social influence of ideas, and other collective level elements are 
assumed to be the constitutive elements of scientific knowledge (e.g., Shapin, 1995). 
Therefore, any individual, personal aspect is either subsumed within collective 
elements, or plainly neglected (e.g., Shapin, 2012). Hence, in these social studies of 
science there was still missing the central element of my interest as a psychologist: 
the person behind scientific activity, or the individual scientist creating knowledge 
within a scientific community. Just as with the case of the philosophy of science, 
this sociological understanding of science did not fit with my interest as a 
psychologist. This mismatch, however, did not imply that I just dismissed social 
studies of science. If anything, these works made me realize that any proper 
understanding of scientific activity needs to be sensitive to social and cultural 
elements, which are an integral part of the phenomenon. This new insight added a 
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layer a complexity to my own view: the personal dimension of science could not be 
opposed to the social; it should be connected to it. 
Looking for literature that specifically addressed the personal aspect of scientific 
activity and knowledge creation, however, proved much more elusive than finding 
philosophical or social approaches to this topic. Along the way I found inspiring 
ideas in Schütz’s (1967) phenomenological approach to the life-world, or in 
Goodwin’s (1994) idea of professional vision. Yet they seemed too broad, too 
general for properly addressing the knowledge construction process involved in 
scientific activity. Ultimately, it was Valsiner’s (2012) The Guided Science that 
connected all the former dots. While this book presents a social history of 
psychology, I saw in it a perspective that was radically different from what I had 
read before: while there is tight connection between the ideas in psychology that 
have dominated the discipline and particular socio-historical contexts, there have 
also been several scholars who have pushed for ideas against that disciplinary 
consensus. As Valsiner (2012) shows, the latter works have probably brought much 
more innovation to the discipline than the former. Thus, in these ideas I perceived 
an approach that was fully aware of the influence of social and cultural elements, yet 
it did not collapse the personal contribution of scientists within these collective 
trends. For the first time, I saw in here a way of combining a person-centered, 
psychological perspective with a socio-cultural one: cultural psychology. Moreover, 
as Valsiner’s (2012) book made clear, this approach could address the particularities 
of scientific activity. Based on these early intuitions, I started the present doctoral 
research project. 
Interestingly, it was only after starting my doctoral project that I came to know 
about the existence of a sub-discipline explicitly devoted to study scientific activity 
from a psychological perspective: the psychology of science (Feist & Gorman, 
2013). Although at the moment I blamed myself for overlooking such an obvious 
literature, I soon realized why—despite intensively looking for these works—I 
could not find them before. As Feist (2006) describes, the psychology of science has 
been trying for four decades to establish itself as a full-fledged sub-discipline within 
psychology, but it has not succeeded yet. Beyond this disciplinary element, 
however, my excitement for finding these studies diluted pretty soon. This was due 
to the fact that these psychological studies of science presented an individualistic 
perspective of the scientists, more focused in cognitive elements or personality 
traits. While this certainly addressed the personal dimension of scientific activity, it 
did it in a way in which this dimension was reduced to a number of quantifiable 
psychological variables. In other words, it was traditional cognitive and personality 
psychology applied into scientists, thus carrying over a reductionist approach that I 
did not consider fit for the complexities of scientific activity. In doing so, the whole 
social and cultural dimensions of scientific activity were also vanished—only with 
few exceptions (e.g., Osbeck, Nersessian, Malone, & Newstetter, 2011)—, an 
omission that, after learning about social studies of science and cultural psychology, 
was simply impossible to overcome. Hence, even though I ultimately found a 
psychological approach to scientific activity, it was one that simply did not make 
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justice neither to the personal aspect of scientific activity nor to its collective 
dimension.  
Thus, I realized that a theoretical synthesis of my own was required in order to fully 
address what I perceived was the key missing point in the existing literature: how 
scientists—as a persons with interests, motivations, and commitments—shape their 
own scientific work, as part of broader scientific communities, and as members of 
particular societies. In other words, how to explore the ways in which scientific 
knowledge is crafted by the persons producing it, while acknowledging that 
scientific activity is an effort for producing objective knowledge, which is done 
following social, contingent procedures established by a disciplinary community. 
Ultimately, this is the central question of this dissertation. The theoretical answer I 
propose to this question is a cultural psychology of science, which I fully elaborate 
in Chapter 4. In brief, this view synthetizes the general psychological principles of 
cultural psychology (Valsiner, 2014) with the theory of personal knowledge 
(Polanyi, 1962). Thus, the proposed theoretical perspective starts from the 
assumption that the person is constructively making sense of his or her social and 
cultural environment, through the active internalization and externalization of 
cultural meanings. This general framework is combined with personal knowledge 
theory, which proposes that the construction of scientific knowledge is driven by the 
personal commitments of the scientist, among which is creating objective 
knowledge based on—what is perceived as—the best concepts, methodologies, and 
data available in his scientific community. 
The concepts and theories presented thus far are more systematically organized, in 
the form of a literature review, in Chapter 4. However, it was essential for me to 
present how I have related to them, in order to be transparent about how I arrived to 
the conclusions presented in the following chapters. I am aware that this kind of 
personal disclosure is not common among psychologists—although it is a standard 
practice for other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences (cf. Ingold, 
2014). This clarification, however, it is also an effort to show—through my own 
experience as researcher—the importance of attending to personal elements and 
motivations in order to fully understand the scope of a research project. In my 
particular case, for instance, how my training as a psychologist has largely shaped 
my approach to scientific activity; or how my early exposition to social studies of 
science moved me to look for a non-individualistic approach within psychology. 
Moreover, as it is described in the next sub-section, my personal connection to the 
case of economists in Chile also makes clear why I focus on this topic: my concern 
that the massive influence of economists restricts the citizen participation in the 
social debate about the country. When doing this, I do not intend to present a 
comprehensive historical contextualization of Chile during the last 50 years; 
Chapter 3 is written precisely to cover that aspect thoroughly. 
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CHILE, LAND OF ECONOMISTS 
My connection to Chile and its economists is, first and foremost, biographical: I was 
born and raised in Chile. While I was born near the end of the 1973-1990 
dictatorship that brought a select group of economists—the so-called Chicago Boys 
(Valdés, 1995)—to the forefront of the national debate, I grew up during the 1990s, 
a decade of political transition but continuity in the influential role of economists. 
Thus, I only became familiar with the deep, neoliberal social and economic reforms 
that the dictatorial regime implemented (Gárate, 2012) mostly through narratives 
coming from my family, and then on my own through historical documents and 
accounts. 
Growing up during the 1990s in Santiago de Chile, as the youngest son of an upper 
middle-class, single-income family, I learned something about Chilean society very 
quickly: without a responsible management of the family income, it would not be 
possible to receive good-quality education, healthcare, and housing. Even though I 
was a child, I noted how this message came to me loud and clear through 
newspapers, TV news, and family conversations. Interestingly, I noted that this 
same principle was somehow reproduced by the national economy: if the country 
spent more than necessary, the economic success obtained after much struggle 
would be gone. While I did not understand much about those struggles, I did get that 
the responsible management of the economy, i.e. keep it growing as much as 
possible, was essential for the progress of the country as a whole. Moreover, I 
learned through my exposure to mass media that the most capable people to achieve 
the former were the economists—and nobody else. As a consequence of this, I 
assumed that it was natural for economists to have a say about any possible topic—
from education to healthcare—: it was crucial that any policy decision did not 
jeopardize the growth of the economy. The fact that the economic situation of my 
family improved along the years, just as the national economy did, was not helpful 
for having any doubts about this narrative. In retrospective, it was not until much 
late that I questioned the idea that economic growth was the keystone of national 
progress. 
Not surprisingly, when I was close to graduate from high-school one of my top two 
options for college was economics. While I ended up choosing psychology, I was 
fully aware of the prestige and social influence that becoming an economist could 
give me. In fact, I perceived among my high-school professors a certain 
disappointment that I decided to follow ‘just a program in humanities’ instead of a 
formal social science that combined both humanistic and mathematic approaches. In 
this very concrete sense, the social role of economists in Chile was not a distant 
topic for me. Its importance was clear enough to make me, as a 17 years-old 
teenager, to ponder whether to become an economist or not. 
After this point in time, several elements started to cast doubts on me about the 
monolithic logic of economic growth and the uncontested influence of economists. 
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On the one hand, during my college years, specifically in 2006, there was a major 
strike of high-school students. Having received private education during my whole 
school years, the struggles of public education were distant problems that I did not 
fully understand. After the 2006 strike, however, I realized that the message I 
received as a kid was pretty accurate: without a high-income it was not possible to 
secure a good education. While that seemed a matter of fact as a child, as a young 
adult I could see the grim consequences of such a system; and it did not seem 
neither natural nor acceptable any longer for me. On the other hand, alternative 
voices in politics and media began to raise questions about why, after 15 years of 
steady economic growth and a dramatic increase of average income per capita, there 
had been so little advances in human development indexes. In other words, if the 
economy kept growing, then why did public-provided social services remained so 
underdeveloped and underfunded?  
To a certain extent, this was the beginning of a national debate on why the progress 
of the country has benefited only a little section of the population. The answer given 
by the political establishment, backed by several economists, was not so innovative: 
in order to make this progress reach everybody more economic growth was needed. 
Regrettably, the latter was not open to any further discussion, since the opinions of 
economists were not presented as ‘mere personal opinions’ but as expert, scientific 
opinions on the matter. While I did not doubt about the intention of economists for 
providing accurate advice, it surprised me how all these expert opinions converged 
in a similar view of the society. Through this experience I started to wonder whether 
it was really the case that all economic ideas and evidence supported the logic of 
economic growth applied in Chile, or if it was the other way around: that economists 
looked for the ideas and evidence that supported the status quo in Chilean society. 
For the first time, I saw a vivid example of how the personal elements could be 
interwoven into the scientific work. 
Beyond this, the untenability of this economy-centric approach became fully evident 
to me through the massive grassroots movements that erupted since 2011. While, as 
in 2006, these movements began as a request for better public education, this time 
they soon turned into a critique of the social model implemented during the 
dictatorship as a whole. In doing so, the question of the protesters was pretty simple: 
why do education, healthcare, utilities, etc. need to be organized around an 
economic, for-profit rationality if that just deepens the existent social inequalities. 
Through this questioning I realized about the expanse of economic rationality in 
Chile, as the ideas of a single scientific discipline organized most of the social areas 
in the country. Furthermore, this experience made me realize that—contrary to my 
college training in epistemology—science is not necessarily trapped into the so-
called ivory tower. Quite the contrary, since 1973, economics was not only in direct 
contact with the Chilean society, but it actually imprinted a deep mark in how that 
society was organized and regulated. 
Therefore, when I started this research project I was quite critical about the role of 
economists in Chile. I perceived that their influence was certainly overstretched, and 
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through it many other perspectives were moved out of the focus. At the same time, I 
perceived that many of the views presented as strictly scientific were also connected 
to social perspectives, which were not explicitly stated. Hence, the case of 
economists in Chile appeared as an example of both the tight connection between 
science and society, and also of the participation of personal elements in the 
construction of scientific knowledge. This is how the two main issues addressed by 
this thesis converged in a single research project. 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is structured in 8 chapters, which represent the multiple angles from 
which I address the main research question of this thesis: how economists in 
Chile—as a persons with interests, motivations, and commitments—shape their own 
scientific work, as part of a local and global scientific community, and as members 
of the Chilean society. The present chapter is the general introduction to this 
question, in which I have showed how my position about this question, as individual 
and researcher, has been constructed. 
The next chapter, Chapter 2, summarizes the different aspects of the research 
methodology used in this thesis. Beyond describing it, this chapter provides 
justification to the methodological decisions made along the research process 
regarding study design, recruitment of participants, and strategies of data production 
analysis. 
Chapter 3 is the first of the five manuscripts that compose the core of this thesis. In 
particular, this chapter presents a systematic historical overview of the main social 
processes that Chile has experienced in the last five decades. Through this historical 
overview, the expanse of economists’ influence becomes crystal-clear. 
On a different note, Chapter 4 contains the theoretical backbone of this thesis. In the 
first half, this chapter presents a literature review of the philosophy of science, the 
social studies of science, and the incipient psychology of science. The second half is 
devoted to elaborate the theoretical synthesis of cultural psychology and personal 
knowledge theory that structures this whole thesis: the cultural psychology of 
science. 
Chapter 5, on the other hand, provides a general perspective of the results generated 
from the empirical work conducted. Thus, it presents a comprehensive thematic 
analysis that provides a panoramic perspective of the multiple views and 
experiences expressed by the economists interviewed. It closes with the analysis of a 
single case, which shows in a concrete case how personal elements weave together 
the different aspects involved in working as an economist in Chile. 
Likewise, Chapter 6 contains an extended presentation of a case study. Through this 
analysis it is possible to observe how a participant articulates together two aspects 
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that are assumed to be contradictory for economists: an econometric and a political 
orientation. By doing so, this case shows how constructive could scientists be at the 
moment of establishing their position within the alternatives offered by the scientific 
community. 
Chapter 7 presents a very specific discussion around a topic underlying the two 
previous chapters, namely whether it is possible—and reasonable—to establish a 
strict separation between the ‘activist’ and the ‘scientific’ positions. In order to do 
so, an analysis of what exactly means these two positions is conducted. Following 
this, the usefulness of the distinction is analyzed for the particular case of 
researchers in the humanities and social sciences.  
Finally, Chapter 8 presents the main conclusions of this thesis. It is composed, first, 
by an integrative summary of Chapter 3 to 7, which is followed by the discussion of 
two potential critiques that these ideas and findings could receive. After this, the 
underlying risk of conducting critical studies of science is addressed. The final 
remarks of this thesis discuss its limitations and future directions. 
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CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY: STUDY 
DESIGN, METHODS AND FIELDWORK 
EXPERIENCES 
This chapter summarizes the methodological guidelines that guided the empirical 
implementation of this research project. It also describes and justifies the 
methodological decisions adopted in relation to the recruitment of participants, the 
strategies of data production, and the analytic framework. While most of this 
information is described in Chapters 5 and 6, here it is presented in a systematic and 
more detailed way. 
STUDY DESIGN 
The present study adopted a qualitative research methodology and an exploratory, 
descriptive design in order to address its main research question: how economists in 
Chile—as a persons with interests, motivations, and commitments—shape their own 
scientific work, as part of a local and global scientific community, and as members 
of the Chilean society.  
The election of conducting the empirical research under a qualitative methodology 
follows a central interest of the present work, namely addressing the personal 
experiences and meanings of economists in Chile. As Denzin and Lincoln (2005) 
note, qualitative research aims to “study things in their natural settings, attempting 
to make sense of, or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings [that] people 
bring” (p. 3). More specifically, qualitative research looks to understand human 
actions from the subjective perspective of the acting persons (Cook & Reichardt, 
1986), which is the exact aim of the present work. Moreover, this methodological 
approach made possible to capture the commonalities (Kleining, 1982) but also the 
diversity existing in these personal perspectives. As I further elaborate in Chapter 4, 
given the existence of a widespread portrayal of economists in Chile as ‘almighty’ 
social actors (Heredia, 2011), it was especially important for the chosen 
methodological approach to be able to explore the potential diversity of experiences 
and meanings, and thus offer an alternative to this blanket characterization. Finally, 
the results and conclusions yielded by previous studies on this topic that adopted a 
quantitative methodology (e.g., Correa-Mautz, 2014), made clear that a qualitative 
approach was required to grasp the richness of the topic. 
Moreover, most of the previous research conducted about economists in Chile has 
had a historical or sociological focus (e.g., Ossandón, 2011). Thus, there was no 
external reference that helped in orienting the study of personal perspectives and 
meanings of economists. Therefore, the exploratory and descriptive nature of 
qualitative research (Krause, 1995) was essential to progressively address the 
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guiding research question through the research process. Furthermore, the flexibility 
of the qualitative approach resulted crucial to adapt the sampling and data 
production procedures in response to new elements that emerged along the research 
process. Thus, the fact that the object of study in qualitative research is always 
preliminary (Kleining, 1982), certainly assisted in incorporating the feedback 
provided by participants to adjust methodological decisions that were based in the 
pre-assumptions of the researcher.  
Regarding the latter, it is important to include a reflection on my position as a 
researcher. As Krause (1995) notes, the main instrument of qualitative research is 
the researcher him/herself, and thus it is essential to have a self-reflective approach. 
In this sense, as a researcher, I did not consider myself as a distant observer of the 
studied phenomenon, which went to meet informants and aseptically ‘collect’ 
information that they had. On the contrary, as I made explicit in Chapter 1, I had a 
series of pre-conceptions and expectations about my participants that certainly 
shaped my initial approach to them and to this research project in general. 
Interestingly, as I kep meeting and talking with more and more economists I started 
to realize about a diversity of views and opinions that simply did not fit in my initial 
preconceptions. In this sense, I was especially surprised to find self-criticism 
regarding several practices of the discipline. Finally, as I describe in further detail in 
the Interviewing sub-section of this chapter, being a young PhD researcher elicited 
an unexpected connection for many of the participants. If anything, all these 
elements made clear that—either I looked for it or not—I was directly involved in 
the co-construction of data with the participants. 
RECRUITING INFORMANTS 
The process of recruiting participants for this study was progressive, taking different 
directions following further readings on the topic, and also following the directions 
and suggestions that participants made. Accordingly, this process was guided by two 
complementary sampling strategies were used: purposive (Luborsky & Rubinstein, 
1995) and snowball sampling (Noy, 2008). The first strategy allowed me to 
purposefully look for participants that represented different age groups, genders, and 
institutions. Given the aim for exploring the diversity of views and experiences of 
economists in Chile, this sampling approach was required to cover the different 
positions that economists might assume in Chile. The second strategy, on the other 
hand, allowed me to follow the contacts that participants constantly suggested to 
me. 
The process of contacting participants was done entirely through e-mail, which were 
personally directed to the potential participant. In these e-mails, a small description 
of the research project and the research was provided, concluding with a request to 
meet for conducting a 45 to 60 minutes interview. Two minimum criteria remained 
stable along the whole process of contacting participants: having a degree in 
economics, and being based—either for work or studies—in Chile. Using these 
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basic criteria, I started contacting young research assistants and PhD students, under 
the assumption that they would be more open for collaborating than senior 
economists. The former was in fact the case: these early participants proved to be 
crucial informants for both narrowing down the research question and to have a 
better understanding of the landscape of economics in Chile. In this sense, through 
their input—and complementary readings—I learned about the relevance of 
contacting economists not only based in universities or research centers, but also in 
government agencies and think tanks. While I initially overlooked the latter—
assuming their lack of academic focus—, I soon realized that they were essential to 
understand the circulation and social use of economic knowledge in Chile. Thus, I 
started to contact junior researchers and analysts working at these institutions. 
Through the interviews I had with them, I learned about the different positions from 
which economists work in Chile, creating very asymmetrical relations among those 
based in the institution in which they work. Finally, using the contacts provided by 
junior researchers, I was able to contact university professors and senior-level think 
tank researchers. Naturally, along this process there were many informants that 
never replied back to the initial contact, but in general the reception and openness of 
this group of participants was remarkable. More about this is detailed in the sub-
section ‘Interviewing’. 
Through this process, a total of 25 economists were interviewed for this study. 
There were 17 male and 8 female, ranging from 25 to 70 years of age, who—at the 
moment of being interviewed—worked at 4 different think tanks, 3 universities, 3 
government agencies, and 2 research centers. The case-by-case description of each 
participant is detailed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Participants’ characterization 
Participant 
Code a 
Characteristics 
Gender Age Degree Position Institution 
A Female 25-35 MSc Jr. Economic Analyst Gov. Agency 1 
B Male 25-35 PhD (S) Student University 1 
C Female 25-35 PhD (S) Student University 2 
D Male 25-35 PhD (S) Student University 2 
E Male 25-35 MSc Research Assistant Research Center 1 
F Male 25-35 MSc Research Assistant Research Center 1 
G Female 25-35 MSc Research Assistant Research Center 1 
H Male 45+ PhD Professor University 3 
I Female 25-35 MSc Researcher Think Tank 1 
J Male 25-35 MSc Researcher Think Tank 1 
K Female 25-35 MSc Researcher Think Tank 2 
L Female 35-45 PhD Professor University 3 
M Male 25-35 Hon. BSc Researcher Think Tank 3 
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N Male 25-35 MSc Research Manager Research Center 1 
O Male 45+ PhD Professor University 1 
P Male 35-45 Hon. BSc Economic Analyst Gov. Agency 2 
Q Male 35-45 Hon. BSc Economic Analyst Gov. Agency 3 
R Male 25-35 MSc Researcher Think Tank 2 
S Male 45+ PhD Professor University 1 
T Female 35-45 MSc Senior Researcher Think Tank 2 
U Male 25-35 MSc Research Assistant Research Center 2 
V Female 45+ PhD Professor University 2 
W Male 35-45 MSc Senior Researcher Think Tank 4 
X Male 45+ PhD Professor University 2 
Y Male 35-45 MSc Research Manager Think Tank 3 
a: The code assigned to each participant only lists them alphabetically following the chronological order 
in which they were interviewed, and so it has no relation to the given names of the participants. 
 
Regarding ethical considerations, as the foot of Table 1 specifies, the personal 
information of participants was anonymously handled through the research process. 
Moreover, no form of reward or compensation was offered or given following 
participation. This element is worth noting because it emphasizes the voluntary 
component of participation. 
PRODUCING DATA: INTERVIEWS AND FIELDWORK  
As noted above, as qualitative researcher I was tightly involved in the whole process 
of research. Therefore, the data used in this study was not ‘collected’ from the 
participants above described, but actually produced through the encounters I had 
with them. In this sense, while the recorded audio content of the interviews was the 
main source of information used, my experiences meeting these participants, and 
progressively getting into the world of economics in Chile, also was a relevant, 
more unspecifiable input for this study. 
INTERVIEWING  
As just noted, the main technique used for data production was interviewing the 
participants, based on a semi-structured script. This conversational technique, far 
from a procedure to ‘extract’ information that participants already have, was 
understood as an active, dynamic exchange of views and opinions on the topics 
addressed. Thus, they were conducted as ‘inter-views’ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 
2009) rather than questioning sessions guided by the interviewer. Accordingly, 
following Alvesson’s (2003) suggestions, the views and positions expressed by 
participants were consistently contrasted with opposed views expressed by other 
participants. This dialogical exercise was not intended to question the validity of 
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participants’ views, but just to serve as a prompt for promoting further elaboration. 
Regarding the issue of ‘validity’, it is important to note that, following the 
inherently constructive nature of qualitative research, the meanings and positions 
expressed by participants were not assumed to represent a single, unitary truth; thus 
making any other alternative perspective ‘false’. It was assumed that the accounts 
provided by participants were ‘true’ in the sense of being honest elaborations, 
intended to address the topics that emerged along the interviews. 
In total, 27 interviews (participant A and F were interviewed twice given their 
availability) were conducted in person by the researcher. Their length ranged from 
25 minutes to 2 hours, with a typical duration of 50 to 70 minutes. The interviews 
were primarily conducted at the workplace of the participants, with the exception of 
three interviews that took place in public places as per participants’ request. The 
opportunity to visit participants’ work environment provided me with experiences 
that certainly contributed in my understanding of the ‘world’ of economists and 
economics in Chile. In particular, these experiences gave me a physical grasp of a 
number of institutions that, based on my readings, initially seemed like abstract 
entities with a unitary character. On the contrary, the physical experience of visiting 
them made me realize how concrete and contingent they are.  
The degree of structure varied from interview to interview, following the 
particularities of each interaction, yet a semi-structured script guided all of them. 
This script was initially constructed to explore the topics that were of interest to the 
research, but was subsequently refined based on the initial interviews; mostly 
eliminating issues that simply did not make sense to participants (e.g., why not do a 
PhD in Chile). Thus, the most used version of the script was organized to address 
the following themes: studies and career path; current position and expected 
projection; past and present interest in doing economics; historical and current role 
of economists in Chile; and personal experience working as an economist. Around 
these main five themes, several impromptu questions were made by the interviewer 
depending of the order in these themes were addressed. However, certain questions 
were recurrent to initiate the conversation (“Could you tell how you got to work 
here?”) and to open topics not yet addressed (“After more than 10 years working as 
an economist, what changes do you perceive in yourself?”). These questions were 
presented in an open form in order to facilitate the elaboration of participants. 
Likewise, silence was used as a communicational resource to promote further 
elaboration and especially to avoid interrupting participants’ answers. 
Overall, the interview interactions were very fluent due to the openness of 
participants to talk in extenso about almost any topic that was brought to the 
conversation. Connected to this, they were patient and clear to explain any 
economic technical concept or methodology that I did not know at the moment of 
the interview. Likewise, as I progressively started to use more economic jargon in 
my questions and commentaries, I noted that participants reacted to this by using a 
more technical language to refer to the discipline and to the work of fellow 
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economists. Despite this, during the interviews I constantly felt as an outsider asking 
about things that, if I were an economist, should not be necessary to discuss.   
EXPERIENCES AND CHALLENGES OF DOING FIELDWORK 
The former element, in fact, is one of three experiences that I had while meeting and 
discussing with the participants. In particular, I consider these experiences as 
significant moments or perceptions that defined the way in which I conducted the 
data production process. Thus, the first of them is the experience of doing research 
about a scientific discipline to which I was—and still am—an outsider. This not 
only implied a considerable time familiarizing myself with technical terms (e.g., 
instrumental variable) and ordinary terms that were used in a very specific way 
(e.g., model), which were constantly used by participants to describe their work. It 
also involved learning about the ‘rites of passage’ that define the different career 
stages in which a researcher on economics is located (e.g., participating in the ‘job 
market’). In spite of this very marginal immersion in the world of economists, even 
at the end of the last interview I was left with the impression that I only scratched 
the surface of what is it to be an economist in Chile; how it is actually done on an 
everyday basis. This observation should not be a surprise for any ethnographer, but 
it points to the challenges of understanding life-worlds that are different from one’s 
own (Schütz, 1944). 
The second experience was a very concrete exchange during the interview with 
participant J, who is a tenure-track professor and former head of department. When I 
introduce to him my research, I mention the possibility of conducting non-
participatory observations in graduate seminars and research meetings at the 
university in which he worked. To this he immediately replied: “you cannot make 
something like that [ethnography observations in meetings or seminars], you are 
crazy if you are planning to do that, I can tell you here and now that is not going to 
work, nobody will give you access to something like that, who gave you that idea?” 
When I reply that this idea was based in a suggestion of an ethnography professor, 
he told me back: “well, maybe he suggested that to you because in the US 
economists are different, but in Chile we are pretty insular, we do not like to share 
what we do, even less to somebody from another discipline”. Even though this was 
an isolated experience, it made me realize that—without having that explicit 
intention—the interview-based approach I chose fit with the expectations of my 
participants. Should I decided to take a more ethnographic approach, the data 
production process would have been much more difficult to conduct.  
On an entirely different note, the third experience related to personal characteristics 
that I did not expect them to be significant but ended up being quite relevant for the 
interview interactions. The first of them was my age, which was pretty similar to 
most of the participants, i.e. in between 25 and 35 years. This generational aspect 
led several participants of this age group to express an unexpected closeness, which 
was made clear by the repeated use of slang and cultural references. Even though 
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this did not imply that participants suddenly addressed me as a close acquaintance, it 
led them to perceive that I could understand them better because of being of similar 
age. While this could have been the case, it became an unexpected resource to 
facilitate the interviews with participants of this age group. Similar to this, the fact 
of doing a PhD—even though it was not in economics—served as another factor 
that made participants perceive that ‘I understood what they were saying’. Far from 
hindering more clear elaborations, I noted that this element made easier for 
participants to talk about their projects of starting doctoral studies, or about their 
present or past experiences as PhDs. Once again, this experience emphasized how 
much the researcher is involved in the data production, and even more so in the case 
of conversational techniques like interviews. 
ANALYZING DATA: THEMES AND CASES 
Since the process of analyzing the verbal content of the interviews conducted is 
thoroughly described in the Methodology section of Chapter 5, in the following only 
an essential summary is presented. First and foremost, the analysis of this material 
was performed following the analytic frame proposed by Wagoner (2009). In brief, 
this framework proposes to combine aggregate and single-case qualitative 
techniques of analysis in order to generate both panoramic and granular perspectives 
of the data. Thus, this approach offered both a general perspective of the common 
aspects of the views and experiences of economists, but also the necessary detail to 
analyze in further depth those cases that presented more richness and complexity. 
For conducting the analysis at the aggregate level, the thematic analysis proposed by 
Braun and Clarke (2006) was chosen due to its flexibility and clearly established 8-
step process. Therefore, the interview material was first transcribed using the 
software ELAN (version 4.9.4) and then content-coded and analyzed with the 
software nVivo for Mac (version 11). After this, an initial set of codes was created in 
order to start to detect common themes across the data set. Once these initial codes 
were created, tentative themes were organized and tested against the data. After this 
step, three major themes were defined and named: role of economists in Chile; 
defining economics; and economics as a personal activity. The results generated 
from this thematic analysis are presented in detail in the section Results of Chapter 
5. 
The single-case analysis was performed through two case studies performed along 
the guidelines of Harrison, Birks, Franklin and Mills (2017), and also drawing 
inspiration from the idiographic approached proposed by Salvatore & Valsiner 
(2010). The in-depth analysis of these two cases, participants K and F, varied in 
orientation. While the former was more brief and oriented to show how this 
participant interwove the different themes of the thematic analysis in a very 
particular fashion, the latter included a complete case analysis of participant F, 
addressing more biographical elements, and placing special emphasis in the unique, 
multi-faceted way in which he constructed his position as an economist in Chile. 
The results of these two case studies conducted are presented in Chapter 5 and 6.  
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LOOKING FOR HAPPINESS, FINDING ECONOMIC GROWTH:  
THE CHILEAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
David Carré 
 
On September 5th 1988, after 15 years of military dictatorship, Chileans saw on their 
TVs a message full of hope: “Chile, happiness is coming”. This claim—presented as 
a lively jingle1—was the core message delivered by the campaign for the ‘NO’ 
option in the referendum to be held a month later. This referendum, the first election 
since March 1973 to have pre-established voter registration lists and international 
observers, asked Chilean to choose between two alternatives: ‘SI’, yes in Spanish, 
for extending the civic-military regime led by Augusto Pinochet 10 more years until 
1997; or ‘NO’ calling for free presidential and legislative elections on 1989, and 
thus ending the dictatorship. In spite of the confidence of the regime in a landslide 
victory and the unclear consequences for the people campaigning against it 
(Valenzuela & Constable, 1988), more than seven million people cast their ballots 
on October 5th. The result was a resounding 56% of support for the ‘NO’ option. 
Apparently the idea of reaching a long-overdue happiness moved Chileans to bet 
against all odds and oppose the dictatorship in the polls. Not long afterwards, on 
March 11th 1990, another historical moment was broadcasted on national TV: 
Pinochet himself handed the O’Higgins badge—symbol of the presidential office—
over to Patricio Aylwin, the center-left candidate who won the free elections of 
1989, in the newly built National Congress. This epic story, portrayed by the 2012 
film No (Larraín & Larraín, 2012), appears both as the downfall of a cruel 
dictatorial regime and the emergence of an all-new democratic era. An era that 
brought stable democracy, reduced poverty from 38,6% to 11,7% (Ministerio de 
Desarrollo Social, 2016), increased the size of the economy by four times (from 
$4,407 to $22,316, as GDP per capita, PPP) (World Bank, 2016), and made the 
country a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in 2009. That is the story of how Chile moved from its most recent 
dictatorship to the current democracy; at least according to its political, economic, 
and technocratic elite (e.g., Boeninger, 1997). 
Yet 20 years after those events, the most likely scene to find in the streets of 
Santiago de Chile, especially on a Thursday morning, is a demonstration of over 
100,000 high-school and college students chanting: and it’s going to fall / and it’s 
going to fall / the educational system of Pinochet. Far from an isolated phenomenon, 
the malaise voiced by students’ organizations was endorsed by most of the 
																																																								
1 The main campaign video is available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H3Jph-
eMjX8, the translation of the lyrics is available in Appendix 1. 
TOWARDS A CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
	 22 
citizenry2 and escalated dramatically: what started as calls for banning profit on 
higher education institutions turned into demands for reverting most of the ‘social 
reforms’ (Gárate, 2012, p. 262ff) implemented by the dictatorial regime. These 
reforms ‘modernized’ four key social areas—pensions, healthcare, education, and 
labor relations—by liberalizing the first three into for-profit markets and minimizing 
any influence of trade unions. This so-called modernization, however, has created 
average pensions under the minimum wage, i.e. less than US$300 per month 
(Superintendencia de Pensiones, 2016); public hospitals with a US$240 million 
operational deficit (Alarcón, 2016); an educational system in which performance is 
mostly explained by family income and social differences (OECD, 2014); as well as 
a median wage under US$500 per month (Durán & Kremerman, 20153). These 
figures, typically overshadowed by the stunning macro-economic indicators 
mentioned above, provide hints about the less than bright side of the country’s 
recent success.  
To the external observer, who is probably aware of Chile’s sustained economic 
growth, the scenario described above should be puzzling. In fact, for many internal 
observers—mostly elite members—this was puzzling too (Mayol, 2016). Thus 
several questions were raised in the wake of the 2011 grassroots movements: how is 
it possible that in such (macro-economically) successful country there are massive, 
widely supported demonstrations? Moreover, why do Chileans still protest against 
Pinochet’s educational system and his reforms if the center-left coalition that 
defeated him in the 1988 referendum led the government uninterruptedly until 
2010? Does this whole movement imply that, after more than 20 years of 
democratic rule, ordinary people perceive that things are no different from the times 
of dictatorship? But, is this idea even conceivable? In fact, the very notion that 
democratic rule is similar to a form of dictatorship is something that not only defies 
the ‘official’ narrative about Chilean transition to democracy (e.g., Moreno Brid & 
Hernández, 2004), but also seems to go against conventional wisdom and ordinary 
experience. On the other hand, it also seems naïve to assume that the whole legacy 
of a dictatorial regime would be gone just by handing office to a democratically 
elected government.  
To see through this apparent contradiction, the ideas developed by Moghaddam (this 
volume; see also 2013) appear as a helpful approach. Even though his case studies 
mainly involve revolutions that succeeded in toppling dictators but failed in 
establishing long-lasting democracies (e.g. Iran in 1979, most of Arab spring 
countries), I argue that his ideas remain valuable to understand progressive 
																																																								
2 According to national opinion surveys (ADIMARK GfK, 2011, 2012, 2015), by December 
2011 there was a 70% of support to the demands raised by the social movement for education. 
Remarkably, this support, which peaked at 79% on September 2011, remains above 70% by 
June 2015. 
3 These authors also discuss on the implications of such low wages; in particular they connect 
it to the shocking figures about debtors in Chile: while the workforce is composed by 
approximately 8 million people, the total number of debtors is 11 million people—of which 4 
million are defaulters. 
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processes of transition from dictatorship to democracy, like the ones that took place 
in Latin America during the 1980’s. More specifically, in this chapter I aim to show 
how the ideas developed by Moghaddam offer an insightful perspective on the 
Chilean transition and the 2011 grassroots movements. To do so the present chapter 
is organized as follows. First, a summary of the Moghaddam’s ideas on democracy 
and dictatorship is presented. Afterwards, I develop a summarized historical account 
of Chile between 1965 and 2015 to provide sufficient context for a proper 
understanding of the post-1990 transition process. Following this, I discuss in which 
ways Moghaddam’s social-psychological view sheds light on why a peaceful, 
economically-successful transition to democracy like the Chilean one has produced 
the current levels of social discontent. Finally, I conclude this chapter with remarks 
on the implications of Moghaddam’s ideas for further understanding, and potentially 
addressing this malaise. 
MOGHADDAM ON DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: BEYOND 
INSTITUTIONAL LABELS 
At the beginning of his The Psychology of Dictatorship, Fathali M. Moghaddam 
(2013) declares his reason for addressing such a contentious topic: the major gap he 
observes between academic accounts on dictatorship and his first-hand experience 
living under a dictatorial rule. In particular, he criticizes the excessive emphasis 
given by scholars to ideological elements. In brief, he is skeptic about the idea that 
ordinary people do not resist dictatorships because they submit to the master 
narrative of the regime, and so they lack any empowering ideologies that support 
them in breaking their oppression. Against this position, Moghaddam holds the view 
that citizens are both aware and skeptical about the ideological principles that 
dictatorial regimes allegedly champion; yet people must submit in order to avoid the 
regime’s surveillance and violence against those that stand out. For him, however, 
ideology in dictatorship plays a different role: it becomes the common narrative 
unifying and justifying the ruling elite and its oppressive actions.  
Moghaddam’s critique (2013), it could be argued, is one that puts into question the 
assumed macro-social character of dictatorship. Certainly not by denying this 
character, but rather by complementing it with a perspective that is sensitive to 
individual and psychological aspects. As seen above, major social trends, like 
ideologies, are crucial to understand the functioning of dictatorial regimes—e.g., 
communism in China—; but these collective trends cannot be assumed to plainly 
control every individual living under the rule of a regime. This social-psychological 
perspective on dictatorship is echoed by his approach to democracy (Moghaddam, 
this volume), which revolves around two ideas: the macro-micro rule of change and 
the democratic citizen. The basis of the former idea is a continuum running between 
pure dictatorship and pure democracy as, for Moghaddam, democracy and 
dictatorship are not separate, distinct categories but rather orientations towards 
which a given society gravitates at a certain moment. Alongside the direction in 
which social change happens is the level, or order, at which societal change occurs. 
In this sense, while first-order social change—viz. fashion, customs—does not 
TOWARDS A CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
	 24 
really alter the governance system, second-order change does affect the formal 
social system, for instance by introducing changes in the law. These macro-social 
changes, however, do not necessarily lead to an immediate transformation of 
people’s values, attitudes, or social relationships—i.e. third-order change. That 
difference is the key to Moghaddam’s micro-macro rule of change: whereas first- 
and second-order change can take place overnight, third-order change takes 
considerably longer. In concrete terms this means that macro-institutional changes 
might happen quite fast, but people’s ordinary behavior and thought change at a 
much slower pace—and not necessarily in line with the former.  
Taken together, the dictatorship-democracy continuum and the macro-micro rule of 
change provide an analytical perspective that goes beyond broad institutional labels. 
The former idea, on the one hand, shows that it is actual governance what 
determines whether a certain government leans towards a dictatorial or a democratic 
rule, regardless of the voting system by which it got in office. This pragmatic view, 
as it will be shown later, is crucial to bring the shortcomings of electorally flawless 
democracies to the fore. Through the macro-micro rule of change, on the other hand, 
Moghaddam (this volume) looks at democracy from the perspective and experiences 
of the individuals daily involved in it. Although he does not dismiss the importance 
of leaders and institutions, as he makes explicitly clear (see this volume, pp. 9-10), 
he is somehow returning to the root of democracy: the demos, or common people. 
Remarkably, he does not just state this relevance but he proposes a set of 
psychological characteristics that he considers crucial for citizens “capable of 
supporting, and participating in, a democracy” (p. 11) beyond electoral processes. 
Specifically, these characteristics are ten: self doubt; questioning sacred beliefs; 
revising opinions in light of evidence; seeking to understand those who are different 
from us; learning from those who are different; seeking information and opinions 
from different sources; openness to new experiences; creating new experiences for 
others; principles of right and wrong; actively seeking experiences of higher value4.  
As seen thus far, Moghaddam’s ideas on democracy and dictatorship offer a novel, 
social-psychological perspective on these topics, which are typically addressed as 
macro-social and institutional. Yet to properly ponder how these ideas contribute in 
analyzing the Chilean transition from dictatorship to democracy, it is necessary to 
provide at least a rough historical summary of this process. Thereby, in the 
following I present a brief account of the 1965-2015 period, starting with the events 
that led to the military coup of 1973 and ending with the post-2011 social and 
political scenario. The main sources informing this account come from different 
disciplines—history (Gárate, 2012; Silva, 2010), political science (Huneeus, 2014), 
																																																								
4 This set of characteristics could be respectively translated to 10 statements (see p. 11, Figure 
2): “I could be wrong”; “I must critically question everything, including the sacred beliefs of 
my society”; “I must revise my opinion as the evidence requires”; “I must seek to better 
understand those who are different from me”; “I can learn from those who are different from 
me”; “I must seek information and opinions from as many sources as possible”; “I should be 
actively open to new experiences”; “I should be open to creating new experiences for others”; 
“There are principles of right and wrong”; “Not all experiences are of equal value”.  
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economics (Ffrench-Davis, 2014), and sociology (Undurraga, 2014)—in an effort to 
provide a perspective that reflects the multiple ways in which Chile has changed. In 
spite of this, it should be noted that, as any reconstruction of historical events—
especially recent ones—, this account portrays my personal view of them. As an 
eyewitness of the second half of this period it is pointless to pretend that I am an 
impartial observer. The selection of sources, however, aims to compensate the latter 
by including, for example, critical (e.g. Gárate, 2012) and supportive (e.g. Silva, 
2010) views on the political conduction of the country after 1990. Likewise, while 
Huneeus (2014) is critical about the economic policies of the same period, Ffrench-
Davis (2014) argues in favor of them. All in all, by contrasting different disciplines 
and positions I hope to present a brief but accurate picture of Chile’s recent history.  
DEMOCRACY BACK AND FORTH: CHILE FROM 1965 TO 2015 
The changes experienced by Chile in the last 50 years are deep and thorough, as it is 
the case for many developing countries in the world. In terms of demographics, the 
figures are awe-striking: it doubled its population, from 8,6 from 17,6 million 
people (World Bank, 2016); the average income (as GDP per capita in current US$) 
increased from $547 to $13,383 (World Bank, 2016); literacy rate moved from 84 to 
96 percent (Rosen & Ortiz-Ospina, 2016); attainment rates for upper secondary 
education rose from 38% to 77% (OECD, 2014); and so forth in many areas. Yet all 
this progress did not happen in the vacuum, as a result of a continuous, steady social 
process. On the contrary, these figures are the abstract representation of a period full 
of tensions and transformations, which have brought advances as well as setbacks. 
In order to make the presentation of those events more clear, this half-century period 
is sub-divided in four moments: before, during, and after the 1973-1990 dictatorial 
regime, and the current, post-2011 scenario. 
CHILE LOOKING FOR ‘REVOLUTIONS’: 1965-1973 
Choosing 1965 as the outset of the process that ended Chilean democracy in 1973 is 
no coincidence5. At the time, 5 years before the inauguration of Salvador Allende’s 
																																																								
5 As the middle of the sixties is a relevant date to understand the status of the global scenario 
in which Chile was striving for change. Recently after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Cold War 
was at its height, and despite being far away from the centers of power, South America was 
not away from the conflict at all. Particularly after the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the US 
government perceived the threat that more Latin American and Caribbean countries could 
turn towards communism. This led to the US security and intelligence agencies to increase 
their counter-insurgency efforts through extensive training programs directed to Latin 
American military personnel. This training, mostly conducted in the School of Americas 
between 1963 and 1984 (Pineo, 2014), introduced military men from southern countries into 
the National Security Doctrine (Pion-Berlin, 1989), which set the agenda on subjects like 
state, national security, and strategy for most of the future military regimes in the region. In 
parallel to this, the CIA engaged in extensive covert operations in Chile between 1963 and 
1973—as thoroughly detailed by the ‘Church report’ (1975). Notorious among these activities 
were the payment of ‘assets’ like Agustín Edwards Eastman—owner of the national biggest 
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Popular Unity government, the country was already living a “revolution in freedom” 
(see Juventud Democrata Cristiana, 1965). The term was coined by the president in 
office, Eduardo Frei Montalva, to declare his commitment in conducting deep social 
reforms without conceding to communist influence—at the time portrayed by 
Allende. Despite representing the political center, Frei Montalva implemented many 
progressive reforms during his government (Silva, 2010). Notoriously among them 
were the agrarian reform, which replaced the colonial land-ownership system 
(latifundio) and redistributed the farmlands among minor farmers; the 
‘chilenization’ of the copper, i.e. the first step to nationalize the vast copper 
resources extracted by foreign companies; and the ‘popular promotion’, an initiative 
that supported the creation of thousands of community organizations (e.g., sports 
clubs, community centers) to canalize the increasing demands of participation from 
the citizenry (Huneeus, 2014). All these initiatives produced uncertainty to the local 
oligarchy, a conservative elite used to own the land and run the political affairs of 
the country at will (Salazar, 2005), and also to global powers that perceived a fertile 
ground for a communist turn in the country. In fact, these progressive 
transformations fell short of the impossibly high expectations created by the Frei 
Montalva administration despite addressing long overdue needs from lower- and 
middle-income classes (Huneeus, 2014); a situation that paved the way for a more 
popular-oriented alternative. In sum, beyond political affiliations, Chile was already 
transforming at an accelerated pace before Allende initiated his ‘Chilean way to 
socialism’. 
In this context of change and popular discontent, Salvador Allende secured in 1970 
a slim majority by obtaining a 36,6% of the votes against a 35,2% of his closest 
competitor. After being ratified by the congress, following all constitutional 
procedures, Allende started a 1000-day long government that accelerated and 
deepened the reforms initiated by his predecessor. In his words this was “a 
revolution with empanada and red wine6”. To do so, Allende’s government fully 
nationalized several industries—commercial banks and copper mining, among 
others—, fixed the prices of basic goods, and increased real wages up to 55% 
(Ffrench-Davis, 2014). As noted by Silva (2010), however, Allende conducted these 
transformations in a very tight schedule and without a technically qualified team for 
such an enterprise. This added to the resistance from many land- and factory-owners 
and destabilized the economy of the country completely. The unprecedented 606% 
inflation rate on 1973  (Braun, Braun, Briones, Díaz, Lüders, & Wagner, 2000) is a 
																																																																																																																																		
newspaper—, and the many ways in which Allende’s ascension to power was hindered—like 
the permanent funding of opposing organizations and politicians, or the successful plot for 
killing loyal general René Schneider (see Gustafson, 2003). In the big picture, however, all 
these interventions acted as a catalyzer of internal affairs rather than its origin. Therefore, 
while undeniable, the weight of the influence exerted by the U.S. government in Chile during 
this period is much more difficult to be properly assessed. 
6 This expression makes use of two typical foods, empanadas and red wine, in order to stress 
that the experience of socialism in Chile will follow its own traditions—respect to the 
constitution, in particular—rather than the armed revolutions through which it got into power 
in other countries. 
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case in point of such structural imbalance7, which had a direct impact on day-to-day 
life through constant food rationing, shortages of basic products, and strikes. At the 
same time, political fractures led Allende’s government to be increasingly isolated 
from the political center and center-left that initially supported him, which reduced 
its governability to the point of being declared as unconstitutional by the parliament 
in August of 1973.  Maybe unbeknownst to the members of the parliament on that 
session, this declaration provided the constitutional legitimacy for the military to 
throw its long-planned coup d’état (Briones & Bosselin, 2013). 
THE DICTATORIAL ‘FREEDOM’ OF THE MILITARY REGIME: 1973-1990 
The image of La Moneda palace burning on the morning of September 11th 1973, 
after being air-bombarded by the Chilean Air Force, foreshadowed in many ways 
the next 17 years of the country. The most obvious one is the role of the military, 
which abandoned their subordination to the civil authorities and assumed the total 
control of the government through a junta composed by the heads of its four 
branches: general Pinochet (Army, and chief of the junta), admiral Merino (Navy), 
air general Leigh (Air Force), and general Mendoza (Carabineros, or civil police). 
That tragic scene also portrayed the brutality in which any form of opposition was 
going to be dealt with, something that the human rights violations committed by 
agents of the state to more than 27,000 Chileans between 1973 and 1990 sadly 
proves (see Comision Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura, 2005). Finally, 
causing the house of the government to go up in flames somehow symbolized the 
deep blow that the regime would inflict on the Chilean state and its hitherto crucial 
role in the society—ending for good the attempts for reaching a welfare state 
initiated in the 1930’s (Gárate, 2012). 
As widely known, under the 1973-1990 dictatorial regime Chile experienced a 
dramatic social and economic transformation towards an extremely liberal form of 
capitalism, to the point of being labeled as “a laboratory for experiments in political 
economy.” (Garcia & Wells, 1983, p. 287) These overarching transformations, 
however, were not devised by the military junta itself8 but by a group of high-level 
advisors to the regime, loosely denominated as Chicago Boys (see Valdés, 1995). 
This label encompasses a number of Chilean economists who completed doctoral 
																																																								
7  However, as Ffrench-Davis’ data reveals (2014), during the 1970-1973 period and 
especially during 1971 the national GDP grew as close as ever to its potential GDP. This 
means that the country got almost the best possible performance out of its maximum 
economic capabilities (for more detail on this methodology, see Ffrench-Davis, 2014, 
Appendix). 
8 In fact, Gárate (2012) and Vergara (1984) propose that the regime did not have a master 
plan for the country besides ousting Allende and removing communist ‘threats’. The first 
form of these plans came as a harsh report made by a number of the Chicago economists on 
the national economic policy. This report, known as ‘the brick’—in Spanish, El Ladrillo 
(Centro de Estudios Públicos, 1975/1992)—, contained detailed suggestions on how to tackle 
the ‘problematic’ areas in order to reduce the inflation and make the economy thrive again. 
These suggestions soon turned into the initial lines of economic action of the regime. 
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studies at the University of Chicago under the intellectual influence of Milton 
Friedman, Arnold Harberger, and the Chicago School of Economics. Thus they 
became strong supporters of applying orthodox monetarism and free-market 
capitalism to every aspect of the social life, i.e. a neoliberal ‘economicism’ (Garber, 
2014). Therefore, they stood in stark opposition to the ECLAC9 developmentalist 
model (see Bresser-Pereira, 2011)—dominant in Chile since the 1930’s—which 
considered the state as a main economic actor, responsible for fostering key areas 
for the national development. Some members of the Chicago group—notoriously 
Sergio de Castro, Miguel Kast, and Hernán Büchi—secured relevant positions along 
the military regime, which added to the strong support of key members of the junta 
since 197510 allowed them to implement no-holds-barred economic transformations. 
Thereby, a shock therapy (Ffrench-Davis, 2014; see also Sachs, 1994) based on 
shrinking the state, liberalizing the financial market, indiscriminately looking for 
international capitals, and privatizing state-owned companies, was applied in order 
to transform the structure of the national economy. This “capitalist revolution” 
(Gárate, 2012) of the economy was also extended to social areas like pensions, 
healthcare, education, and utilities—as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. 
Thus all these areas experienced the same process: a withdrawing of the state, a 
process of privatization11, and then letting private, for-profit initiatives operate them 
in competitive markets. Thereby what used to be state-provided social rights were 
transformed into commercial services provided by competing private companies. By 
so doing, the principle for allocating these resources shifted from beneficiaries’ 
needs to their payment capacity (Atria, 2016). In this new scenario, the state 
assumed a subsidiary role by covering only those areas in which private companies 
would not be attracted to compete—for instance, providing healthcare or pensions to 
those with limited or no resources to spend.  
Until 1982 economic and social reforms following the former spirit were conducted 
with strict rigor. Ironically, the doctrinaire rigor on deregulating both foreign capital 
inflow and national financial institutions created an exchange rate imbalance that 
triggered the worst economic crisis experienced by the country since the Great 
Depression (Ffrench-Davis, 2014). Even though this major collapse of the economy 
																																																								
9 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, dependent from the United 
Nations.  
10 Vergara (1984) describes in detail the micro-political intrigues by which the Chicago Boys 
view, supported by Pinochet and Merino, managed to overcome the traditional pro-state 
orientation of the military. Furthermore, Gárate (2012, p. 195) proposes that the alignment of 
the junta with the neoliberal proposal did not come out of rational deliberation but due to its 
technical and scientific presentation, which would present the regime as apart from ideologies 
and politics. 
11 It is necessary to mention that, as Gárate (2012, p. 314) notes, most of these privatizations 
were done at impossibly low prices and on companies that operated within strict regulations, 
provided good-quality services, and were profitable. Moreover, as Huneeus (2014) reveals, 
most of the new, private owners of these companies were people close to the regime that in 
most cases used privileged information to secure the operation. Hence, despite a liberal 
façade, these privatizations hide very questionable elements. 
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drove the regime to apply pragmatic measures to alleviate the crisis—e.g. rescuing 
the insolvent banking industry—, it did not make the regime change the core of the 
neoliberal political economy that Chicago technocrats and now also the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund) advised. Thus a harsh, multi-year structural 
adjustment program was set in motion to renegotiate the external debt. Here it is 
worth mentioning the question made by Meller (in Gárate, 2012, p. 305) about the 
handling of this crisis: Can a democratic government create an structural adjustment 
program that keeps the unemployment rate above 24% for four years, that reduces 
real wages by 20% and keeps them depressed for five years, and that shrinks social 
expenditure per capita in 10% for 6 years? As Gárate (2012) remarks, this is likely 
impossible in any democratic context12, and so it should be a reminder of the 
authoritarian context in which these economic and social policies were 
implemented. Moreover, in an ironic turn of events, the adamant handling of this 
crisis would become the first step towards the fall of the regime. 
According to Ledesma De Lapeyra data (1998, p. 289), the already massive crisis 
had a disproportionately negative effect on lower- and middle-income classes. Not 
surprisingly, this was the breaking point for students, unionized workers, and 
shantytown residents to begin in 1983 the national protest days (jornadas de 
protesta nacional), a series of eleven massive protests that lasted until 1986 and 
called for ending the dictatorship (Schneider, 1995). Even though the immediate 
reaction of the regime to these protests was murderous repression, it opened a 
unique opportunity for the diminished political opposition to assemble and start 
negotiations with the regime. These negotiations were harshly criticized by popular, 
grassroots movements for validating the status of the regime, but they ultimately 
secured the commitment of the regime in conducting the 1988 referendum with 
more transparency—i.e. the presence of international observers and having pre-
established voter registration lists (Huneeus, 2014). Notwithstanding this tension, 
the referendum upset—described at the beginning of the chapter—is, for Huneeus 
(2014), explained precisely by the combination of the strong political involvement 
of the citizenry in the protest movement, and the cohesion of politicians of all colors 
against Pinochet—rather than a lively, one-month long TV campaign offering 
happiness, as conventional wisdom proposes.  
After the regime conceded defeat on the evening of the referendum day, the fate of 
the most recent dictatorship in Chile was sealed. Yet, during its two remaining 
years, the regime did not stay passive in the least. Working on the assumption that 
its candidate for the 1989 presidential election 13  would be defeated by the 
																																																								
12 As observed by the editors, this scenario resembles policies implemented by the current 
Brazilian temporary government lead by Michel Temer, which have frozen social expenditure 
for the next 20 years (Phillips, 2016) despite criticisms even from the UN (Watts, 2016). The 
questionable ways in which Temer’s government ousted former president Dilma Rousseff 
makes Meller’s question also relevant for the current situation in Brazil. 
13 The presidential candidate was no other than Hernán Büchi, a second-generation Chicago 
Boy who was Head of the Treasury since 1985 and redoubled the liberal policies after the 
crisis. 
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opposition—as it happened—, a total of 226 ‘blocking laws’ (leyes de amarre) were 
passed to hamper any real modification to the economic and social reforms 
(Huneeus, 2000). Moreover, after two years of expansive social expenditure—which 
left an impression of economic success, despite all the overall appalling figures 
(Ffrench-Davis, 2014)—, the upcoming government was left with a budget deficit of 
US$300 millions. Hence, even if the democratic rule was reestablished in March 
1990, the power of the dictatorial regime cast a long shadow into the public life for 
the next decade. Surprisingly, the influence of its social and economic reforms 
would last much longer than the power of the military. 
DEMOCRACY POST-PINOCHET, THE CONCERTACIÓN YEARS: 1990-
2011 
To fully understand the developments of the Chilean democracy after Pinochet it is 
necessary to understand first the political elite that governed the country during the 
1990-2010 period: the Concertación (Huneeus, 2014). The Concertación de 
Partidos por la Democracia (Coalition of Political Parties for Democracy) was the 
coalition where all the political groups that opposed the dictatorial regime, except 
for the Communist Party, converged. I emphasize political since the Concertación 
grew increasingly distant from grassroots movements (Undurraga, 2014), especially 
unions, even though they played a crucial role in ending the dictatorial regime. 
Nevertheless, the Concertación was the most successful coalition in electoral terms 
in Chilean history: it not only defeated Pinochet’s regime in the voting polls but also 
won four consecutive presidential elections and had a slight majority in both 
Congress chambers for 20 years. Likewise, its success in macro-economic terms, as 
detailed at the beginning of this chapter, is unparalleled in Chilean history. While 
the latter contributed to achieve major goals (e.g., notoriously reducing the poverty 
rate), the overarching political doctrine of the Concertación and its social impact is 
much more debatable—as the figures in the second paragraph of this chapter reveal. 
In brief, it is possible to observe across the 20 years of Concertación governments a 
major gap between an accelerated economic growth and a slow, unequal human 
development. A phenomenon denominated by the UNDP14 local branch as “the 
paradoxes of modernization [in Chile]” (1998). The origins of this asymmetry are to 
be found in the first years of the 1990’s.  
When Patricio Aylwin, the first president of the Concertación, was sworn in office 
on March 1990 he received a divided country with opposed expectations from 
different social groups. Particularly contradictory were the opinions around the 
socio-economic reforms implemented during the dictatorship (Huneeus, 2014). On 
the one hand, businessmen and right-wing politicians devoted heart and soul to 
defend—what they considered—the regime’s great legacy of modernization, 
foretelling the return of the times of Allende—i.e. lines for groceries, inflation, 
etc.—if anything was changed. On the other hand, the Concertación was divided 
between a minor group who considered necessary to repel most of these policies, 
																																																								
14 United Nations Development Programme. 
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especially privatizations; and a majority group of politicians and technocrats who 
preferred a policy of ‘pragmatic continuity’ in order to present the Concertación as a 
wise governing coalition, capable of keeping the economy growing before 
addressing social inequalities. Here Aylwin followed the ‘pragmatic’ line advocated 
by his Head of Treasury, Alejandro Foxley, and his technocratic team of 
economists, introducing only minor adjustments to the works of the Chicago team. 
This so-called pragmatic approach seems puzzling and raises the question (Gárate, 
2012) why the Concertación embraced the regime’s policies as part of their own 
political project—despite its regressive social impact and authoritarian origin. 
The former choice, far from a contradiction, lies in the roots of the Concertación’s 
economic team: the CIEPLAN15 ‘monks’ led by Alejandro Foxley (Silva, 2010). 
During the 80’s, in the midst of harsh political repression, the think-tank CIEPLAN 
became the only safe space for criticizing the Chicago Boys’ policies given its 
sophisticated use of the same technical language and methodologies with which the 
Chicago grouped worked (Gárate, 2012). After the 1982 crisis and the subsequent 
social unrest, the economists from CIEPLAN moderated its harsh criticism and 
focused in proposing incremental modifications to the existing neoliberal policies to 
alleviate their evident social costs for lower- and middle-income classes—and thus 
keep the social order (Huneeus, 2014). Thereby, any reform oriented to change the 
income distribution (e.g., eliminate taxation loopholes for top income, regulation on 
wages negotiation), or promote an industrial policy, was thereafter disregarded. 
These elements are the gist of the ‘growing with equality’ (crecer con igualdad) 
doctrine (Ffrench-Davis, 2014) implemented—only with minor differences—along 
the four Concertación governments. Therefore, by the time of elaborating the first 
Concertación’s governmental program in 198916, none of the technical members 
behind it was looking to transform the core of the economy as the regime 
established it—contrary to the high expectations created in the people by political 
leaders. Moreover, the four presidents of the Concertación never tried to change this 
orientation, thus leaving the conduction of the Treasury (Ministerio de Hacienda) to 
different teams of technocrats and technopols (see Silva, 2010 for a review). It is 
important to note that in Chile the Treasury has full control over the Budget Office, 
which in practice gives the Treasury—and its Head—an influence way beyond its 
areas of decision (Silva, 2010). Therefore, both the national economy and the 
allocation of state-resources became a ‘reserved domain’ (Huneeus, 2014) that could 
only be discussed in the technical jargon of expert economists. This major influence 
of economic technocrats, as Silva (2010) proposes, helped in establishing a buffer 
that kept economic policy stable beyond political turbulences. On the other hand, as 
																																																								
15 Corporación de Estudios para Latinoamérica (Corporation of Studies for Latin America). 
16 Here is important to note two major changes in the global scenario at the time. First, 
international creditors as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had 
started in the 80’s to set many of the regime’s neoliberal policies as ‘suggested reforms’ for 
giving loans to developing countries—the so-called Washington Consensus. Secondly, the 
progressive collapse of the Soviet Union made a great impact in those who opposed liberal 
capitalism as it left them without any viable alternative. These two elements made incredibly 
difficult to hold a fully critical stance on the transformations made by the Chicago Boys. 
TOWARDS A CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
	 32 
Gárate (2012) argues, by ‘leaving the economy to the experts’ a major part of the 
governmental decisions were controlled by a little number of unelected technocrats, 
excluding the citizenry from any participation beyond voting for those who will 
appoint the experts. As it will be shown in the closing of this chapter, both Silva’s 
and Gárate’s positions are relevant for understanding how Chile consolidated its 
democracy—and also the current citizen discontent. 
Following Aylwin’s government, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle came into office for a 6-
years period after a swift victory in the polls. During his term, new and younger 
technocrats—the so-called Frei Boys—had a relevant role in a government defined 
by the goal of modernizing both the state apparatus and the economy even more. 
Despite the recessive effect of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the sudden arrest 
of Pinochet in London in 199817, Frei’s agenda did not change much from what was 
described in the previous paragraph: as the GDP grew above 5% in average, his 
government increased the social expenditure in healthcare and education, and also 
started an extensive program of private concessions for public infrastructure 
(Ffrench-Davis, 2014). Not surprisingly, Frei’s successor was his minister of 
Infrastructure, Ricardo Lagos. Lagos, the first socialist to assume the presidential 
office since Allende, did not differ much from his two predecessors despite its 
political affiliation and the ups and downs of the economy. Even if during his 
government technocratic teams of economists lost certain relevance to political 
advisors (Silva, 2010)—mostly lawyers—, the third government of the 
Concertación ended up deepening the private concessions policy, including the 
banks as creditors for higher education students (CAE), and subscribing free-trade 
agreements with the U.S., the E.U., and China. 
The fourth and last government of the Concertación, however, was different in 
many areas. First, it was led by Michelle Bachelet, the first woman in history to 
assume the presidential office. Also, she voiced the UNDP (2004) critique towards a 
national elite, composed by politicians and technocrats alike, concentrating the 
power and blocking any form of participatory democracy. Thereby her government 
aimed to have a ‘citizen orientation’, in which technocrats, politicians and citizens 
could discuss together about the country (Silva, 2010). Despite her intent and the 
inclusion of more ‘citizen-oriented’ technocrats—mostly from the think-tank 
Expansiva—, her Head of Treasury, Andrés Velasco, had the typical influence over 
the whole government, deciding where to allocate state resources without any 
popular input. Deepening the irony on his participatory effort, Bachelet’s 
government faced the first major movement of protests since the return of the 
democracy, as in 2006 tens of thousands of high-school students demanded more 
funding for public education. On the other hand, her government implemented a 
dramatic increase of social expenditure—supported in all-time high prices of 
copper—aimed to alleviate the social consequences of the 2008 financial crisis. 
																																																								
17 This event—maybe surprisingly—did not have major political consequences despite its 
symbolic relevance. Although it made crystal-clear that the military was no longer a force that 
could destabilize—not to stay overtake—democracy again. 
CHAPTER 3. LOOKING FOR HAPPINESS, FINDING ECONOMIC GROWTH 
	 33 
Interestingly, this policy partially bended the Concertación doctrine of keeping 
macro-economical balances above social welfare at any cost. Not surprisingly, it 
also helped Bachelet reach an unprecedented popularity (84% of approval) that 
foreshadowed how deeply the people expected further involvement from the state. 
Paradoxically, in 2009 the country elected the center-right candidate, Sebastián 
Piñera, a renowned businessman that promised taking technocracy and economic 
growth to the next level of efficiency. However, after only one year in office, 
Piñera’s administration had to face the massive series of protests for education 
described at the beginning of this chapter, which thenceforth took over the national 
agenda and cornered the government. 
Looking for a participatory democracy: Chile post-2011 
At this point, now with a deeper understanding of the socio-historical process lived 
by Chile in the last 50 year, the sudden and deep expression of social discontent in 
2011 should be less puzzling than it was at the beginning of this chapter. In the 60’s 
and 70’s Chile used to be a poor, mostly rural country that struggled with inflation; 
but had an increasingly growing state that managed to provide social services—
healthcare, education, pensions, etc.—in an egalitarian way. Since the 80’s the 
country became increasingly rich in macro-economic terms, but social services were 
turned into products to be traded within competitive, for-profit markets. This change 
improved and expanded these services, but it was an improvement that only those 
wealthy enough to afford them—or willing to become debtors—could benefit from. 
Even if after the 90’s the country entered the ‘high income’ category (World Bank, 
2016) and there were consistent efforts for expanding state support, the access to 
proper social services is still determined by income (see Cotlear et al., 2015; Santos 
& Elacqua, 2016; Vargas, 2006). In the country with the most unequal income 
within the OECD (2016), the former scenario has left most of the population out of 
both economic growth and human development. If this tension broke out through 
higher education, it is mostly because this has left thousands of young Chileans with 
massive student loans and poor education (see Guzmán, González, Figueroa & 
Riquelme, 2014). 
The former helps in understanding the deep roots of the social malaise that has 
dominated the country since 2011, yet not its ‘sudden’ appearance. This sudden 
character appears as such given how isolated the political establishment grew from 
ordinary citizens during the governments of the Concertación. With less than 5% of 
the population participating in them, political parties did not provide a space to 
include grassroots movements. Furthermore, the technocratic emphasis of the 
governments since 1975 deepened an old trait of the Chilean elite, namely the fear 
that including citizenry in any social deliberation could escalate and turn into 
anarchy 18  (Huneeus, 2014). Whilst technocrats certainly have undoubtedly 
contributed in running the state more efficiently by developing better public policies 
																																																								
18 Not surprisingly, this spirit is perfectly captured in the 1980 constitution, which does not 
include any form of referendum or popular initiative.  
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(Silva, 2010), their independence soon turned into isolation from any social input. 
Considering both elements, citizenry was left with no voice or role about the future 
of their communities, regions, or the country altogether—beyond casting a vote 
every 4 years (Gárate, 2012). As the UNDP noted more than 10 years ago (2004), 
power—in the broadest sense—in Chile is too tightly concentrated in a political, 
economic, and technocratic elite. Thus the possibility for the people to express its 
discontent within any institutional frame was—and still is—close to none, and so it 
has erupted through several protests and strikes since 2011. Examples are many. 
The social movement for education, far from a short burst of discontent by college 
students in Santiago, extended nationwide and was visibly active, through massive 
street protests, at least until 2015. Likewise, during 2016, the grassroots movement 
‘No+AFP’ (No more AFP [Pension Funds Managers]) got major traction in his 
efforts for repelling the pension system implemented by the military regime. In 
August 21, this movement managed to take around 1 million people (around 6% of 
the population) to the streets in 50 cities, in what probably has been the single 
biggest demonstration in Chilean history. Moreover, several regional movements 
across the country have locked out their communities for weeks in order to raise 
their local demands; so has been the case of Aysén and Freirina, in 2012, and 
Chiloé, in 2016. 
Despite this heated climate, democratic institutions kept working in order and 
Michelle Bachelet was reelected in 2013 as president. For her second term, Bachelet 
listened to the citizenry demands and thus proposed tax, pensions, labor, 
educational, and even constitutional reforms. Not surprisingly, she won the run-off 
election by an unprecedented 62% of the votes. Behind this landslide victory, 
however, there was the lowest turnout since the return to democracy: a mere 41% 
that paled against the 94% of turnout in 1989—another sign of the increasing 
distance between citizenry and its political representatives. Regrettably, the 
ambitious governmental program spread Bachelet’s administration too thin over too 
many areas, proposing reforms that received widespread criticism. On the one hand, 
a citizenry eager to see deep changes as soon as possible criticized these reforms as 
‘too late, too little’. On the other hand, conservative groups hindered the reforms for 
considering them as ‘populist’ initiatives. Despite failing in securing most of the 
goals intended by the social reforms, Bachelet’s administration has distinctively 
advanced in citizen participation; especially through the ‘citizen dialogues’ 
(dialogos ciudadanos) that have informed—although to a little extent—both the 
constitutional and the educational reforms. The latter, however, has not helped the 
government in improving the poor perception that the public opinion has of it, with 
a mere 24% of approval (ADIMARK GfK, 2015).  
Having in mind this outlook of the last fifty years of Chilean history, it is now 
possible to determine to what extent Moghaddam’s ideas on dictatorship and 
democracy are insightful for this case. In particular, in the following section I 
elaborate on how his proposal is fruitful to understand the deep social malaise 
expressed since 2011. 
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DISCUSSION: DEMOCRACY-AS-VOTING-SYSTEM AND 
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 
The first element of Moghaddam’s proposal that sheds new light on the Chilean case 
is the continuum between pure dictatorship and pure democracy. As noted before, 
this thought-provoking idea is an invitation to look at societies beyond their current 
voting system and instead focus on concrete ways of governing and living. In the 
case of Chile, Moghaddam’s continuum is particularly useful to see how the change 
of regime—from dictatorial to democratic—that happened in March 1990 was 
neither instantaneous nor complete. Chile advanced many steps closer towards ‘pure 
democracy’ right after that moment indeed, notoriously by recovering the right to 
elect its representatives and openly dissent from the government without 
prosecution. Yet the legacy of the dictatorship certainly persisted through the 
democratically elected Concertación governments; either by external blockades—
like the 1980 constitution—, or by choice—as the technocratic, economic-centered 
way of governing. These elements, which remain ingrained more than 25 years after 
the change of regime, are some of the reasons why Huneeus (2014) labels Chilean 
democracy as ‘half-sovereign’. An apt description for a democracy that is trying to 
move away from its dictatorial past towards a more participatory orientation, for 
instance through the citizen dialogues implemented by Bachelet’s second 
administration; but it is certainly not yet there. Without Moghaddam’s continuum, 
these nuances are hidden under a binary, dictatorship-or-democracy logic that the 
post-Pinochet political elite has repeatedly used to validate their actions (e.g., 
Tironi, 2016). At the same time, the granular analysis allowed by the continuum 
makes easier to understand the citizen discontent despite the fully democratic 
character of Chilean elections since 1990. 
Furthermore, Moghaddam (this volume) reminds us that social change towards 
democracy— or dictatorship—occurs at different levels and timings. According to 
his macro-micro rule of change, there is a difference between (potentially) fast-
paced changes in the formal system (first and second order respectively), like social 
customs and laws, and slow-paced changes of the informal system (third order), as 
the thoughts and behavior of the people. Therefore, changes in the latter do not 
necessarily convey a transformation of the latter. For the Chilean case, this rule fits 
squarely with how after 15 years of formal, state-driven political repression 
Chileans did not change either their thoughts or behavior about elections—thus 
attending en masse the voting polls in 1988. Yet it is also possible to see how one 
systemic transformation to the formal system in particular has impacted the 
informal, personal level: the provision of social services (education, healthcare, etc.) 
through for-profit markets. This massive change has opened the possibility to 
choose among different providers besides the state, although with a major caveat: 
that level of ‘freedom’ goes hand-in-hand with the monetary resources that each 
person or family has—as in any open market. Given the strong income inequality 
described above, this transformation has only deepened segregation in Chilean 
society, as socio-economic level nowadays determines where Chileans live (Vargas, 
2006), which schools they attend (Santos & Elacqua, 2016), and what healthcare 
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they receive (Cotlear et al., 2015). Whilst this makes high-income groups free to 
choose the alternative they prefer, it relegates most of the population to isolated 
neighborhoods, low-quality education, and poor healthcare, since that is what they 
can afford. If anything, these transformations have provided a justification for long-
standing classism in Chilean society19, as now the formal system naturalizes the idea 
that people should receive only what they pay for—thus turning solidarity into an 
outdated notion. Moreover, this multi-level segregation has dramatically reduced 
interaction between members of different socio-economic groups, thus stimulating 
what the UNDP called a generalized “fear of the other” (1998, p. 127f) between 
fellow Chileans. Thus it is clear how a systemic change has altered—certainly for 
worse—the way in which Chileans think about and behave to those that are 
perceived as different. As noted by three of the ten defining characteristics of 
Moghaddam’s democratic citizen (seeking to understand those who are different 
from us; learning from those who are different; and creating new experiences for 
others), this changes at the personal level are not to be taken lightly as they erode 
the social fabric that holds a democratic society together. 
Tightly connected to the privatization of social services, there is an ideological 
aspect to the Chilean transition that is also interesting to analyze from 
Moghaddam’s (this volume) perspective: the emphasis given to economic growth 
over human development. Following Pareto’s (1935) critical assessment of elite 
theories, Moghaddam (this volume) proposes that, in dictatorships, ideologies are 
the narratives that justify the atrocious acts of the ruling elite—yet are taken with 
distance by ordinary people. The case of the ‘freedom ideology’ invoked by the 
military regime to prosecute his political opponents—in their words “eliminate the 
Marxist cancer” (Ortiz de Zárate, 2010, p. 166)—exemplifies this principle very 
well. However, the economic turn that such ‘freedom’ took along the regime—
discussed above—permeated beyond the dictatorial elite right into technocratic and 
political elite of the forthcoming democracy. As previously described, key 
politicians and technocrats agreed on following a ‘growing with equality’ doctrine 
since the inception of the Concertación. In all fairness, this doctrine was different 
from its predecessor as it aimed to alleviate through social expenditure the structural 
income inequalities created by a hyper-liberalized economy. Yet the former was 
possible only under sustained macro-economic growing conditions, following 
trickle-down economics reasoning. Therefore, by focusing in ameliorating rather 
than tackling structural inequalities, the leading elite of the Concertación put 
forward a less radical variation of the ideology displayed by the dictatorial regime 
instead of a fundamentally different one (Huneeus, 2014; Undurraga, 2014). Thus, 
contrary to Moghaddam’s proposal, democracy in Chile did not bring different elites 
with competing ideologies, but rather a ‘free-market’ of competing public policies 
(Gárate, 2012) that shared a common ideological background. 
																																																								
19 Classism certainly is a defining characteristic of the Chilean society. Probably part of the 
colonial legacy, it has remained strong since the advent of the republic (Salazar, 2005).  
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The analysis of the elites’ ideology during Chilean transition to democracy, 
however, should go beyond insightful comparisons and focus instead on how it has 
affected the advance towards an ‘actualized democracy’ (Moghaddam, this volume) 
in Chile. In this sense, a consequence of this ‘ideological narrowing’ is the 
distancing between political representatives and the citizenry. This distancing, 
evident since 2011, follows from the simple fact that the majority of the population 
has expressed very clearly—in recent elections and demonstrations—to prefer equal 
human development as a priority alongside economic growth, not below it. 
Regrettably, most of the political, economic, and technocratic elite has consistently 
dismissed this expression of popular will as a mere populist burst20—a critique that 
potentially questions the very basis of modern democracy, namely popular 
sovereignty. Hence, beyond its continuity from the dictatorship, the most worrying 
aspect of the ideological orientation of the Chilean democratic elite seems to be its 
disregard towards the expectations of most of the citizenry that it aims to represent. 
The former disregard of citizenry aspirations by the elite also has a strong 
technocratic component associated to it. Since economic growth was turned into top 
priority and most of the social services were converted into competitive markets, the 
discussion about the whole Chilean society turned into an economic discussion21. As 
clearly shown by the debate between Chicago Boys and CIEPLAN economists in 
the 80’s, or the role of the Heads of Treasury during the 90’s and 00’s, the social 
debate in Chile has been discussed by economists in the technical jargon of 
economics, and based in econometric evidence. Although this could hardly be 
criticized for making the debate more rigorous and scientific, this “rise of 
economists” (Markoff & Montecinos, 1993, p. 37) as key social actors is likely 
connected to the disregard of the citizenry (Gárate, 2012). In this vein, any element 
brought to the social debate that escapes economic rationality, or econometric 
measure, has been typically disregarded as irrelevant, or derided as ‘mere ideology’. 
Likewise, those who do not speak the technical jargon of economics could hold only 
a minor voice in the discussion. Interestingly, these elements have worked as 
implicit rules, especially since the 90’s, even though many contemporary Chilean 
economists think that it is not reasonable to pretend that economics should—or 
could—settle every aspect of the social debate (Carré, in preparation). The latter, 
unfortunately, has not made a difference in how the views and experiences of citizen 
movements have been downplayed by the media, politicians, and even the rest of the 
citizenry—precisely for not being presented through economic arguments. 
Inversely, as some economists criticize (Carré, in preparation), many have misused 
their qualifications in economics just to have a better platform to influence the 
debate. This critique to the foremost role that economists have been given in Chile 
during the last 50 years is by no means an effort to deem their undoubted and 
																																																								
20 Far from populist bravado, however, even ECLAC economists (e.g., Ramos, 1995) have 
supported this position since decades, attending the social costs of a sequential approach (i.e. 
growth, then equal development). 
21 As Ariztía (2011) aptly describes it, the primacy of economic elements and the language of 
economics have been the “lingua franca for the political transition [to democracy] and the 
intellectual basis for the [Chilean] development model.” (p. 13) 
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necessary contribution as irrelevant. It is rather a call for a social debate informed by 
plural perspectives, in which ordinary citizens could have their views and 
experiences attended22. On this, suggestions for including the citizenry in a more 
active role made by scholars like Silva (2010) and Ffrench-Davis (2014), who have 
defended the valuable contribution of technocrats—especially economists—during 
the transition to democracy, should not be dismissed. A shift on this direction could 
not only make the Chilean democracy advance towards a more actualized form—as 
already suggested by the UNDP (2014)—but, eventually, empowering Chilean 
citizens into bringing the happiness that they have long-awaited. 
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APPENDIX 1 
“Chile, la alegría ya viene” by Sol y Lluvia 
Original lyrics English translation 
Chile, la alegría ya viene (bis) 
 
Porque digan lo que digan yo soy libre de 
pensar. 
Porque siento que es la hora de ganar la 
libertad, 
Hasta cuando ya de abusos, es el tiempo 
de cambiar 
Porque basta de miserias voy a decir que 
no. 
 
Porque nace el arco iris después de la 
tempestad, 
Porque quiero que florezca mi manera de 
pensar, 
Porque sin la dictadura la alegría va a 
llegar, 
Porque pienso en el futuro voy a decir 
que no. 
 
Vamos a decir que no, oh con la fuerza 
de mi voz, 
Vamos a decir que no, yo lo canto sin 
temor, 
Vamos a decir que no, vamos juntos a 
triunfar, 
Por la vida y por paz. 
 
Terminemos con la muerte, 
Es la oportunidad de vencer la violencia, 
Con las armas de la paz. 
Porque creo que mi Patria necesita 
dignidad. 
Por un Chile para todos, vamos a decir 
que no. 
 
Vamos a decir que no, oh con la fuerza 
de mi voz, 
Vamos a decir que no, yo lo canto sin 
temor, 
Vamos a decir que no, vamos juntos a 
Chile, happiness is coming (bis) 
  
Because whatever they say, I’m free of 
thinking 
Because I feel that is the time for gaining 
freedom 
It’s enough of abuses, it’s time to change 
Because it’s enough of misery, I’m going to 
say no 
 
 
Because after the storm comes the rainbow,  
Because I want a thousand ways of thinking 
to blossom 
Because without the dictatorship, happiness 
will come 
Because I think of the future, I’m going to 
say no. 
  
 
We’re going to say no, with strength of my 
voice, 
We’re going to say no, I sing it without fear 
We’re going to say no, together we will 
triumph 
For life and peace. 
 
 
Let’s end with death,  
This is the chance of defeating violence, 
With the weapons of peace. 
Because I believe that my country needs 
dignity. 
For a Chile for all, we’re going to say no. 
 
 
We’re going to say no, with strength of my 
voice, 
We’re going to say no, I sing it without fear 
We’re going to say no, together we will 
triumph 
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triunfar, 
Por la vida y por la paz. 
 
Chile, la alegría ya viene. (bis) 
For life and peace. 
 
Chile, happiness is coming. (bis) 
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TOWARDS A CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
David Carré 
 
Abstract  
In the present article the general guidelines for a cultural psychology of science are 
proposed. In order to do so, the first section of this article presents a literature 
review of the philosophical, sociological, and psychological studies of science 
during the 20th century. Through this review, it becomes clear that the existing 
studies of science have either neglected the personal role of the scientist, or 
subsumed it under collective elements, or reduced it to cognitive styles and 
personality traits. To overcome this shortcoming, the cultural psychology of science 
proposes to understand the scientist as a purpose-oriented person that constructively 
transforms culturally available meanings in order to create novel, scientific 
knowledge. Therefore, this proposal looks to emphasize the crucial, driving role of 
the person of the scientists for the creation of novel scientific knowledge. 
Keywords: psychology of science, social studies of science, cultural psychology, 
personal knowledge, philosophy of science 
 
While the construction of scientific knowledge is both personal and social in nature, 
in recent decades, the inquiries on scientific activity have only been concentrated in 
the fertile social studies of science (e.g., Collins, 1983). These studies, it could be 
argued, represent the most recent iteration of a long-standing tradition of 
philosophical and humanistic inquiry on the nature of knowledge and how this 
knowledge is constructed. By offering an analytical perspective that reveals the tight 
connection between institutions, discourses, and power relations with scientific 
knowledge (e.g., Williams & Cook, 2016), social studies of science have provided a 
more grounded approach to scientific activity than the abstract perspectives 
previously offered by epistemology and philosophy of science (Shapin, 2008). 
These studies, however, have kept a distinctive trait from its predecessors, namely 
excluding the knower—as a human being—from the construction of knowledge 
(Polanyi, 1958/1962; Greene, 1966/1974). While philosophical accounts have had 
an epistemic focus that disregards any concrete experience of knowing (Fullerton, 
1897), social studies of science have tended to subsume individual experiences into 
collective elements (Runyan, 2013; e.g., Shapin, 2012). Since the 1970’s, a series of 
studies on the psychology of science have systematically tried to bridge this gap 
(Feist & Gorman, 2013), yet they have fallen short in producing concepts and 
empirical studies that account for the personal dimension of scientific activity 
without isolating the scientist from cultural and historical environments (Osbeck, 
Nersessian, Malone, & Newstetter, 2011).  
TOWARDS A CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
	 50 
This systematic neglect of the knowing person—or scientist—as a crucial element to 
understand scientific activity is the main shortcoming that the proposed cultural 
psychological aims to address. In order to do so, the first section of this article 
presents a brief historical sketch of the different attempts at understanding scientific 
knowledge construction in the 20th century: from philosophical to social to 
psychological accounts. The second half develops the conceptual foundations for a 
cultural psychology of science, i.e. a synthesis of Polanyi’s (1962) personal 
knowledge and Valsiner’s (2014) cultural psychology. This synthesis presents the 
scientist as a purpose-oriented person that constructively transforms culturally 
available meanings in order to create novel, scientific knowledge. 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
The turn of the twentieth century not only brought major social and political 
changes, but also intellectual ones. One in particular was the emergence of 
philosophical movements like logical positivism and logical empiricism (for a 
review see Creath, 2014), which have had a major impact in the understanding of 
science. Following the original project of the Enlightenment (Carus, 2007), 
philosophers conforming the so-called Vienna Circle, like Carnap (1928/1967), 
Ayer (1936), or Hempel (1950), applied rigorous logical analyses to determine the 
verifiable nature of statements made by empirical sciences. For decades, the main 
trend within this approach was verificationism, i.e. the strict application of the 
verifiability principle (Misak, 1995), which establishes that “[i]n order to be 
meaningful, a hypothesis must be such that there is in principle an experiment or 
observation which would verify it or show it to be true or false” (p. viii). 
Verificationism, however, was harshly criticized by Popper (1934/1959), who—
using the same terms of the Vienna Circle—managed to logically demonstrate 
falsificationism as a more appropriate criterion to demarcate what is science and 
‘non-science’. In Popper’s words: “[scientific systems’] logical form shall be such 
that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be 
possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience.” (p. 18, 
emphasis in the original) Therefore, either in its verificationist or falsificationist 
form, the philosophical analysis of science placed special emphasis on the scientific 
method, since the way in which scientific claims are verified was considered to be 
the hallmark of scientific discourse1 (Uebel, 2016). In so doing, philosophy of 
science assumed a prescriptive stance towards scientific activity, establishing how it 
should be done—from a logical perspective—rather than describing how science is 
actually done by scientists. Therefore, philosophical accounts of science have little 
to do either with how real people construct knowledge and do science (Fullerton, 
																																																								
1 An enormous amount of the effort of logical positivists and empiricists was devoted to lay 
the foundations of a ‘proper’—i.e. logically grounded—language for science (e.g., 
Wittgenstein, 1922/1983). Thus much of the works made by philosophy of science during the 
early 20th century are tightly connected with the developments of analytic philosophy in 
particular, and philosophy of language at large. This issue was not addressed here since it 
considerably exceeds the scope of this paper. 
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1897), or how these processes are embedded in institutional, social and historical 
contexts (Knorr-Cetina, 1981). 
Given the former emphasis, it is interesting to note how, from within the philosophy 
of science, emerged a historicist perspective like the one proposed by Kuhn (1962). 
In his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn parted from earlier positivistic 
views by questioning the assumption that scientific progress is a continuous addition 
of scientific truths to already stated truths. On the contrary, through a historical 
analysis of science, Kuhn (1962) proposed the existence of ‘normal’ periods of 
science in which knowledge accumulates, but also of ‘revolutions’ that involve deep 
revision of the existing disciplinary matrix, or paradigm. These paradigms are the 
“shared theoretical beliefs, values, instruments and techniques, and even 
metaphysics” (Bird, 2013, p. 6) to which the relevant scientific community is highly 
committed. Contrary to Popper’s (1959) proposal, Kuhn (1962) considers that 
scientists are ‘conservative’ since they avoid revolutions, ignoring or explaining 
away anomalies—i.e. falsifications—as much as possible before replacing their 
paradigms. Therefore, Kuhn’s (1962) analysis not only offered an alternative 
narrative about the development of science, but more importantly he brought to the 
fore the idea that science is open to be analyzed in social and historical terms2. The 
latter does not imply that Kuhn considered the development of science as 
determined by elements external to science itself (Kuhn, 1992; Shapin, 1995). Yet 
his suggestion that ‘extra-scientific’ factors have an impact on the election of new 
paradigms3 was crucial for some sociologists and historians of science to propose 
that scientific activity is also determined by socio-political factors (Bird, 2013). 
SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE AND SOCIOLOGY OF 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
The idea that scientific activity is tightly connected to the social and cultural 
environments, however, is far from being original to Kuhn (1962). In fact, it could 
be traced at least 30 years earlier to the works of Fleck (1935/1979) and Merton 
(1938, 1972). Kuhn (1962), nevertheless, helped in the formalization of science and 
technology studies in general, and the socio-historical studies of science in 
particular (Hess, 1997). Thus, in the 1970s, both the Social Studies of Science 
journal and the Society for Social Studies of Science (4S) were founded on the 
																																																								
2 Determining the full impact that Kuhn’s (1962) work has had over Western thinking is 
really hard to determine. Within philosophy of science, it could be argued that many of his 
contemporaries developed critical approaches of science that conveyed equally radical 
critiques to the logicist perspective; Polanyi (1962), Lakatos (1968), and Feyerabend (1975), 
to name a few. Yet the impact that the Structure reached beyond philosophy of science is 
what makes Kuhn’s (1962) work contribution so innovative. 
3 According to Bird (2013), Kuhn was also influenced by Gestalt psychology, particularly in 
his description of how paradigm changes transform the very perception of phenomena and 
facts that scientists have. The consequences of this psychological angle, however, are 
definitely minor than those of the socio-historical turn of science. 
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grounds that scholars from “many disciplines have begun to show increasing interest 
in the social characteristics of science and technology, the political and economic 
influences affecting scientific and technological development, and the impact of 
science and technology on the condition of modern society.” (Editorial, 1971, p. 1) 
This area of studies brought together contributions from several disciplines, like 
anthropology (e.g., Latour & Woolgar, 1979), history (e.g., Schaffer & Shapin, 
1985), and especially sociology (e.g. Knorr-Cetina, 1981). Among these trends, the 
sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) (Collins, 1983) has been the most 
influential one for STS at large (Hess, 2001). In the view of Shapin (1995), “[w]hile 
traditional sociology of knowledge asked how, and to what extent, ‘social factors’ 
might influence the products of the mind” (p. 289), sociology of scientific 
knowledge “sought to show that knowledge was constitutively social” (p. 289). 
While this approach opened many novel lines of inquiry—e.g., science funding, 
institutional micro-politics, editorial practices, etc.—, its ‘radical’ orientation 
towards a completely social understanding of science sparked negative reactions, 
notoriously the so-called ‘science wars’ (Segerstråle, 2000). More importantly, the 
rise of sociology of scientific knowledge also marked a sharp break from the 
philosophical understandings of science above described: “SSK set out to construct 
an ‘anti-epistemology,’ (…) and to develop an anti-individualistic and anti-
empiricist framework for the sociology of knowledge in which ‘social factors’ 
counted not as contaminants but as constitutive of the very idea of scientific 
knowledge.” (Shapin, 1995, p. 197, emphasis added)  
As seen, social studies of science have analyzed scientific activity exclusively at a 
collective level; thus disregarding any potential personal element involved in it4. As 
it is implicit in the previous quote, this resistance to consider scientists’ 
psychological or biographical aspects could be linked to the efforts at dismantling 
the individualistic accounts created by philosophers of science5 (see Runyan, 2013). 
Furthermore, there is also the trend within social studies of science to hold “[t]he 
idea that there is nothing coherently and stably to be said about the subjective 
element in knowledge-making, that it is inchoate, arbitrary, unstable, and endlessly 
varying” (Shapin, 2012, p. 172). Therefore, for Shapin (2012), the latter “excuses us 
[social scholars of science] from making its workings an explicitly framed topic of 
inquiry.” (p. 172) Moreover, if social factors are considered to be the constitutive 
element of scientific knowledge, any personal aspect could be deemed as irrelevant 
even before considering it for analysis. Not surprisingly, these conceptions have led 
																																																								
4 This is not to say, however, that any form of social inquiry necessarily disregards the 
individual experience. The sociology of the life-world—sometimes called micro-sociology—
proposed by Schütz (1967) is a clear example of how the two dimensions could be integrated.  
5 Runyan (2013) describes his experience in a graduate seminar directed to historians of 
science as follows: “As far as I could tell, there was not much of an argument, but that social, 
cultural, and material studies of science were valued, and were seen as the cutting edge. 
Within this view, talk of biography was lumped with a discredited ‘Great Man Theory of 
History.’ From this perspective, talk of individuals and their psychology was seen as 
intellectually or politically regressive for overemphasizing individuals and neglecting the 
extent to which science is socially constructed.” (p. 356) 
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to a scenario in which “recent literature in history and social studies of science 
[have] explicitly discounted the role of personal, psychological, or experiential 
factors in science” (Runyan, 2013, p. 356). As Mahoney (1979) declared more than 
three decades ago: “In terms of behavior patterns, affect, and even some intellectual 
matters, we know more about alcoholics, Christians, and criminals than we do about 
the psychology of the scientist.” (p. 349) 
STRIVING FOR THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
Given the date and the dire tone of Mahoney’s (1979) statement, it is reasonable to 
expect that such underdevelopment of a psychological understanding of science 
would be a matter of past times. This is hardly the case. Despite explicit efforts for 
establishing a psychology of science could be found as early as the 1970’s (e.g., 
Singer, 1971; Mitroff, 1972), it is possible to observe that proclamations of the 
definitive ‘arrival’ of this sub-discipline have been made many times since (e.g., 
Gholson, Shadish, Neimeyer, & Houts, 1989; Shadish & Fuller, 1993; Feist, 2008), 
without much success6. This lack of disciplinary organization, however, has not 
hindered the production of several empirical studies on the subject. Following the 
summaries made by Simonton (2009) and Feist (2012), psychological studies of 
science have shown a strong emphasis in studying distinctive cognitive styles (e.g., 
Nersessian, 2002) and personality traits (e.g., Feist, 2006a), with only minor efforts 
devoted to explore the concrete experiences of scientists and the role of social 
elements (e.g., Osbeck et al., 2011). Then, if the field has been fruitful despite its 
lack of organization, why is it still necessary to make the case for the existence of 
psychological studies of science (e.g., Feist, 2006b)?  
While Feist (2012) proposes that psychology of science as a discipline is still in an 
‘identification’ stage—previous to a proper ‘institutionalization’—, two more 
substantive reasons could be proposed to understand the scarce impact of 
psychological approaches within studies of science at large. The first of them is the 
lack of an integrated theoretical framework, as it could be deduced from Feist’s 
(2012) definition of the field: “psychology of science is simply the study of 
scientific thought and behavior” (p. 14). Both in this definition and in most of the 
literature (e.g., Feist, 2006b; cf. Osbeck et al., 2011) lies the implicit assumption 
that scientists are just a specific sub-group that could be distinguished from other 
scientists or ‘non-scientists’. Thus, by controlling this grouping, ‘independent 
variable’, other psychological elements—cognitive styles, personality traits, etc.—
should vary across the groups. In so doing, the question of how or why those 
assumed differences emerge is neglected (Valsiner & Brinkmann, 2016), thus 
increasing the volume of empirical research without a proper theoretical 
																																																								
6 The short life (2008-2009) of the Journal of Psychology of Science and Technology (JPST) 
is a clear—regrettable—example of this trend. 
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understanding of the phenomenon at stake7. In this aspect, the difference between 
psychological8 and philosophical (e.g., Polanyi, 1962) or sociological (e.g., Knorr-
Cetina, 1981) studies of science is plainly evident. Moreover, reducing the full range 
of personal experience to a limited—quantifiable—set of psychological aspects 
restricts the scope of these studies and, more importantly, neglects the person of the 
scientist as a whole. Yet both the former and the latter shortcomings could be 
avoided, as the thematically-broader, qualitative research conducted by Osbeck and 
her collaborators (2011), and the works on psychobiography made by Runyan (e.g., 
2006, 2013) show. 
Besides the former, there is a thematic element that certainly has hindered the 
efforts of the psychology of science inserting itself within the science and 
technology studies community. As described above, both Simonton (2009) and Feist 
(2012) observed a preference of psychological studies to focus on cognitive and 
personality aspects. While this focus of inquiry is completely valid, it clashes with 
the aim of social studies of science—especially SSK—to overcome the 
individualistic and rationalistic perspectives portrayed by philosophical accounts of 
science. Thus, when psychologists of science conclude, for instance, that “more 
successful and creative scientists are metacognitive, flexible, and most likely to use 
the strong-inference technique of testing more than one hypothesis at once” (Feist, 
2006b, p. 185), this is likely to be anathema for historians and sociologists of 
science. Hence, there is an impending need for putting forward the early efforts of 
Shadish and Fuller (1993) for creating a more social psychology of science, capable 
of including institutional, cultural, and historical elements within the psychological 
analysis of scientists. (Osbeck et al., 2011)  
STUDIES OF SCIENCE, NEGLECTING THE SCIENTIST 
Summarizing the ideas presented thus far, it is clear that along the 20th century 
emerged quite different, and certainly novel ways of conceptualizing and studying 
scientific activity. Thus, the turn of the century brought a new logic-philosophical 
understanding of science, which examined in depth how any science must 
empirically verify—or falsify—its theories and statements in order to certify their 
truthfulness. In so doing, scientific activity was depicted as nothing more than the 
logical, detached and systematic proving of cumulative hypothesis, following purely 
rational criteria. Against this aseptic and prescriptive understanding of science, a 
strong reaction movement composed by historians, anthropologists and sociologists 
emerged in the 1930s and gained definitive traction in the 1960s: the social studies 
of science. These studies, particularly influenced by sociology of scientific 
knowledge, put forward the thesis that social elements (e.g., power relations, 
																																																								
7  Moreover, this widespread tendency of psychology (Danziger, 1990) promotes the 
production of pseudo-empirical research (Smedslund, 2008, 2016). 
8 Here is necessary to set aside the work made by Osbeck and her collaborators (2011), who 
state from the outset that their study was conducted using activity theory as theoretical 
framework. 
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ideological discourses, funding, etc.) are not merely related to scientific knowledge 
but are actually constitutive of it. In so doing, they have systematically disregarded 
any personal, psychological or biographical related to scientific activity. As a 
consequence of this neglect towards the personal experience of scientists, a number 
of scholars have made seminal contributions to establishing a psychology of science 
over the last four decades. Their emphases, however, could be seen just as an 
extension of both cognitive and personality psychology into a new group of 
subjects: scientists. Thus, the psychology of science has been prolific in creating 
empirical studies regarding cognitive styles and personality traits, but has yet to 
develop a theoretical framework for understanding the whole of the psychological 
experience involved in being a scientist. At the same time, these studies have paid 
little attention to inquire how these psychological elements are related to social and 
cultural environments. By so doing, they have to some extent reenacted the image of 
scientists portrayed by philosophy of science, namely a purely rational individual 
isolated from anything social or worldly influence. Taken together, these two 
factors—lacking a theoretical framework and individualism—have certainty 
contributed both in the slow development of psychology of science and in the scarce 
impact over science studies at large. 
Taking into accounts these shortcomings, in the following section an integrative 
theoretical framework for conceptualizing and studying the psychological, personal 
aspects involved in scientific activity is proposed: a cultural psychology of science.  
THEORETICAL GROUNDS: CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY  
The general psychological theory in which this proposal is framed is cultural 
psychology (Cole, 1998; Shweder, 1990, 1999; Valsiner 2007, 2014). Rather than a 
sub-discipline within empirical psychology that looks for differences between 
different cultures—which is the case for cross-cultural psychology (e.g., Daniel, 
Schiefer & Knafo, 2012)—, cultural psychology “orients itself to the study of higher 
psychological functions—those functions that entail the use of human will, 
intentional construction of meaning.” (Valsiner 2014, p. 17). Therefore, rather than 
focusing on the study of cognition or behavior (e.g., Feist, 2006b), cultural 
psychology is a science of human conduct, i.e. “actions in the world that are made 
meaningful by the acting human being” (Valsiner 2014, p. 17). Yet these 
meaningful actions are not done isolated individuals in an abstract realm9, on the 
contrary they are inherently woven into a cultural fabric (Valsiner, 2007) and 
oriented towards interacting with fellow human beings (Cornejo, 2008). Shweder 
(1990) aptly describes this unity between the personal and the cultural:  
																																																								
9 Ironically, the notion that cultural environments are constitutive role for psychological 
experience is more than centenary, as it was the basis of the Völkerpsychologie (see 
Diriwächter, 2004) proposed by 19th century authors like Lazarus, Steinhal, or Wundt 
(Valsiner, 2012).  Even if this idea is commonsensical and acknowledged by most 
psychologists, as Cole (1996) notes, the discipline has systematically failed in integrate it 
seriously. 
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The basic idea of cultural psychology is that, on the one hand, no 
sociocultural environment exists or has identity independently of the way 
human beings seize meanings and resources from it, while, on the other 
hand, every human being's subjectivity and mental life are altered through 
the process of seizing meanings and resources from some sociocultural 
environment and using them. (p. 74)  
This inclusive separation (Valsiner, 1998), which implies a “mutual constituting 
between person and the social world” (Valsiner, 2007, p. 3), is regulated through the 
constructive internalization and externalization of cultural meanings (Valsiner, 
2014). These transformative processes make possible that “while the ‘incoming 
[cultural] messages’ can be similar for different individuals, the ways in which these 
messages become transformed and reconstructed is necessarily personally unique.” 
(Valsiner, 2007, p. 40) Therefore, cultural psychology goes beyond both traditional 
behaviorist or cognitivist approaches in psychology, which ignore the meaningful 
nature of human actions, and also radical forms of social constructionism that 
reduce personal experience to collective elements.  
As a general psychological framework, cultural psychology addresses the main 
shortcomings of studies of science identified above: the individualism implied in 
philosophical accounts; the neglect of personal aspects made by social studies; and 
the cognitive and personality reductionism present in most psychological studies of 
science. In doing so, cultural psychology proposes a notion of persons and 
psychological phenomena that fits the general complexities of studying scientific 
activity including the perspective of the persons behind it. Due to its general 
character, however, this psychological approach does not address the particularities 
of the psychological experience involved in doing science and creating scientific 
knowledge. Therefore, in order to bridge this specificity gap, the ideas of cultural 
psychology are to be complemented with a different conceptual framework: the 
theory of personal knowledge (Polanyi, 1962). 
THEORETICAL GROUNDS: PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 
In his Personal Knowledge, Polanyi (1962) aimed to change the long-standing 
assumption of modern Western thinking (Greene, 1974) that any “passionate, 
personal, human appraisal” (Polanyi, 1962, p. 15) must be removed from science at 
all costs in order to keep it objective. According to him, this necessity follows from 
“the conception of natural science as a set of statements which is ‘objective’ in the 
sense that its substance is entirely determined by observation” (Polanyi, 1962, p. 
16). However, as he consistently shows, either in mathematical formalism, in 
appraising of probabilities, or in finding orderly pattern of events—and ultimately in 
every form of skillful knowing and doing—there is a fundamental personal, tacit 
component (Polanyi, 1968) upon which those observations rely. “Such is the 
personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding” (Polanyi, 1962, p. 
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vii); yet “this does not make our understanding subjective” (p. vii) as it will be 
shown. 
The personal component proposed by Polanyi (1962) is based on his theory of tacit 
knowledge (1966, 1968), which proposes a ‘dual’ structure of our psychological 
experience, namely a focal point of awareness and a field of surrounding elements—
or particulars—of which we have only a subsidiary awareness. An example of this, 
according to Polanyi, is language: when we read a sentence we do not focus in the 
single, written words but in the meaning conveyed through that sentence. Thus, in 
this case the words used are subsidiary, or tacit, elements that establish a functional 
relation from which emerges a focal point, i.e. the meaning of that expression. In 
establishing such relation, the role of the person is crucial as: “the knower integrates 
the subsidiaries to a focal target—or that the subsidiaries have a meaning to the 
knower which fills the center of his focal attention” (Polanyi, 1968, p. 31). 
Therefore, meaningful articulations of subsidiary elements—be it in language, 
perception, or knowledge—are only possible because of a person oriented towards a 
purpose articulating them (Polanyi, 1966).  
Thus, the tacit knowledge is organized in triadic relations between subsidiary 
particulars, its focal target, and the knower that links the first to the second (Polanyi, 
1968). Yet, these relations are neither static nor fixed but inherently dynamic, since 
the “triad will disappear if the knower shifts his [or her] focal attention away from 
the focus of the triad and fixes it on the subsidiaries.” (Polanyi, 1968, p. 31) 
Therefore, if the focus is moved to a particular subsidiary element, this element is 
no longer subsidiary but instead the new focal point, which in turn is a new 
articulation of other elements that are subsidiary to it. This element, for Polanyi 
(1968), determines the ultimately unspecifiable character of knowledge, since the 
knower cannot pinpoint every single subsidiary particular present in a given 
articulation as they refer in turn to other elements10.  
These two elements—the role of the knower and the unspecifiable character of 
knowledge—are crucial for understanding the construction of scientific activity in 
the personal perspective proposed by Polanyi (1962). The former, on the one hand, 
implies that the meaningfulness of a scientific observation or an abstract modeling is 
determined by the articulation of the apposite subsidiary particulars—theories and 
methodologies, as well as previous experiences—made by the scientist. The latter 
element, on the other hand, makes it difficult for the knower to exhaustively 
determine all the elements supporting his or her articulation; as Polanyi (1962) 
observes: “the curious thing is that we have no clear knowledge of what our 
presuppositions are and when we try to formulate them they appear quite 
																																																								
10 Moreover, as Polanyi (1968) notes, the subsidiary awareness is not binary—as in the case 
of the focal—but rather gradual. This gradual character implies that while there is a more 
explicit awareness of certain subsidiary elements, there are other elements of which there is 
only possible to grasp a liminal awareness. For instance, the bodily functions that are 
subsidiary to speech. 
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unconvincing.” (p. 59) Taken together, these elements substantiate the central claim 
of Polanyi (1962), namely that: “In every act of knowing there enters a passionate 
contribution of the person knowing what is being known, and that this coefficient is 
no mere imperfection but a vital component of this knowledge” (Polanyi, 1962, p. 
viii).  
Yet, how is the former theorization advocating for objective knowledge if every 
aspect of it seems relative to the subject constructing it? For Polanyi (1962), 
scientific activity is different from other forms of knowing as in it “[t]he effort of 
knowing is thus guided by a sense of obligation towards the truth: by an effort to 
submit to reality.” (Polanyi, 1962, p. 63) In this sense, even if the scientist is 
actively articulating a number of particulars—for instance, the output of a statistical 
analysis—“[t]he act of personal knowing can sustain these relations only because 
the acting person believes that they are apposite: that he [or she] has not made them 
but discovered them.” (p. 63) Far from self-deception, such belief represents the 
basic commitment that scientists must establish in their quest for establishing 
objective knowledge, i.e. pursuing their inquiries using those theories, 
methodologies, data, etc. that are pondered as the best available. Was Newton 
deceiving himself when he initially proposed that gravitation was based on ether’s 
density? (Rosenfeld, 1969) Or was he just using the best scientific conceptual 
repertoire available at his time?11 Polanyi (1962) concludes that: “It is the act of 
commitment in its full structure that saves personal knowledge for being merely 
subjective.” (p. 65) Moreover, if this personal commitment for achieving true 
knowledge is replaced by a blind acceptance of the procedures of the scientific 
community (cf., Latour, 1987), then science becomes nothing more than a mere 
repetition of what was already established as valid; thus dramatically reducing the 
possibility of groundbreaking innovations (Polanyi, 1962). 
In sum, Polanyi (1962, 1966, 1968) certainly succeeds in creating a person-centered 
approach to the construction of scientific knowledge, which accounts for the crucial, 
committed role of the scientists without losing the scientific spirit of creating 
objective knowledge. The major shortcoming of Polanyi’s conceptualization, 
however, is how isolated the knowing person is portrayed—either from fellow 
scientists, scientific communities, or historical backgrounds. While Polanyi does 
address the former elements (see 1962, Chapter 7; 1968, p. 34), these are tangential 
remarks rather than proper, substantive elaborations on the issue. In so doing, 
Polanyi (1968) seems to assume that subsidiary particulars are elements passively 
available for being articulated by the knower, thus neglecting their origin and the 
process by which they became available for that particular person. At the same time, 
Polanyi’s (1962) conceptualization provides little insight on how the meaningful 
																																																								
11  The example of Newton brings forward the discussion of what means that certain 
knowledge is ‘objective’. As Daston and Gallison (2007) systematically show, what has been 
deemed as ‘objective’ has dramatically changed along history. This argument makes clear 
that, along with the personal commitment for making scientific discoveries, there necessarily 
is a broader community in which such inquiry is framed. Regrettably, this issue exceeds the 
scope of this work and so it is not be further addressed. 
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knowledge articulations made by personally-committed scientists are circulated and 
discussed with fellow scientists in order to create scientific consensus. As it will be 
proposed in the following, it is necessary to synthetize these ideas with those of 
cultural psychology above described in order to bridge these gaps and thus create a 
comprehensive theoretical framework. 
A NEW SYNTHESIS: CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
The cultural psychology of science proposed here shares a common principle with 
both cultural psychology and personal knowledge theory: the centrality of the 
scientist, as a human being, to understand how is scientific knowledge created. In 
this sense, the knowledge constructed by a scientist is assumed to be, first and 
foremost, meaningful and purposeful for that particular person. Thus, the scientist is 
the ultimate responsible of articulating together different concepts, theories, 
analyses, data, observations, etc. in coherent scientific statements, projects, and 
programmes. Furthermore, the scientist articulates these (subsidiary) elements 
following the orientations that he or she is certain that are the best possible, or 
available, for addressing the issue at stake; and thus leaves a tacit imprint that lies at 
the very core of his or her work. Here there is a necessary developmental angle too, 
as the chosen way of doing science could only be understood looking at that 
scientist’s personal trajectory. Above this, however there is a distinctive, 
overarching commitment of all those who do science for discovering something 
‘hidden’ in reality, in other words, to create knowledge that has a general validity. 
As soon as such commitment is broken, we enter in the notoriously different realm 
of scientific deception (cf., Rommer, 2015), or fraud (e.g., Stapel, 2016).  
While the individual person is considered here to be the constructive articulator of 
knowledge, this is always and necessarily done along with fellow scientists, by 
being a member of a—local and global—scientific community, by working within 
specific institutions, and by participating in broader cultural and historical 
environments. Far from abstract ‘influences’, the social environments in which the 
scientist is embedded—group, community, institution, society, and history—are the 
sources for the particular cultural meanings out of which he or she articulates 
knowledge. These elements, importantly, vary from being very explicit—e.g., what 
are the valid methodologies for a discipline—to more tacit—e.g., political 
implications of scientific activity—to almost unnoticeable—e.g., the cultural role of 
science in society; thus, they are all present as subsidiary elements supporting focal 
knowledge articulations. Yet, these cultural meanings are not merely reproduced by 
the scientist, as they are constructively internalized and selectively externalized. In 
this sense, scientists are considered to be inclusively separated from their cultural 
environments; for they are constitutively connected to them, yet they are not mere 
instances in which these cultural meanings are echoed. Moreover, these different 
social environments are the arenas in which personal articulations join the efforts 
made by fellow scientists in order to re-construct the corpus of ideas and evidence 
that constitute a scientific discipline. The sole observation, or direct experience, of 
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how scientists of any sort are in permanent interaction with fellow scientists, 
working and communicating with them; or how they are trained in a discipline in 
which they later participate; or their active membership of institutions, like 
universities or research centers; or the influence that particular historical or political 
events have on the development of a discipline; any of them should suffice to make 
this point clear enough. 
The fact that scientists are embedded in multiple cultural environments, however, 
does not imply that they are fully restricted to their rules, principles, and 
assumptions. On the contrary, these cultural meanings enable them to produce 
knowledge that goes beyond what has already been established by scientific 
communities—even if those very same communities sometimes resist that novelty. 
In fact, the production of novel ideas and empirical findings, rather than the 
reproduction of what is already known, is an overarching goal of science; the latter, 
as Polanyi (1962) notes, is the task of encyclopedists, not of scientists. Thus, in the 
constructive articulation of the new, the commitment of particular scientists for 
achieving—what personally is envisioned as—true knowledge in ways that dissent 
from the established consensus is crucial. Maybe the most obvious example of this 
is the life and work of Galileo, whose  “strong and increasing desire to find a new 
conception of what constitutes natural philosophy and how natural philosophy ought 
to be pursued” (Machamer, 2014, p. 16, emphases added), led him to face harsh 
resistance not only from fellow physicists and astronomers, but also from the main 
cultural institution of his time, the Catholic church. Despite this opposition, which 
even led him to live his last years under house arrest, he never dropped the 
principles, methodologies, and discoveries that ultimately shaped the modern 
conception of astronomy, physics, and science at large. Yet, he never relinquished to 
them because he was certain of their validity; even if this implied to be opposed by 
most of his scientific and cultural environment. 
Summarizing, the core of a cultural psychology of science is the centrality of an 
active, purpose-oriented scientist that constructively transforms culturally available 
meanings in order to create novel, objective knowledge. Even if the former does not 
conform to the standards set by the socio-cultural environment. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper proposed a new theoretical framework for the psychological 
understanding of scientific activity: a cultural psychology of science. For this 
purpose, a brief overview of the literature on philosophy, sociology, and psychology 
of science was presented in order to describe previous conceptualizations and 
studies on science. Through this review was possible to observe both the 
development of the field and its shortcomings, particularly the neglect—even by 
existing psychological accounts—of the personal experience of scientists. In order 
to address the former, a theoretical framework based in cultural psychology and the 
notion of personal knowledge was proposed as a new general frame for 
psychological studies of science. This approach proposed the centrality of the 
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knowledge-making person—in this case the scientist—to understanding scientific 
activity and its product, scientific knowledge. Moreover, the proposed theoretical 
framework makes possible to keep the social and cultural nature of scientific 
activity without neglecting the personal commitments and intellectual passions in 
which this activity is also based. Furthermore, these personal commitments appear 
as the main driver of those scientific advances that require going beyond the 
established consensus of a scientific community. Hence, this whole person-centered 
view of scientific activity is what I have called a cultural psychology of science. 
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HUMANS OF ECONOMICS:  
THE SOCIAL ROLE AND PERSONAL DIMENSIONS OF 
ECONOMISTS IN CHILE  
David Carré 
 
Abstract: In recent decades, the rising influence of economists in Chile has been 
critically addressed by several social studies of science. However, the historical and 
sociological focus of these works has tended to collapse the diversity of economists’ 
views and experiences into collective elements. The present article aims to address 
the former shortcoming by providing a qualitative, cultural psychological inquiry on 
the subject. For this purpose, an interview-based study with economists in Chile was 
conducted. The thematic analysis and the case study performed on this material 
accounted for the existence of quite different perspectives among participants 
regarding the social influence of economists, disciplinary elements, and their 
personal involvement in this scientific activity.  
Key words: Chilean economists, Cultural psychology, Social studies of science, 
Psychology of science, Thematic analysis, Case study, Personal perspective 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In a bold statement, John Maynard KEYNES (1936/2007) wrote almost 80 years 
ago: “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.” (p. 383, 
emphasis added) Setting aside any doubt on what he meant, KEYNES continued: 
“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and 
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the 
world is ruled by little else.” (p. 383) These quotes, it could be argued, represent an 
opinion from a man that—being a renowned political economist himself—grew too 
complacent when pondering the relevance of his and his colleagues’ work1. Thus, it 
is nothing but surprising to find scholars who consider that KEYNES’ position 
actually falls short to describe the actual influence of economists in Latin America 
(e.g., MARKOFF & MONTECINOS, 1993). In these authors’ (MONTECINOS & 
																																																								
1 In fact, in a way that probably few social scientists could equal, KEYNES and his ideas had 
a major impact in how the world was shaped in economic terms after World War II: as one of 
the crucial participants of the Bretton-Woods agreement, he took part in creating the first 
global monetary order from which institutions like the IMF and the current World Bank 
emerged (see DAVIDSON, 2009). 
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MARKOFF, 2012) view: “Keynes’ comment (…) refers to a different time; by the 
end of 20th century, economists exerted a visible power over economies and turned 
into the practical men (and, sometimes, women) of the hour” (p. 63, emphasis 
added). While the latter position might appear as an overstatement about the 
situation in Latin America, it actually fits the characterization made by the literature 
of one specific country in the region: Chile.  
According to VALDÉS (1995), the social and economics reforms that—during the 
1973-1990 dictatorship—transformed Chile into a radical form of liberal capitalism 
cannot be understood without the select group of economists that designed and 
implemented these policies: the Chicago Boys. GÁRATE (2012a), extending the 
former point, proposes that the influence of economists in Chile did not decay with 
the end of the dictatorship; on the contrary, they became crucial actors to make the 
transition between dictatorship and democracy possible. Moreover, ARIZTÍA 
(2012) argues that the technical language of economics—almost private to 
economists—became the “lingua franca of the political transition” (p. 13), and also 
the backbone of the national model of development. Connected to the latter point, 
SILVA (2010) proposes that, since the 1990’s, economists in Chile have secured—
through the Central Bank and the Treasury—the technical control of the debate on 
economic policies and social expenditure. Furthermore, as OSSANDÓN (2011) 
reveals, this influence has reached beyond strictly economic areas; for instance, by 
reorganizing the national healthcare system through for-profit market logic. In fact, 
the technical role played by economists in Chile has become so preponderant that it 
has turned them into ubiquitous expert advisors for any public policy (GÁRATE, 
2012b); an element that has ultimately hampered the democratic governance by 
narrowing the social debate just into an economic discussion (HUNEEUS, 2014; cf. 
CARRÉ, in press). Finally, through an illustrative comparison with the case of 
Argentina, UNDURRAGA (2014) shows how distinctive the role of economists in 
the contemporary Chilean society is.  
Therefore, far from an isolated position, the view of MONTECINOS and 
MARKOFF (1993, 2012) actually represents the academic consensus on the subject, 
namely that: “During the second half of the 70’s and the 80’s, the status of 
economists suffered a radical transformation in Chile.” (GÁRATE, 2012b p. 109) 
This transformation ultimately expanded the traditional role of economists in the 
country: from a research-oriented academic, who occasionally advised the 
government on economic issues (SILVA, 2010), to technocrats and technopols 
(DOMÍNGUEZ, 1997) directly and permanently involved in the public debate2—
regardless of whether the topic was related to the economy or not3.  
																																																								
2  This situation certainly challenges the clear distinction that WEBER (1917/2004a, 
1919/2004b) drew between science and politics. 
3 “Economists are no longer satisfied with having control of most of the technical agencies of 
the state. Rather than focusing in managing central banks and planning offices, they have 
expanded their intellectual and bureaucratic control over the whole state apparatus, including 
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Thus, the landscape of economics in Chile also changed. As noted by several 
authors (e.g., GÁRATE, 2012b; SILVA, 2010, 2012), the expansion of the 
economists’ role was supported by the emergence of a new kind of institution during 
the 80’s and 90’s: think tanks. These ‘independent’ organizations have given 
economists an intermediate platform—in between academia and the state 
apparatus—for working full-time on compiling available academic research, and 
using it to participate in the public debate. The influence coming from think tanks in 
Chile, however, is far from neutral since they are mostly advocacy institutions, often 
linked to political parties, rather than ‘universities without students’ (see GÁRATE, 
2012b, p. 116, Figure 1). Nonetheless, this intermediate position has allowed 
economists working at think tanks to focus on research without the rigor and slow-
pace of academia, and also to participate in the debate regardless of sharing the 
political orientation of the government in office. Therefore, the landscape in which 
economic knowledge is created and distributed in Chile has certainly changed 
during the recent decades. Nowadays, alongside traditional universities devoted to 
conduct high-impact research, there are also think tanks oriented to translate this 
research into concrete aspects of the social debate. At the same time, increasingly 
more governmental agencies are directly run by economists, or have their work 
oriented through economic indicators. Hence, from these quite different positions, 
economists in Chile have become the ones to give, through their technical and 
scientific knowledge, direction and validation to the social discussion and to 
political actions alike.  
The transformation experienced by economics and economists in Chile is also a 
clear example of the tight, entangled relation between the knowledge created by 
social sciences and the human phenomena it addresses4. Thus, the role of economics 
and economists in Chile has become a major topic of inquiry for Science and 
Technology Studies (STS)—as the ample literature referenced above and other 
sources5 show. Accordingly, most of these works have gone beyond stating or 
describing this relevance, looking into the actual political and institutional 
conditions under which economists and economics have become so influential. 
However, HEREDIA (2011) criticizes these studies for having relied on—and thus 
reinforced—an overgeneralization: that of the almighty economists. In practice, this 
means that the studies previously mentioned have portrayed economists in Chile as 
if having an absolute social power, automatically granted by their technical 
qualification; which, contrary to the aim of these studies (e.g., ARIZTÍA, 2012, p. 
																																																																																																																																		
poverty programs, regulations for the labor market, healthcare, social security, education, and 
even foreign policy” (MONTECINOS & MARKOFF, 2012, p. 66). 
4  As ARIZTÍA (2012) aptly says: “Be it their books, concepts, models, narratives, 
hypotheses, public policies, minutes, or councils; or their experts, intellectuals, technopols, 
academics, or advisors; the products and actors of social sciences do not dwell within 
classrooms and campuses only: they move and act all over the world they try to understand 
and explain.” (p. 9) 
5  Particularly the blog Estudios de la Economía [Studies on Economics] 
(https://estudiosdelaeconomia.wordpress.com/), which receives regular contributions from 
most of the authors referenced. 
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15), amplifies the economists’ role. At the same time, and more importantly for the 
present article, this portrayal has collapsed the diversity of Chilean economists into 
a broad, uniform label (HEREDIA, 2011). Even when particular cases have been 
addressed by these studies (e.g., OSSANDÓN, 2011), this has been done leaving 
aside any element—and any cases—that does not fit the prototype of a neoliberal, 
technically-oriented economist. In so doing, the existing literature on this topic has 
mostly operated under the assumption that economists, as a uniform collective, 
follow the prototype of the Chicago Boys in the 80’s, or the early 90’s Heads of 
Treasury (viz. Alejandro Foxley, Eduardo Aninat)—i.e. truly almighty economists. 
Therefore, any potential personal elements shaping the technical and scientific work 
of economists that escapes this collective characterization—like personal interests or 
views on the discipline—have been so far disregarded and collapsed under the 
‘almighty’ way of being an economist. 
Regrettably, disconnecting scientific work and scientific knowledge construction 
from any individual or personal dimension seems to be a consistent trend in STS at 
large, and particularly within social studies of science6. As SHAPIN (2012)—a 
leading figure in the latter field—notes, these studies share the “idea that there is 
nothing coherently and stably to be said about the subjective element in knowledge-
making” (p. 172), which makes personal elements fit “for its supposedly 
contaminating task and also excuses us from making its workings an explicitly 
framed topic of inquiry” (p. 172). This observation not only confirms the tendency 
to exclusively address the collective dimension of the phenomenon—as exemplified 
by the studies on Chilean economists—, but also reveals the scant attention that 
studies of science have paid to the long-standing efforts for developing a 
psychology of science (e.g., MITROFF, 1972a, 1972b; MAHONEY, 1976; 
GHOLSON, SHADISH, NEIMEYER & HOUTS, 1989; OSBECK, NERSESSIAN, 
MALONE & NEWSTETTER, 2011; PROCTOR & CAPALDI, 2012; FEIST & 
GORMAN, 2013). Beyond a disciplinary divide, such disregard could be attributed 
to the individualistic approach that most of these psychologically-oriented studies 
have adopted. Namely focusing mostly in cognitive features and personality traits, 
which give the impression of a scientist isolated from any social or cultural 
influence. The latter, however, does not provide sufficient justification for claiming 
that the person of the scientist is irrelevant to understand the creation, circulation 
and social use of scientific knowledge7; or worse, labeling it as a source of error, as 
																																																								
6 The notorious exceptions here are intellectual biographies, like the ones made by Ray 
MONK (e.g., 1991, 2001). This kind of works—a minority within history of ideas and history 
of science—certainly shows how the intellectual production cannot be fully understand 
without looking at the life of the authors. The enormous amount of work required to create 
one of this intellectual biographies, however, limits their scope to only outstanding 
contributors to their fields, like Wittgenstein or Russell. This inherent limitation, regrettably, 
contributes to the historical trend of portraying science as an activity led by selected 
geniuses—viz. Grand Man theory—rather than a laborious endeavor created by the small 
contribution of many different persons. 
7 SEGERSTRÅLE (2000) makes an interesting historical observation about this: “What about 
the voice of scientists themselves, after all the objects of these studies? Unlike earlier 
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SHAPIN (2012) describes it. In fact, this assumption of irrelevance probably 
emerges from a sociological, collective-centered reasoning; for which the 
motivations and views on the discipline of the persons working everyday as 
scientists could be subsumed under their membership to specific institutions or 
scientific communities. While the latter undoubtedly is a relevant level of analysis—
as largely shown by the literature—, it does not preclude a more granular analysis of 
the scientific activity at a personal, psychological level. Therefore, the question at 
stake is how to integrate rather than separate these two dimensions when studying 
scientists and their work; somehow following the lead left by POLANYI 
(1958/1962) when he proposed that knowledge is social constructed, but it is also 
personal.  
1.1 THIS STUDY 
Therefore, the present article aims to bridge the existent gap between the social and 
psychological studies of science through an empirical study that explores the 
personal views and experiences of a number of economists in Chile in relation to the 
creation, circulation and use of economic knowledge. In order to do so, a cultural 
psychological approach to scientific activity is adopted. This perspective primarily 
looks at scientific activity from the experiences and meanings that scientists, as 
persons living in cultural worlds, make of it. These personally meaningful 
experiences, as proposed by VALSINER (2014), are constantly developing and 
becoming meaningful within social and historical environments. Therefore, these 
personal elements could never be private constructions made in complete isolation 
of the social world  (CORNEJO, 2008; SCHÜTZ, 1967), which certainly does not 
imply that this process could be reduced to an impersonal social construction. In this 
sense, there is no question whether personal experiences and their meanings are 
privately or socially determined, as they necessarily emerge from the dynamic unity 
between a person and its environment (VALSINER, 2007). Moreover, these 
meaning constructions are not expected to always be fixed and unitary, given the 
inherently ambivalent—and sometimes even contradictory (CARRÉ, 2017)—nature 
of human experiencing (VALSINER, 2014). Finally, this psychological approach is 
complemented with the concept of personal knowledge proposed by POLANYI 
(1962), which emphasizes that personal involvement is a crucial aspect of scientific 
activity. Furthermore, rather than a token of subjectivism, as largely assumed, the 
notion of personal knowledge (POLANYI, 1962) shows how the drive of each 
scientist for creating knowledge is actually essential for making science something 
more than technical reproduction.  
																																																																																																																																		
sociologists of science, who relied on scientists’ own statements, the new science scholars 
largely ignored what the scientists themselves had to say about their scientific commitments 
and concerns, or how they judged good science from bad. It is not too much to say that a 
certain ‘Besserwisser’ approach prevailed, with the sociologists smugly overruling the 
scientists.” (pp. 5-6) 
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Therefore, this cultural psychological perspective of science makes possible the 
observation of the diversity of personal views and experiences of contemporary 
economists in Chile. Yet without disconnecting these from the multiple social 
environments in which these views and experiences are embedded: concrete 
institutions with specific guidelines; the local community of economists and its 
rules; the global discipline of economics and its scientific practices; and the 
historical background of the discipline in the country. In so doing, this article looks 
to provide an alternative perspective to the existing studies on the role of economists 
in Chile, revealing a personal dimension that has been typically collapsed under 
institutional labels and collective generalizations. At the same time, by avoiding an 
individualistic approach to psychological phenomena, this work hopes to create an 
insight that could be better integrated with existing social studies on the subject. On 
this, the efforts made by OSBECK and her collaborators (2011) for producing a 
more social psychology of science seem essential to overcome the isolation and 
limited diffusion that psychology of science has experienced (for a historical 
overview see FEIST, 2012, pp. 25-26, Table 1.4).  
More generally, this study hopes to be a contribution to the understanding of the 
transformative social processes that Chile is currently experiencing (HUNEEUS, 
2014). In this sense, this work looks to open to the public and make more 
transparent the views of local actors that currently give shape to economics and 
create new economic knowledge. Therefore, this is not an effort to cast a shadow of 
doubt over the integrity of the scientific and technical work that economists have 
done in Chile—in other words, it does not try to initiate a new ‘science war’ 
(SEGERSTRÅLE, 2000). Nevertheless, this article presents a vision of the 
discipline and its practitioners that is much more nuanced than how it has been 
typically portrayed, either by the media—as dispassionate, purely data-driven 
mathematicians—, or by the critical literature—as technocrats avid to exert further 
control by using and abusing scientific rhetoric. The vision presented here, rather 
than pick one of these sides, focuses on what economists themselves expressed 
about how they acknowledge and negotiate this tension in order to define a personal 
position as economist. Thus, this work is neither an effort to bash the work of 
economists nor to flatter it. It rather tries to bring the views of economists from 
different age, qualification, and institutions to the fore and—based on them—
rethink the crucial role that economists has played in the recent history of Chile. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
In order to explore the personal views and experiences of economists in Chile in 
relation to the creation, circulation, and use of economics knowledge, a qualitative, 
interview-based study was conducted. This approach was chosen following the 
successful way in which previous studies (e.g., OSBECK et al., 2011) have explored 
and analyzed the diversity of experiences and perspectives of scientists. While 
quantitative studies addressing this topic (e.g., CORREA-MAUTZ, 2013) have 
managed to attract large number of participants (close to 400), the analysis 
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conducted by them offers little detail about the particular experience of each 
participant. Thus, the election of this approach assumes certain limitations in order 
to achieve a more granular and meaningful understanding of the phenomenon. 
Hence, a series of interviews were conducted with 25 economists in Chile.  
2.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Participants for this study were selected following a purposive sampling strategy 
(LUBORSKY & RUBINSTEIN, 1995) aimed to represent the different actors of the 
landscape of economics in Chile described above (i.e. universities, think tanks, and 
government agencies). In total, 42 persons were initially contacted by e-mail, of 
which 25 replied and agreed to participate (17 male and 8 female). All of the 
participants had a degree in economics: 6 a PhD, 3 were PhD students, 13 a MSc, 
and 3 an Honors BSc. All of them worked full-time in a position that specifically 
required such qualification, and were based in Santiago de Chile. Regarding their 
positions, 6 participants were tenure-track professors at three different universities; 
5 worked as research assistants for local branches of two international research 
institutions; 8 were researchers in four different think tanks; 3 worked in the 
division of economic studies at three governmental agencies; and 3 of them were 
PhD students at two local universities. The age of the participants ranged between 
25 and 70 years: 14 participants were between 25 and 35 years, 6 of them between 
35 and 45, and only 5 participants above 45 years of age. Table 1 summarizes this 
information and organizes it in a case-by-case basis. 
 
Table 1: Participants’ characterization 
Participant 
Code a 
Characteristics 
Gender Age Degree Position Institution 
A Female 25-35 MSc Jr. Economic Analyst Gov. Agency 1 
B Male 25-35 PhD (S) Student University 1 
C Female 25-35 PhD (S) Student University 2 
D Male 25-35 PhD (S) Student University 2 
E Male 25-35 MSc Research Assistant Research Center 1 
F Male 25-35 MSc Research Assistant Research Center 1 
G Female 25-35 MSc Research Assistant Research Center 1 
H Male 45+ PhD Professor University 3 
I Female 25-35 MSc Researcher Think Tank 1 
J Male 25-35 MSc Researcher Think Tank 1 
K Female 25-35 MSc Researcher Think Tank 2 
L Female 35-45 PhD Professor University 3 
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M Male 25-35 Hon. BSc Researcher Think Tank 3 
N Male 25-35 MSc Research Manager Research Center 1 
O Male 45+ PhD Professor University 1 
P Male 35-45 Hon. BSc Economic Analyst Gov. Agency 2 
Q Male 35-45 Hon. BSc Economic Analyst Gov. Agency 3 
R Male 25-35 MSc Researcher Think Tank 2 
S Male 45+ PhD Professor University 1 
T Female 35-45 MSc Senior Researcher Think Tank 2 
U Male 25-35 MSc Research Assistant Research Center 2 
V Female 45+ PhD Professor University 2 
W Male 35-45 MSc Senior Researcher Think Tank 4 
X Male 45+ PhD Professor University 2 
Y Male 35-45 MSc Research Manager Think Tank 3 
a: The code assigned to each participant only lists them alphabetically following the 
chronological order in which they were interviewed, and so it has no relation to the given 
names of the participants. 
Only 4 of the participants (C, D, H, V) were not born in Chile, but they had lived for 
at least 2 years in the country and were either native speakers or fully proficient in 
Spanish.  
2.2 DATA COLLECTION 
All the participants were contacted and interviewed between 2014 and 2015, in a 
process that comprised 27 in-depth, semi-structured interviews (2 participants were 
interviewed twice given their availability). These interviews were conducted in 
person by the author at the working place of the participants, except for three of 
them that took place in public spaces as per participants’ request. They were 
audiotaped after receiving the explicit consent of participants and upon agreeing on 
the anonymous handling of their information thorough the research process. No 
form of reward or compensation was offered or given following participation. 
Participants were briefed about the aim of the study and the background of the 
researcher both in the initial contact and at the beginning of the interview. An open-
ended, semi-structured script was used to prompt participants to address the 
following topics along the interview: studies and career path; current position and 
expected projection; personal interest in economics; historical and current role of 
economists in Chile; personal experience working as economist. This script, 
however, was used in a flexible way, adapting it to the particular developments of 
each interview. Closed questions and interpretations by the researcher were avoided 
as much as possible in order to let the participants express their views as they found 
fit. However, following ALVESSON (2003), participants’ positions were regularly 
confronted with counter-positions expressed by other participants, in order to 
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promote an elaboration of their views beyond the simple statement of information. 
In general, participants were talkative and open to address any topic or question that 
was asked. Likewise, they were very clear to explain any technical detail that the 
researcher did not know. It is also worth mentioning that close to half the 
participants were of similar age to the author, which in most of these cases led to a 
certain atmosphere of peer-to-peer interaction—as noticed both in the constant use 
of slang and specific cultural references. Regarding the interview situation, all but 3 
of the interviews were conducted in private, noise-free rooms. Thus there were no 
noticeable interruptions or distractions during the interviews. Regarding their length, 
interviews lasted 62 minutes in average, with only 4 of them lasting for less than 45 
minutes. 
2.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
The analysis of these interviews was done following a two-step analysis, which 
involved an aggregated thematic analysis (BRAUN & CLARKE, 2006) followed by 
the analysis of a single case (HARRISON, BIRKS, FRANKLIN & MILLS, 2017; 
SALVATORE & VALSINER, 2010). This synthesis of aggregate and single case 
analysis is based on the work done by WAGONER (2009) on how different 
methodologies make possible (or not) to capture the subtleties of psychological 
phenomena. As this author concludes, “working between single cases and the 
aggregates can provide invaluable resources for both interpreting single cases and 
understanding the nature of the variation found at the aggregate level.” (p. 118) 
Therefore, this analytical framework offers both a panoramic perspective of the 
broader themes addressed by the participants, but also provides the option of a more 
granular perspective capable of observing the uniqueness of how different 
participants articulate these themes. Hence, it fits squarely with the aim and 
orientation of the present work. 
Thus, the interview content was transcribed using the software ELAN (version 
4.9.4), and then content-coded using the software nVivo for Mac (version 11). The 
coding and the analysis of this data were performed through a thematic analysis, 
along the guidelines8 proposed by BRAUN and CLARKE (2006). This form of 
qualitative analysis for the interview material was chosen due to the combination of 
flexibility and depth that offered. Following these guidelines, it is important to 
clarify here the epistemological grounds in which the analysis was performed. First, 
even if the analysis conducted had a descriptive spirit, it certainly was analyst-
driven, as the pre-existing topics of interest and focus of the interviews make 
impossible to claim a passive role of the researcher. Second, this analysis followed a 
‘semantic approach’, i.e. a “progression from description, where the data have 
simply been organized to show patterns in semantic content, and summarized, to 
																																																								
8  Namely: familiarizing with the data, generating initial codes, searching for themes, 
reviewing themes, defining and naming themes, and finally producing a report (BRAUN & 
CLARKE, 2006, p. 87, Table 1). 
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interpretation, where there is an attempt to theorize the significance of the patterns 
and their broader meanings and implications.” (BRAUN & CLARKE, 2006, p. 13) 
Therefore, the accounts given by participants were taken as valid and trustworthy 
meaningful constructions—even if they were ambivalent or contradictory—, yet 
they were analyzed in reference to the position of the participant in his or her 
cultural environment. Hence, this analytic approach fits the theoretical background 
used in this article, which conceptualizes persons as active meaning-makers of their 
cultural environment.  
After the thematic analysis, a single case was conducted, following WAGONER 
(2009) two-step approach. This second step was aimed to gain insight of how the 
general themes addressed in the first step were articulated together by particular 
participants, following their own personal views and experiences. For this purpose, 
the case of participant K was chosen given the wide of range of topics that this 
participant addressed in her interview, but especially due to the explicit elaboration 
made by her about the intertwinement of her normative views and her work as 
economist at a concrete institution. Given this intricate topic of interest, a case study 
approach (HARRISON et al., 2017) appeared as a sound option since it is “most 
suitable for a comprehensive, holistic, and in-depth investigation of a complex issue 
(…) in context, where the boundary between the context and issue is unclear and 
contains many variables.” (p. 28) Therefore, far from ‘anecdotal evidence’ (cf., 
SALVATORE & VALSINER, 2010), the analysis of this single case provided a 
general perspective of the ways in which participants weaved together the above 
themes, turning them into personal positions rather an abstract issues (CARRÉ, 
2017).  
In the following section, the main results obtained through this two-step analysis are 
presented. In the first place, the results of the thematic analysis are shown; for the 
sake of brevity, no more than two extended excerpts are included per sub-theme. 
Following this, the case of participant K is analyzed in depth. These excerpts are 
translations since all the interviews were conducted in Spanish. 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 THEMATIC ANALYSIS 
The thematic analysis performed revealed many different topics addressed by 
participants, which were organized in themes and sub-themes in a hierarchical way, 
as Figure 1 shows: 
CHAPTER 5. HUMANS OF ECONOMICS 
	 79 
 
Figure 1. Hierarchy of themes and sub-themes 
In the following, interview excerpts representing the different perspectives that 
participants had on these various topics are presented, starting with the role of 
economists in Chile, then their definitions of economics, and finally on how they 
perceived economics as personal activity. 
3.1.1 ROLE OF ECONOMISTS IN CHILE 
3.1.1.1 Excessive social influence of economists 
One of the main topics addressed by the interviewees was the role that economists 
have played during the last decades in Chilean society. About this role, participants 
expressed a distinctive coincidence—rarely seen for other themes—about the 
existence of a notorious and widespread influence of economists in the country: 
“Having a degree in economist in here [Chile] is totally overrated…economists have 
the last word for social issues…so what’s the best option for anybody wanting to 
have influence on the media? Go out and say ‘hey look! I’m an economist and I 
work in this or that think tank’.” (F) 
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“You can see economists in Chile that have an opinion about everything and they 
they’re seen as experts for any topic…for example my [relative] works in education 
and she sees how the influence of economists in the area is excessive…well, you 
don’t need to look that far actually, the minister of education is an economist.” (H) 
As these excerpts show, participants held strong-worded opinions about the role of 
economists in Chile, using terms like ‘overrated’ to describe it, or pointing to their 
‘excessive’ influence. This stance is worth noting since it is completely aligned with 
the sociological and historical literature on economists in Chile summarized above. 
Thus, it is clear that the ‘social transformation’ lived by economists in recent 
decades is not just a scholar analysis, but something experienced and perceived first-
hand by those involved in the activity.   
3.1.1.2 Positions towards social influence 
Far from a description about something distant, however, participants took a 
personal stance about this social role. In this sense, most of them expressed a 
skeptical, or openly critical position about it: 
“I think that is something harmful, harmful for the discipline and for the 
country…it’s OK to have your own ideas and participate in the debate, but the 
problem comes when there’s this idea that you’re the authority and nobody else 
should have a say.” (H) 
“As a discipline, I think that we, economists, have been very arrogant…we don’t 
know what we don’t know, and we think that what we know is more than 
enough…and I’m very critical about this.” (O) 
Thus, agreeing on the existence of a massive influence of economists did not imply 
to endorse this in the least. In fact, the critical view expressed by participants H and 
O was the most typical among participants. This criticism is of special interest for 
this analysis since it does not seem to fit with the ‘almighty’ economists 
(HEREDIA, 2011) portrayed above, who supposedly look to exert as much 
influence as possible. Furthermore, for some participants this influence was neither 
perceived as something sought by economists, nor as unbounded: 
“So economics took all the [social] space that was left available by other social 
sciences…but I do not see intentionality from economists, this was rather the place 
in which society placed us.” (S) 
“But who makes decisions in the end? Politicians…so you can’t blame economics, 
as a discipline, for decisions that are political.” (A) 
Once again, these excerpts suggest that, while participants agreed on the existence 
of a strong influence of economists, they did not embrace it—as economists were 
supposed to, according to the literature.  
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Contrary to this self-critical and distant position, only one participant expressed an 
opinion in complete support of this influence: 
“Well, I actually like that you can find economists everywhere, economists think 
that there is always a lack of economists in more areas…for example, I think that 
many policy decisions during this government have been made out of political 
rather than technical criteria, so I think there is a lack of technically-oriented 
people…and I think that if you talk with any economist they are going to tell you 
the same.” (L) 
It is worth noting that this participant considers his view as a common opinion 
among fellow economists, which does not seem to be the case in the present data 
set.  
3.1.1.3 Rationale of social influence  
Participants of this study elaborated very different reasons to explain the origins of 
the influence that economists have had in the country. Thus, some were explicit in 
connecting this phenomenon to political and historical factors: 
“The Chilean case is very particular, and all this comes from the dictatorship…at 
that time humanities and social sciences were destroyed, but economics was a small 
island within social sciences, which not only wasn’t destroyed but it was actually 
heightened in its validation and legitimacy through the Chicago school.” (S) 
“I think this is based in the fact that we’re a country that came out of a dictatorship 
in which some people had an excessive power…it may sound Machiavellian, but we 
lived a dictatorship in which some economists could decide on structural aspects of 
the society.” (B) 
As seen, these participants attributed economists’ influence directly to the 
dictatorship times and the reforms made by the Chicago Boys (VALDÉS, 1995); as 
it is also clear, this is not perceived as something positive. This perspective, 
interestingly, is fully aligned with the historical accounts described in the 
introduction. 
An opposite perspective, however, was expressed by participants who considered 
that the basis of this influence is the (perceived) great contributions made by 
economists to the development of the country in the recent decades: 
“They [Chicago Boys] are people that made huge contributions to the country, they 
made the country take a leap forward…I mean a lot of people in Chile stopped 
living in poverty because of them…so given the success they had, maybe Chile goes 
to the extreme opposite and starts to pay too much attention to them, well, to us.” 
(E) 
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While this perceived contribution is deemed as something positive, this valuation 
does not limit participant E to consider that such contribution has led the country to 
pay “too much attention” to economists. Thus, it is possible to see that the perceived 
rationale for economists’ influence is not necessarily connected to the personal 
stance—critical or supportive—towards it. This example, furthermore, shows how 
nuanced and unique were the perspectives constructed by different participants. 
Related to the former view, a small number of participants connected economists’ 
influential position to structural advantages of the discipline rather than to 
contingent political events or contributions: 
“People tend to associate economics with the Treasury and macroeconomics, but the 
truth is that economics is an analytic method that you can apply to any science, 
particularly social sciences…but we have one advantage, that we are trained to 
measure, which is something that other social sciences don’t do…but we, 
economists, are educated since early in our training to propose an hypothesis and 
then proceed to test it econometrically…other sciences have tried to catch up, but 
we are on the lead…so we can have an opinion in almost every topic because we 
have a method that allow us to formulate a problem and solve it…and this is the 
imperialism of the economists.” (X) 
Even though this view was a minority among participants, it is worth noting as it is 
much closer to the portrayal of economists made by the literature on the subject, i.e. 
social actors that base their influence on the rhetoric of technical, economic 
knowledge. For economics have a perceived an inherent advantage compared to 
other disciplines, which makes it completely natural for economists to have a more 
influential position. It is also interesting to note the identification made by 
participant X, consistently referring about economists in Chile as ‘we’, which is 
something that most participants did not do. Regarding this identification, it is 
important to note that he is a senior professor, with more than 40 years in academia, 
and also the eldest participant—which hints on a generational element that will be 
addressed later. While the few participants holding this view pointed to the strict 
numeric, mathematic nature of economics as something given, the characterizations 
made about the discipline were much more diverse, and certainly not only centered 
in the numeric. 
3.1.2 Defining economics 
The characterization of economics as a discipline was a recurrent theme across 
interviews. In particular, participants addressed five core elements, which many 
times reached beyond the local Chilean context: (a) the evidence-based nature of 
economics; (b) the conceptual role played by incentives; (c) the limits of this 
economic rationality; (d) the tension between normative and positive economics; 
and (e) the mistrust between actors in the Chilean economics community. The views 
expressed about these topics, following a similar trend of the results presented 
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above, typically included counter-views contesting what other participants said. 
Thus, based on this analysis it was not possible—based on this group of 
participants—to distill something as the unitary view that economists in Chile have 
about their discipline. It is possible, on the other hand, to observe that this is a 
subject in which a diverse range of perspectives sometimes converge and sometimes 
diverge in recurrent patterns. 
3.1.2.1 Economics as evidence-based social science 
When talking about economics as a discipline, participants were eager to stress the 
importance of working around evidence—although none of the participants 
addressed the exact meaning of evidence or data. In doing so, participants implicitly 
emphasized the scientific character of economics:  
“You can think that the color green is prettier, you know, but there is a truth beyond 
that…you can have preferences, but you’re going to study them and contrast them 
with evidence, with models.” (B) 
“You have a conviction as economist and expert in public policies, because you 
can’t forget your own role, you’re not a politician…so you’re convinced that [policy 
A is better than B] because you have a background, you have data, you have studies, 
you have compared experience, etc.…I’m not going to look for the public policy 
that is more popular for the majority, I’m going to look for the policy that I’m 
convinced, not from a ideological point of view, but because I have the evidence for 
saying that it improves the living conditions of the poor, that gives more freedom of 
choice to people, because I believe in that.” (T) 
These examples are clear in showing that, for participants of this study, being an 
economist implied working around data, evidence, and research—something that 
could hardly be surprising. What is interesting to note, however, is that although 
participant T rejects any personal orientation regarding her work, she considered 
that giving more freedom of choice to people is something inherently good that 
public policies—and the economic reasoning supporting them—should foster. Far 
from cynicism, this dual stance of rejecting but also embracing normative 
orientations could be understood as a form of doublethink (Carré, 2017). In this 
sense, the perspective portrayed by participant T—even if it is inconsistent from a 
logical standpoint—reveals her commitment to work on the grounds of evidence 
but, at the same time, to advance towards—in her view—a freer society. Therefore, 
this is an interesting example of how deeply the personal orientations and 
motivations could be ingrained into doing economics. 
Several participants, on the other hand, made clear their suspicion about taking 
economics evidence at face value. Thus they elaborated a critical angle against the 
former:  
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“If you take the econometric road, well econometrics can take anything in, you input 
a lot of data, whatever it is, and it’s always going to produce something, the thing is 
how you interpret that…and there’s a lot of theory behind that, there are theories 
saying A and others saying B, so what side you choose has to do a lot with your 
ideology, what are the basis for saying what you’re saying…and what has more 
weight? That’s difficult to say.” (P) 
Considering this excerpt by itself, its most relevant aspect seems to be the skeptical 
stance towards the allegedly more objective side of the discipline, namely 
econometric instrumental. Yet, this excerpt becomes much more meaningful when it 
is connected to the one discussed right above, which precisely shows how difficult it 
is to make such a clear-cut distinction between personal interests and way of 
choosing economic evidence—even when it is explicitly endorsed. Moreover, as it 
will be shown later, touching upon the role of ideology on economists’ work is 
anything but a minor issue. 
3.1.2.2 Key role of incentives in economic thinking 
The second topic addressed regarding the discipline was the crucial role that 
incentives has for economic thinking. In fact, most of the participants defined 
incentives as the conceptual keystone of economics: 
“To understand how scarce resources are allocated is to understand incentives, 
because if those incentives are not well aligned the allocation is going to be 
inefficient…and incentives are related to the market, to public policies, to the state, 
to externalities, so you need to understand that in depth…and this is why you see 
economists involved in topics like prison management, education, healthcare, 
because if you assume that all individuals behave according to incentives then you 
can use the economic instrumental to understand what happens in the classroom, I 
can analyze family dynamics, I can even analyze crime.” (H) 
Although incentives were consistently mentioned as the basis of economic 
rationality by most of the participants, there was little elaboration on how incentives 
work. In this sense, participants apparently assumed that economic actions and 
policies move people—all people—to react in a certain standard way; somehow 
disregarding the complexities of human motivation. Yet, in a very interesting turn 
from the former, a number of participants held a critical view of this exclusive focus 
on incentives: 
“Economists from older generations are more one-sided, more radical on their way 
of looking at the world…but we, newer generations, understand that economics is 
not the only way to look at things…it’s a reduced way, smart and rigorous indeed, 
but it’s a limited and particular way of looking at things, it’s no more that…I’m not 
going to explain the world from economics alone.” (F) 
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As mentioned earlier, there was a consistent perception among participants in the 
25-35-age range about a generational divide between ‘old’ and ‘new’ economists. 
This was elaborated in different forms but it shared the common root of identifying 
‘older economists’ as too radical in their economic or political thinking; which 
served as a counterpoint for how younger economists defined themselves—much 
more open to different ideas and disciplines.  
3.1.2.3 Limits of the discipline 
Connected to this distance from an overarching logic of incentives, participants 
consistently touched upon the limitations they perceived about this reasoning.  
While few participants expressed conceptual concerns about incentives, most of 
them presented cases that they considered as not fit to be assessed by economics and 
its rationality: 
“It’s complicated when the dignity of the people is involved…so for example you 
can’t defend what happens with the [healthcare system] that charges higher fees for 
women, I understand that from an economic point of view women imply more costs, 
but that’s not right because that’s outright discrimination…so there are many topics 
like this in which I have concerns.” (I) 
“There are things that I’m up to negotiate, and here comes the normative again, 
despite my economist’ gut, for example, if you tell me ‘legalize drugs’, I would say 
no, because I’m sure that regarding drugs people don’t know what’s best for them 
and so it clashes with the view of an economist, which would be completely 
libertarian…but I don’t believe in that position, but that’s something normative and 
then I move to the citizen side.” (K) 
It is interesting to see how participants elaborated concrete limits to the reach of 
economics, which are explicitly connected to their personal experiences and 
ideological positions. This is clear in how participant I expressed her concern about 
the discrimination that women experience in the Chilean healthcare system, 
something that affects her directly as a woman. Likewise, participant K mentioned 
how legalizing drugs is an issue that, for her, just should not be decided on the basis 
of economics. Although this reasoning should make unclear on what grounds 
economic rationality should be applied to any topic, this reflection was largely 
absent. Besides this, these examples reveal interesting topics in which, when 
confronted against personal values, economics thinking recedes.  
3.1.2.4 Positive-normative tension in economics 
Following the ‘citizen’ side mentioned in the latter example, participants 
consistently identified a tension between the normative and the positive—as in 
positivism—side of the discipline (cf. CARRÉ, 2016). This tension could be 
described as whether economists create or pick certain evidence given their 
scientific, objective value or because it feeds on their own normative views. 
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Regarding this tension, it was possible to identify the full range of views, from ‘pure 
positivist’ to ‘full normative’ views, with more nuanced visions in the middle: 
“None of us [professors at University 2] write political columns, these columns are 
only technical…they address policy issues, because they’re applied, but they’re not 
about values, they’re about things that are ultimately technical…and this is 
something very typical from [USA university name] where they trained us to 
completely separate the positive from the normative side of economics, and we 
make that distinction very clearly…we end up making recommendations, but that is 
supported in positive elements.” (X) 
“There needs to be a balance, we’re not of the idea that evidence is the only valid 
argument…there needs to be a balance between all kind of arguments [normative 
and positive], and hopefully evidence is considered as much as possible…but it’s 
ok, both arguments are equally valid…the problem is when normative things are 
tried to be disguised as positive, positive in the scientific sense…if that distinction is 
clearly made, I have no problem.” (N)  
“It’s a circular argument, when you say that you are not politically oriented, you’re 
politically oriented already, because you’re defending an approach and a 
methodology that’s showing a reality that’s oriented by your theoretical 
framework…so I see a lot of hypocrisy in the vision of fellow economists that call 
themselves ‘aseptic-ones’, as if their work is not politically oriented, and that’s 
related with the training curriculums, that’s why I think that political economy is so 
crucial what’s happening today.” (W)  
First of all, these excerpts show the enormous diversity that was possible to find on 
whether economics is perceived to be driven by positive data or by normative 
orientations. It is interesting to note that how for ‘positive-oriented’ participants, the 
normative side is something that must be kept away from economics at all costs, 
while participants endorsing a ‘normative-oriented’ view claimed that such view is 
just a pretense created by those who do not want to acknowledge their own position. 
These positions create a deadlock that cannot be solved as long as the positive and 
the normative orientations are perceived as polar opposites. As discussed elsewhere 
(CARRÉ, 2016), this is not necessarily the case, especially for social sciences like 
economics. In this sense, keeping normative orientations completely apart from 
scientific activity is something very unlikely—if not undesirable—, which does not 
imply that these orientations would override the scientific aim of creating true 
knowledge (POLANYI, 1962). This integrative position, to be further discussed in 
the case analysis, was rarely present among the interviewed participants, which led 
to many suspicions between fellow economists. 
3.1.2.5 Mistrust between actors of the Chilean economists’ community 
Several participants expressed a skeptical perception about the work that fellow 
economists conduct at other institutions, something that was especially clear 
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between university professors, think tank researchers, and research assistants. 
Mutual mistrust, in this sense, was based on the perception that other economists 
conduct their research just on normative or political grounds rather than technical 
ones: 
“There’s people within the discipline that try to preach in technical language 
something that is clearly ideological…I’m talking about Chicago economists in 
Chile…you read them several times in a month in newspapers, and they try to talk 
from a technical point of view, but they have no evidence for their claims, and 
actually many times the evidence goes in the opposite direction…so you’re not 
going to lose your time trying to debunk them, because you know there’s a strong 
ideological component behind it…disguising the ideological as technical is 
something that many people do…economics is not like physics, there’s people and 
social process involved.” (O) 
“I think that many think tanks are not very rigorous, they just prefer slogans…or 
others [think tanks] that are too dogmatic and only pay attention to evidence 
supporting one side of the argument…it’s a complex thing, but I think that you can 
make a rigorous study, based on evidence, and not because of that you’re going to 
find everything else wrong.” (M) 
Here, again, the role of normative elements is a divisive point among economists. 
As seen, these elements have a clear role in the suspicions about the objectivity of 
the work made by fellow economists—but, interestingly, never about their own 
work. On the other hand, this suspicion between Chilean economists reveals that the 
landscape of the economics community is anything but homogeneous. In other 
words, while the label ‘economist’ might be seen as a blanket validation for 
outsiders, for those who take part of the community the institutions to which 
economists are affiliated have a strong influence on how their work is pondered. 
Yet, these distinctions made by economists seem to be largely absent from existing 
accounts on the topic. As an interesting note, the excerpt by participant O is a clear 
reference to economists like participant X, who have regular policy columns in 
newspapers. Thus, this kind of connections emphasizes the role of the economics 
community in the personal positioning of participants, underscoring the need for 
psychological approaches that are sensitive to social and cultural elements. 
3.1.3 ECONOMICS AS PERSONAL ACTIVITY 
Within this theme two elements converged that addressed neither the social role of 
economists nor the discipline, but the personal experience of being an economist: 
the motivations for doing economics; and the personal changes perceived after more 
than 10 years of studying and working as economists.  
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3.1.3.1 Motivations for doing economics 
Regarding the former, participants expressed diverse positions: 
“A lot of topics that [Research Center 1] addresses interest me, things like poverty, 
development, that have always interested me…I’ve always wanted to have a job 
that’s fulfilling, that makes you feel that you’re working for society…I know it 
sounds like a cliché, but I believe in that.” (N) 
“Well, I shared the ideas of everybody in here (Think Tank 1), but that’s funny 
because nobody ever asked me about that…well, it was an honor being invited to 
work here by a professor, even though I would earn a lot less than in other places, I 
would be able to teach and keep studying…but what really attracted me was being 
able to participate in the public debate, to be updated with what’s going on in the 
country, to know how the state works, what are the laws in discussion, so to know 
where are we heading.” (R) 
Although in different ways, there was a clear convergence among participants in 
wanting to make an important contribution to the country. Whilst this interest 
certainly echoes the views on the influential role of economists in Chile, it clashes 
with the general criticism expressed about this privileged position. As noted earlier, 
even if the co-existence of these perspectives could be analyzed as a logical 
inconsistency, the present analysis considered them as valid meaning constructions 
even if they might not conform to logical standards. More importantly, these 
motivations reveal that, far from a detached and aseptic position, most participants 
have an explicit and personal commitment driving their work as economists. While 
this does not necessarily mean that they use their technical and scientific work as a 
leverage to push a normative agenda, it is reminder that economists typically have a 
social sense of purpose beyond publishing. Moreover, the presence of personal 
interests sheds light on how little grasp on actual economists’ experience have the 
portrayal of economists as just detached mathematicians.  
The exception to the former, however, was coincidentally observed in the three 
participants who were working at government agencies, who declared to be 
skeptical about doing any real contribution: 
“I did my internship in an investment bank, but that would be my last choice for 
applying to a job…because of a minimum of commitment, I don’t want to make 
those that have a lot of money to get even more money out of financial 
speculation…but I’m a realist, I don’t want to change the world, you know? Doing a 
marginal analysis, I’m not going to make any difference, zero…but one thing is 
doing nothing, and another thing is doing something harmful…so I don’t hope to 
help anybody out there, but at least I’m not going to help speculators.” (A) 
Thus, except for these three cases, participants declared a consistent, personal 
interest for having an influence on Chilean society through their work as 
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economists. Yet, these cases are not to be dismissed, as they are a reminder of the 
risk of doing blanket statements about ‘Chilean economists’ as an undifferentiated 
group. 
3.1.3.2 Impact of economics in personal life 
The second element that stood out within this theme were the perceived influences 
in their own ways of thinking and behaving that participants attributed to being an 
economist. The clearest example of this is the following excerpt: 
“I think that studying economics gives you a structure of thought that is completely 
different from the people in humanities and other areas, and you notice it in the 
conversations you have and to how you analyze a problem…now everything is cost-
benefit for me, or margin analysis, and I don’t believe anything that’s not backed 
with data…in the end economics is almost an approach to the world, it’s an 
instrumental made to conceptualize problems…and it’s sometimes limited, and very 
totalizing, because you assume that people want to maximize their own interest and 
that their capable of aligning their decisions to that, and with that you can explain 
the world.” (R) 
Following participant R’s description, being an economist have involved a deep 
transformation in the way he approaches the world; something that is scarcely 
considered as part of the scientific activity, given the assumed detachment of 
scientists from their activity. Likewise, participant K declared to experience her 
work as an economist in Think Tank 2 as a sort of extension of her personal 
orientation: 
“Yeah, this work completely represents my way of thinking…particularly because 
of the place I’m working at [Think Tank 2], where I share the way of thinking, 
because of things as basic as the upbringing I received from my parents that make a 
lot of sense to me with everything, like the freedom of the individual, of thinking the 
individual as the center, instead of the group as the center bypassing the 
individual…so it completely goes with me, and it’s funny because I got in 
economics just because of an inspiring professor, and I ended up working in 
something that identifies me completely, so I consider myself so lucky because it 
could have been otherwise.” (K) 
While participant K considered herself lucky for having her position, it is difficult to 
ignore the notorious alignment between biographical experiences (her upbringing, 
an inspirational professor), her personal views of society (individual freedom above 
collectivism), and the ideological orientation of the Think Tank where she worked at 
the moment of the interview. Even if this participant did not perceive it like this, her 
experience seems to point to how tightly interwoven her personal experiences and 
views are with her work as economist, which is in turn bound to a very specific 
institution. The latter point makes it clear why an integrated analysis of 
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psychological and socio-cultural elements is of the essence both for understanding 
the work of economists, and for science studies at large. 
3.2. CASE STUDY 
As already seen, the thematic analysis was useful in mapping the manifold themes 
addressed by participants and the different views that they held about them. The 
final example presented, however, showed how personal interests and orientations 
could be more than just ‘influences’ over a certain topic. They could actually be the 
thread weaving together the different positions that participants constructed. Thus, 
in order to properly grasp the full significance of this rich example, the case of 
participant K is further analyzed in this sub-section.  
Participant K is a female MSc in economics in the age range between 25 and 35 
years, who at the moment of the interview worked as junior research at Think Tank 
2—a well-known right-wing oriented think tank in Chile. Following her trajectory 
as economist, it is interesting to note how she got involved in it: 
“I was at high school and I really had no clue about what studying…and I don’t 
remember why exactly, but I ended up in the business school9, and courses on 
economics started to interest me more…and I remember that one professor in 
particular made me understand that, more than managing money, economics is 
about managing resources of any kind…so the analysis you make in economics is 
more about a certain way of thinking than about finances.” (K) 
Far from a long-standing call, for participant K choosing to become an economist 
was almost a coincidence. This shaky start, however, does not imply that she felt 
disconnected from her current work as economist—as clearly seen above. When 
asked about what exactly consisted her work, she described it as follows: 
“So, I arrived here [to Think Tank 2] and they asked me ‘what do you want to focus 
on?’ and I said education, because that’s my main interest and also my master’s 
thesis topic…so I started applying the most basic logic of economics, cost-benefit 
analysis, opportunity cost, incentives to education…and that’s why I’m here and not 
somewhere else…but sometimes I ask myself if I’m at the right place, because 
talking about education as an economist seems to be something bad nowadays, you 
get a lot of criticism for being an economist talking about education…once I 
participated in an education debate representing Think Tank 2, and a [well-known 
																																																								
9 In Chile there is no bachelor-level training in economics. The degree of economist is offered 
as a major and honors option to those who complete a bachelor on business and 
administration at a limited number of universities. Only a minor fraction of students, typically 
those with better grades, choose to follow the economics path. Despite its academic prestige, 
economics is not a priority option for undergraduate students since it does not increase the 
future wage in comparison to the management major. Moreover, those who pursue the 
‘academic track’ of economics (i.e., master and the PhD) certainly are a minority inside a 
minority 
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journalist] in the panel says to the audience ‘well, the horrors I have to listen for 
deciding to debate with a young economist’…that was tough.” (K) 
While this single excerpt contains the core of participant K’s work as think tank 
researcher—economic analysis of educational policy—, it reveals much more than 
that. As here it is possible to see her definition of economics’ core rationality (cost-
benefit, incentives), one for her motivations for working at Think Tank 2 (the 
possibility for working on education topics), and also a personal experience (being 
harshly criticized at a debate) that questions if economists in Chile are really 
‘almighty’ in any topic they address. In this sense, even if it is possible to make an 
analysis that separates these topics into organized themes, as this example shows, 
these topics are tightly connected to each other, converging in a single meaningful 
articulation.  
Regarding these articulations, participant K’s personal commitment with promoting 
individual freedom of choice, as noted in the last example of the thematic analysis, 
seemed to be the thread weaving together her upbringing, her work as economist, 
and her position at Think Tank 2. This element was worth analyzing in further 
depth, particularly to determine whether this normative orientation had really 
twisted and biased her work as economist—a concern that many participants 
expressed about fellow economists. The first element to note about this is the clear 
line that participant K marked:  
“You know, it’s very funny because if it would be for my ideology I would hate the 
[education quality assurance agency], but if you look at what literature says about 
accountability, about defining criteria for assessing results, the fact that somebody 
inspects minimum conditions at schools, you see that’s something necessary…so I 
admit that compared evidence and international experts say that this agency is 
necessary, although in the bottom of my heart I hate it…from my ideological point 
of view I don’t like that an agency has the power to exert regulations that somebody 
might misuse, but the evidence is the evidence, that’s what experts say, and we 
[Think Tank 2] echo that.” (K) 
As this excerpt makes clear, participant K considered that evidence is something 
more relevant than her own personal ideals of more individual freedom and less 
regulations. As other participants noted, if such commitment to work based on 
evidence would be completely subsumed to normative orientations, then it would be 
pointless to work as a researcher. For it would be much easier to work in politics, or 
simply fabricate evidence, than going through rigorous scientific standards. This 
commitment to base her work in evidence, however, does not go against the fact that 
those normative orientations—as noted in the last example of the thematic 
analysis—are the interest that drove her to work as an economist, and assess those 
ideas in scientific terms. Just as the following excerpt shows: 
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“I feel that here nobody works for getting the spotlight…here we all work for a 
common goal, which is defending the ideas that we believe in, or the policy goals 
that we think are the best for the country.” (K) 
Does this means that participant K would go to any lengths in order to push these 
ideas forward? As she made explicit above, this is not the case: for her, the limit for 
defending her ideas is what evidence says. Yet, at the same time, it is not possible to 
understand why she committed to work as an economist in the first place without 
these personal interests in promoting education and freedom of choice. Therefore, 
far from irrelevant or undesirable aspects, personal elements like this seem crucial to 
properly understand participant K’s work in particular, and scientific activity at 
large. For these elements provide, metaphorically speaking, the weaving thread that 
binds together different experiences, views on the discipline, and research practices 
in a meaningful way. Thus making possible to understand them in a unitary way 
rather than just a collection of opinions. 
Moreover, this insight—largely absent from science studies—seemed to be a pretty 
clear element for participant K. Thus, she reflected that: 
“I think that that’s what make the difference in the end, I mean, the assumptions I 
have, or what I think that’s right is very different from what others want…so, for 
example, I see freedom of choice as an ultimate goal…and the consequences the 
follow that freedom are going to be criticized by those who do not value that 
freedom as much as I do, and I think that in the end everything is connected to those 
tenets, to the valuations you make of things, and that’s the origins of all the 
differences…if I had the same ultimate goals, not the ones that you sometimes 
declare, that the government has, for example, I would be proposing the same 
policies that they’re doing right now.” (K) 
Here it is possible to see how this participant identified that normative orientations 
are not only an element that drives her work, but also the work of other actors, like 
the government. Although, interestingly, she did not attach the same negative 
meaning that other participants attributed to normative orientations—as seen in the 
previous section. On the contrary, to a certain extent she acknowledged that other 
social actors could have different normative orientations, and that is not something 
to be bashed but to be accepted. This opens a topic that participant K did not address 
but that seems of the outmost importance to understand the work of economists in 
Chile: how are those normative elements driving economists’ work discussed in 
order to reach a potential consensus? Moreover, could they really be discussed when 
they are typically assumed to be completely absent? This is a topic that goes beyond 
the present work but certainly deserves attention in further research. 
4. DISCUSSION  
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In order to discuss these extensive data, it is not possible to avoid what MITROFF 
(1972a) wrote about the results of his own seminal study more than 40 years ago: 
“Needless to say, the results of this study are so much at variance with the common, 
stereotyped image of science as to cast "extreme" (if not "total") doubt over the 
validity of such previous accounts of science. Further, the study not only seriously 
questions the images of science that have been perpetrated by the philosophy and 
sociology of science (to mention but only two fields of inquiry that actively study 
science) but it also raises the question of why we have perpetrated such images. In 
psychological terms, why have we needed to perpetrate such images? Is there 
something in the psychology of scientists (and in those of us who study science) that 
has made us need the stereotyped image of science?” (p. B-613) 
While the conclusions of the present work are definitely neither as radical nor as 
opposed to the literature as the case of MITROFF (1972a), the scenario described by 
him certainly resembles the discrepancies found by this study regarding the existing 
works on economists in Chile. Thus, let us summarize both the thematic analysis 
and the case study performed in order to observe in detail how much convergence 
and divergence exists between the present qualitative, cultural psychological 
approach and the historical and sociological literature.  
As a whole, the thematic analysis performed made clear the existence of a myriad of 
perspectives and views of participants. In the first place, while it showed a 
consistent agreement regarding an influential role of economists in Chilean society, 
it also made clear that participants leaned towards criticism rather than support 
about it. Even though the former echoes the historical and sociological literature on 
the role of economists (e.g., MARKOFF & MONTECINOS, 1993), the latter results 
difficult to integrate in it, as economists were expected to endorse rather than 
criticize their own social influence. Furthermore, as some participants declared, 
most economists in Chile do not have much concrete political power, as they 
perceived their influence as expert ‘opinion-makers’ rather than decision-makers. 
Additionally, participants proposed three different rationales for such influence: the 
dictatorship and the role of the Chicago Boys; the contributions that economists 
have made to the country’s development in recent decades; and the inherent 
technical-scientific superiority of economics. These views, interestingly, reflect the 
different political narratives that have addressed the role of economists in Chile 
(GÁRATE, 2012a; HUNEEUS, 2014), namely critical, pragmatic, and supportive.  
Regarding the views on the discipline expressed by participants, five aspects were 
salient. The first of them was placing evidence as the paramount criterion for doing 
economics. Yet this was questioned by underscoring the interpretative side involved 
in econometric evidence. This critique, more likely to be found in sociology of 
scientific knowledge works (e.g., ARIZTÍA, 2012), makes a point on how reflective 
and self-critical participants of this study were regarding their discipline. This self-
criticism and reflexivity is especially noteworthy for a topic like econometrics, 
which has been a dominant trend in the discipline during the last decades (CARRÉ, 
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2017), and thus largely assumed to be a dogma among economists in Chile (e.g., 
GÁRATE, 2012a). 
The second element defined the core of economic thinking, namely incentives, and 
how they allow economists to model any human phenomena. This view provides a 
grounded explanation for MONTECINOS and MARKOFF’s (2012) perspective, 
which points out how economists’ influence has expanded into many different social 
issues. Younger participants, however, consistently deemed this unbounded view of 
incentives—and thus economics—as ‘radical’, using it as an example of the distance 
they perceive with older generations. A generational divide that, following the 
literature reviewed, seems to be an absent topic.  
Connected to the former, the third aspect of participants’ definition of economics 
was the perceived limitations of the incentives logic, which proved to be not so 
universal as previously defined. Interestingly, these limitations were based in 
personal, normative elements rather than conceptual or methodological 
shortcomings; something that was also possible to observe in the two previous sub-
themes. These personal views, as noted in the introduction, have been either ignored 
by the literature or subsumed under collective aspects, like institutional 
memberships (e.g., GÁRATE, 2012b). As the examples presented for these sub-
themes make clear, these personal commitments play a much more relevant role.  
Thus, the fourth element addressed within this theme was the tension between 
positive and normative aspects of economics, which revealed a continuous spectrum 
of positions: from those who considered economics as a positive, data-driven 
discipline to those who view it as driven by normative orientations. While the 
former has been assumed to be the perspective of economists in Chile (e.g., 
MONTECINOS & MARKOFF, 2012; cf., HEREDIA, 2011), the latter view has 
been largely omitted. Moreover, following POLANYI’s (1962) description of how 
difficult it is for scientists to acknowledge the presence of personal elements in their 
work, it is pretty remarkable the insight displayed by participants of this study. For 
all these cases, the intrusion of normative elements was typically deemed as 
something to be avoided; yet even those participants who were vocally against this 
hinted at how their personal orientations colored their work. This negative valuation 
of normative elements seemed to be based on the idea that these elements would 
bias their work, turning it into a mere subjective opinion. This does not necessarily 
needs to be the case, as the former assumption is rather based in an unrealistic 
conception of the scientific work (POLANYI, 1968), particularly for human and 
social sciences.  
Connected to the former, the fifth sub-theme addressed was the mistrust that 
participants expressed about fellow economists working at different institutions, 
since they were suspected of forcing their scientific work to fit their normative 
orientations. Interestingly, participants holding this critical view did not express 
concerns that something similar could happen to them. This differential perception 
of fellow economists, however, has not been stressed by the critical literature on the 
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subject, yet it could certainly complement the analysis of newer actors—namely 
think tanks—of this community (e.g., SILVA, 2012).  
Finally, the third theme addressed by the thematic analysis corresponded to those 
personal elements that participants explicitly perceived to be related with their 
experience as economists. Thus, the predominant motive expressed by participants 
for studying and working on economics was being able to make a relevant social 
contribution, be it through advancing the frontier of knowledge or by promoting 
better public policies. This declared motivation is certainly aligned with the social 
role that economists have had in Chile (GÁRATE, 2012a) and the 
acknowledgement that participants made of this role described above. Moreover, the 
relevance given by participants to their motives for being an economist showed—
from a different perspective—how personal elements drove participants’ work. 
However, an interesting counter-position was expressed by a group of participants 
who declared to be very skeptic about any contribution they could make, declaring 
their work as economists just as an interesting, well-paid job. This counter-position 
shows, once again, how relevant is HEREDIA’s (2011) critique regarding blanket 
depictions of Chilean economists. 
The second element within this theme was the personal changes attributed to being 
an economist. Here it was possible to note several experiences of how economics 
promoted a more analytic mindset, centered in incentives and marginal analysis. 
This is certainly worth noting as the personal changes associated to become a 
scientist have received scant attention even within psychological accounts of 
science—with few exceptions (e.g., OSBECK et al., 2011; YEN & TAFARODI, 
2011). As noted before, this neglect is probably due to the assumed detachment that 
scientists should have toward their activity (POLANYI, 1962, 1968). A different 
angle of these perceived changes was the experience of participant K, who reflected 
on how the relevance of freedom of choice provided continuity between her 
upbringing, her education as economist, her personal social how views, and her 
work at a specific think tank. This example in particular resulted very interesting as 
it shows two quite important points for this work. First, how personal experiences 
and commitments drive in a constructive way the scientific activity by turning it 
meaningful, rather than representing a calculated bias subverting the spirit of 
scientific work. Second, that participant K’s position at a concrete institution, which 
is aligned with her own views, is crucial for this meaningful perception of her work 
as economist. The latter point is a clear example of why it is crucial to analyze 
personal meanings in relation to socio-cultural elements—like institutions—for 
science studies in particular, but for human studies at large. 
The in-depth analysis of participant K’s case showed in further detail how her 
personal interests and commitments were interweaved in her work. In particular, it 
revealed the balance between these normative orientations and the commitment to 
work scientifically as an economist. In this sense, participant K made clear that she 
would not go against what economic evidence establishes, even if this contradicts 
her personal views; thus endorsing a scientific stance that aims for objectivity. At 
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the same time, her interest for doing such economic research was ultimately based 
on her ideal of a society that provides individuals alternatives to choose, especially 
in education. This balance represents a very good example of POLANYI’s (1962) 
theorization on personal knowledge. Moreover, it also showed how the 
acknowledgement of a personal perspective does not imply a rejection of any other 
view that does not coincide with it. Given the relevance attributed by this participant 
to these personal elements, which also coincide with existing theoretical views (e.g., 
POLANYI, 1962; VALSINER, 2014), it is difficult to understand why they have 
received so little attention. If anything, this article is an effort to revert this trend and 
widen the scope of current social and psychological studies of science. 
Summarizing, just as HEREDIA (2011) hypothesized, the variety of perspectives 
expressed by participants was notorious. Thus, based in the diversity observed in the 
small group of participants interviewed, it is not possible to conclude, along with the 
literature, a homogeneous group thinking among economists. On the contrary, 
having a personal, meaningful stance towards these topics was the rule rather than 
the exception. To make this aspect visible, the qualitative, two-step analysis 
proposed by WAGONER (2009) was crucial. While the thematic analysis provided 
a valuable overview of participants’ positions, the personal perspective of 
participants was brought forward through the detailed analysis of particular cases. In 
particular, the latter revealed how personal commitments—about the discipline and 
society—weave together the views that participants had on the social role of 
economists, the discipline, and its relation to their lives.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the present article is by no means an effort to 
‘sabotage’ economists or their work. It is, first, an effort to show the relevance of 
including their personal perspectives and experiences in order to properly 
understand their influence and work; thus avoiding blanket generalizations based in 
collective elements. At the same time, this study aimed to show that it is possible to 
do the former without isolating these experiences and views from the cultural 
environments in which they occur. More generally, this article is presented a way of 
understanding scientific activity better not by suppressing the personal dimension of 
scientists but by exploring and understanding its role. 
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RESISTING BUT ACCEPTING IDEOLOGY:  
MAKING SENSE THROUGH DOUBLETHINK 
David Carré 
 
 
 
As men in society, scientists are sometimes the 
agents, sometimes the objects, of resistance to 
their own discoveries. (Barber, 1961, p. 602) 
 
Resistance, as a general notion, evokes mixed impressions. On the one hand, it 
portrays the courageous, rebellious face-off of the weak against the powerful, the 
oppressor. History is generous with examples of this way of resisting: from La 
Résistance française fighting against Nazi occupiers, to the nonviolent resistance 
and civil disobedience movement led by Gandhi against the British colonial regime. 
Yet resistance might also stand for those holding stubborn positions, acting against 
everything without proposing any alternatives. For instance, reactionaries, those 
who strived for returning to the status quo ante and opposed to (what was presented 
as) the transformative forces of the French Revolution. Therefore, as these two sides 
of resistance show, there must be first a pushing, transformative force—oppressive 
or progressive—in order to be a resistance against it. Hence, regardless of whether 
its valuation is emancipatory or reactionary, resistance appears to exist primarily as 
an oppositional, negative force.  
Going beyond this assumption, however, the present volume offers several 
examples (Cavada, this volume; Konwar & Bhargava, this volume; Sharma, this 
volume; et passim) of what emerges out of such ‘negative’ forces. In brief, these 
works extensively emphasize how oppositional stances could become stepping-
stones for creating novel psychological paths in human lives. In this sense, resisting 
against something—institutional settings, societal expectations, or family 
pressures—might begin as a blunt ‘no’; but it might also support the person into 
constructing something different, something better. Ultimately, as shown by the 
examples in the previous paragraph, those who have resisted against something have 
at the same time always strived for creating—or returning to—something other than 
the current state of affairs. 
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The general character of resistance is well summarized by Valsiner (2014), in 
particular through his A<>non A schema—based on Alexius Meinong’s and the 
Graz School ideas. In the context of his cultural psychology of semiotic dynamics, 
Valsiner proposes that for every node-point sign ‘A’ there is necessarily a ‘non-A’ 
field-like sign (Josephs, Valsiner & Surgan, 1999). Here it is worth noting that the 
‘<>’ symbol connecting A and non-A denotes a co-constitutive relation between 
them. In other terms, the nature of A is necessarily defined in relation to all the 
elements, or meanings that legitimately link with what A-is-not. This approach for 
defining the content of a sign reflects the existence—and creation—of mental 
objects as ‘Gegenstand’, German word for object that “entails the notion of position 
(Stand) against (Gegen) something” (Diriwächter & Valsiner, 2008, p. 219). 
Therefore, for Valsiner (2014), resistance is one of the most basic drivers for the 
functioning and development of the human mind. In his words: “All psychological 
phenomena can be characterized by DIRECTION and COUNTER- DIRECTION 
(or—RESISTANCE to DIRECTION). The unity of such direction and counter-
action creates for psychology the arena for conceptualizing dualities in their 
functions” (p. 13). As it will become clear, this is the general framework for the 
ideas presented from now on. 
In this chapter I look to further elaborate on the basic, driving role of resistance for 
human psychological functioning proposed by Valsiner (2014). In particular, I focus 
on the cases in which persons resist and forbid themselves certain opinions or 
interests in order to make sense of certain areas of their own lives. Interestingly, 
most of these self/cultural–forbidden paths are not only to be avoided, but it 
becomes necessary to overtly stand against them, thus displaying an active 
resistance. As football hooliganism reminds us time and again, rooting is not enough 
for ‘true fans’. For hooligans, it seems more important to fight—sometimes to the 
death—against fans supporting other teams rather than do anything related to what 
happens in the pitch. Thus standing for their team equates to be against other 
teams—even beyond football. In brief, as Nedergaard, Valsiner, and Marsico (2015) 
argue: “We need fictions of not being in order to be, and being so as not be.” (p. 
261) 
My elaboration, however, looks to explore the dynamic character of the latter claim, 
i.e. what happens when those ‘fictions’—of being and not being—are not fixed over 
time but actually exchanged during the span of an interaction. In particular, I aim to 
examine those situations in which strict stances-against-something coexist with 
positions that embrace such ‘against’; thus making the people doing this appear—to 
the outside observer—to be inconsistent and contradictory. More specifically, 
through this inquiry I look to understand the purposefulness1 of such apparent 
inconsistencies—relying on the assumption that they are alternative ways for 
making sense of the own life and environment, rather than mere contradictions. By 
so doing, I take distance from existing views on the topic (e.g. Daniel, Schiefer & 
																																																								
1 For a deeper elaboration on how ‘purposefulness’ is understood along this chapter, see 
Cornejo’s ideas (2010) on the teleological structure of the human being-in-the-world. 
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Knafo, 2012; Higgins, 1987), which a priori assume the lack of verbal or behavioral 
consistency as flawed or problematic. 
In fact, within psychology, inconsistency has commonly been associated either with 
cynicism—e.g., double standards—or some kind of mental slip that must be 
overcome—viz. cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962). Contrary to this trend, I 
argue in favor of temporarily suspending such logicist standpoint2, and ponder 
whether inconsistencies might be a potentially valid sense-making approach for 
persons. For this purpose, during this chapter I leave the term inconsistency, and its 
derogatory valence (see Abelson, 1983), behind. This is done for two reasons: first, 
while consistency is a logical necessity, there is no reason to assume beforehand that 
the same axiom applies to every single instance of psychological experience; 
second, because the notion of inconsistency presumes that there is no possibility for 
equilibrating two incongruent positions, neither over time nor in different contexts. 
Here it is worth noting that through these ideas I do not intend to challenge—not to 
say deny—the relevance of consistency as a psychological principle in the least: 
Gestalt psychology and everyday experience should provide enough support to 
make its importance self-evident. If anything, in this chapter I am trying to suspend 
the assumption that every person, at every moment, must be looking to achieve full 
logical consistency in speech and action.  
Following these ideas, in the present chapter an alternative psychological 
approach is introduced to understand why sometimes persons do not look for 
consistency, instead of plainly pointing to its logically flawed character. Thus, in the 
first place, the seminal hypothesis of cognitive polyphasia proposed by Moscovici 
(1961/2008) is discussed in relation to the presence of contradictions in everyday 
thinking. After this, the Orwellian notion of doublethink (1949/2013), i.e. 
simultaneously holding opposite discursive positions without any perceived 
dissonance, is traced into psychological research. Following the empirical ways that 
the latter notion opens for addressing contradictions as a meaningful resource, the 
case of a young Chilean economist is presented and analyzed under the lens of 
doublethink. As it will be shown, this case provides a vivid example of how 
contradictory thinking might be not experienced as problematic per se, and how it 
could rather help to organize a complex, multi-layered professional role. 
COGNITIVE POLYPHASIA AND THE UBIQUITY OF 
CONTRADICTION 
In his seminal work on social representations, Moscovici (2008) introduced the 
hypothesis of cognitive polyphasia, i.e.: “the dynamic co-existence—interference or 
																																																								
2 This position is perfectly depicted by Frege’s quote: “But what if beings were even found 
whose laws of thought flatly contradicted ours and therefore frequently led to contrary results 
even in practice? The psychological logician could only acknowledge the fact and simply say: 
‘those laws hold for them, these laws hold for us’. I should say: ‘we have here a hitherto 
unknown type of madness.’” (1893/1964, p. 14)  
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specialization—of the distinct modalities of knowledge, corresponding to definite 
relations between man and his environment” (p. 190). This idea emerged from how 
individuals and groups used different, even contradictory, modalities of 
knowledge—political ideology, religion, common sense, medical science, etc.—for 
making sense of psychoanalysis in France. It is particularly interesting to note that 
Moscovici (2008) characterized this use of plural modes of thought as a “disturbing 
observation” (p. 185), a remark that Marková (2008, p. 477) elaborates as follows: 
The reader, well educated in psychology, 
whether of the 1960s or in 2008, might be 
disturbed to learn that human thinking is full of 
contradictions and that people do not think 
according to the Aristotelian laws of thought; 
that they are influenced by thinking of others and 
by historical and cultural ideas transmitted over 
generations. But to this the author himself 
responds by saying that it is not the vocation of 
logic to enforce its laws on anybody. 
In this sense, Moscovici (2008) and Marková (2008) are both fully aware of how 
much psychologists struggle to embrace the presence of contradictions. 
Notwithstanding this: “social psychology [is not] the guardian of the rules—even 
those of thought” (Moscovici, 2008, p. 163), and therefore it should not hold back 
from studying the lack of consistency in thought, speech, or action.  
Considering the former, cognitive polyphasia appears as a key idea for 
approaching contradictions and its psychological sense. Its current understanding, 
however, involves a characteristic that does not make it fully suitable for the present 
study. This feature is aptly represented by Wagner, Duveen, Verma, and Themel’s  
(2000) quote: “Even in the earliest studies it was clear that everyday thinking 
frequently embraces representations that carry contradictory meanings. Such 
contradictions are usually not disturbing so long as each representation is locally 
consistent and so long as they are not simultaneously expressed in discourse.” (p. 
303, emphasis added) As the case described later will show, the latter is not 
necessarily so, as it presents numerous contradictions, simultaneously expressed, 
which do not convey disturbance. Hence, if cognitive polyphasia rules out the latter, 
how else could it be explained? 
DOUBLETHINK BEYOND ORWELL’S 1984 
The term doublethink is introduced to the English vocabulary through George 
Orwell’s dystopian novel Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949/2013). Within Orwell’s 
fiction, “the labyrinthine world of doublethink” (p. 44) is presented as a crucial 
psychological process for keeping the authoritarian order in place. So it is described 
as:  
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To know and not to know, to be conscious of 
complete truthfulness while telling carefully 
constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two 
opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to 
be contradictory and believing in both of them, 
to use logic against logic, to repudiate morality 
while laying claim to it, to believe that 
democracy was impossible and that the Party 
was the guardian of democracy, to forget 
whatever it was necessary to forget, then to 
draw it back into memory again at the moment 
when it was needed, and then promptly to forget 
it again: and above all, to apply the same 
process to the process itself. (pp. 44-45) 
The core idea of doublethink is crystal-clear: to simultaneously embrace 
contradictory and inconsistent stances without noticing them as such. In Orwell’s 
dystopia (2013), however, all the positions that constitute doublethink are twisted 
lies constructed by the propaganda machine of the authoritarian group in power in 
order to keep citizenry uncritical and under control; e.g., the Party’ slogan: “War is 
peace, Freedom is slavery, Ignorance is strength” (p. 6). Hence the ‘bad name’ of 
this process, as Orwell introduced it, comes for its contents—propaganda—rather 
than its structure—coexisting contradictions that do not appear as problematic to 
those expressing them.  
Whereas it is possible to trace the notion of doublethink into humanities and social 
sciences research, it is easy to note its scarce presence. This makes even more 
interesting to observe that it has been applied to a wide range of human phenomena: 
from patterns of illicit drug use among adolescents in Estonia (Allaste & Lagerspetz, 
2005), to the widespread use of ambivalence public relations (Willis, 2015), to the 
contradictory use that teachers make of educational data (Hardy & Lewis, 2016), to 
its prevalence in the accounts of organizational life (El-Sawad, Arnold & Cohen, 
2004). Despite their differences, all these studies present something similar: 
participants who express opinions, either about themselves or about activities they 
perform, that ultimately contradict each other. 
Among these studies, the one conducted by El-Sawad, Arnold and Cohen (2004) 
offers the most theoretical and empirical insight on doublethink. In particular, El-
Sawad and his collaborators elaborate on the purpose of doublethink, which they 
report as a way in which their participants cope with different organizational 
settings demanding opposite positions at the same time. Let us look at two of their 
examples3. A participant identified as Alison, for instance, firstly explains the 
																																																								
3 The examples shown purposely exclude any case that involves so-called non-professional 
roles; for instance, the tension—and associated doublethink—between career development 
and family planning, religious beliefs, etc. This is done with the sole purpose of addressing 
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micropolitical nature of being promoted in her organization: “How [career 
management] happens here is that the first line work out who it is they think are 
stars, and the second line sort of collate that.” (El-Sawad, Arnold & Cohen, 2004, p. 
1189). Only to say later that: “From the political point of view, I don’t think it 
[career progression] is political . . . the people who call it political are the people 
who just do their job and who are only willing to do their job.” (p. 1189). Thus, 
according to her account, being promoted involves navigating through 
organizational politics, in spite of claiming later that those who attribute career to 
politics are those who just work the bare minimum and do nothing to get promoted. 
Likewise, Adam declares that: “You can sort of steer your own path . . . there are a 
lot of opportunities that will allow you to more or less do what you want to do.” (p. 
1193) However, later on he acknowledges that: “Certainly earlier I would say that I 
was restricted in my [career] choices because I was recruited to do a specific role . . 
. if you just accept that and get on with it then you’ll be OK” (p. 1193). As 
contradictory as in the first example, Adam sees his career path as something that is 
fully crafted by him and shaped by the role he was hired for, despite the fact that 
these two positions oppose and exclude each other from a logical standpoint. 
Following these and other examples, El-Sawad, Arnold, and Cohen (2004) note that: 
“There is no apparent tussle between our participants’ contradictory beliefs, no 
detectable sense of implacable struggle, and no need for one to win out over the 
other. One is not more true than the other.” (p. 1198). An observation that leads to 
the most relevant conclusion this study for the present work: 
As we have seen, participants in our study have 
more than one personal narrative. Whilst each 
individual narrative may be internally 
consistent and coherent, it frequently conflicts 
with and contradicts other narratives which the 
individual articulates. We see security as 
deriving from keeping separate or bracketing 
these contradictory and conflicting dimensions. 
(p. 1198, emphases added) 
Based on this, the authors elaborate on the purposefulness of doublethink, which: 
“may be one way of containing the contradiction created by the performance of 
different roles.” (p. 1195) As different roles have different, potentially contradictory 
logics among them: “We suggest that, rather than confronting and attempting to 
resolve contradiction, people contain it by offering different (and separate) 
narratives” (p. 1199). And so it becomes not only possible, but also reasonable to 
enact two different, opposed roles and their associated narratives; as in the first case: 
																																																																																																																																		
the usual concern of bringing “personal issues” into professional settings. Thus I only focus 
in conflicting roles that “officially” pertain to organizational, professional environments—
despite considering the former distinction as an analytical categorization rather than a 
psychologically grounded approach. 
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one that links career progression with personal hard work, and downplays 
micropolitics; and other that allows to be aware and responsive to micropolitics, 
regardless of performance. In so doing, this person is certainly dealing better with 
the complexities of organizational life by simultaneously addressing two different 
dimensions of his professional role. Even if she is not addressing this contradiction 
in a conscious, post-formal way of thinking, as scholars have theorized (Kramer, 
1989). 
In the following, a similar case to those discussed by El-Sawad, Arnold, 
and Cohen (2004) is presented—yet with a variation. While the former authors bring 
forth the use of doublethink in organizational contexts—implying for-profit 
companies—, the following case relates to the less-addressed realm of science and 
scientists. Beyond the scarce use of doublethink in studies of science 
(“Doublethink—Among Scientists and Others”, 1965; Merton, 1963), this domain 
becomes especially interesting for the topic given the stark contrast between its 
public presentation—neat, objective—and how it is ordinarily lived by those 
involved in it—messy, passionate (see Shapin, 2008). All the latter led me to think 
that the role of scientist is prone to contradictory stances that must be coped with 
somehow. Thereby, the single case of a young Chilean economist, working in the 
local branch of an international applied research network, is discussed in the 
following.  
DOUBLETHINK IN THE MAKING OF SCIENCE 
As noted above, scientific activity—as many other occupations—might require its 
practitioners, i.e. scientists, to enact contradictory roles. For scientists in particular, 
one source for such opposition is the idealized image that the public ascribes to 
them. As Petkova and Boyadjieva (1994) show, the popular conception about them 
portrays a scholar who lives in an ivory tower, isolated from any worldly matter and 
solely devoted to his or her research. Research that preferably addresses material 
phenomena, as this assures that no social or moral biases could have an influence 
over its objective character (cf. Daston & Gallison, 2010). Thus we see that the 
stereotypical image captured by Mead and Metraux (1975) forty years ago has not 
aged:  
The scientist is a man who wears a white coat 
and works in a laboratory (…) He is surrounded 
by equipment: test tubes, benzene burners, 
flasks and bottles, a jungle gym of blown glass 
tubes and weird machines with dial (…) He is 
prepared to work for years without getting 
results and face the possibility of failure without 
discouragement; he will try again. He wants to 
know the answer (pp. 386-387). 
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Looking at this aseptic, lab-coated idea of what a scientist should be, it is simple to 
think of opposite roles to it. As discussed elsewhere (Carré, 2016), the most 
contrasting position to the former image of a scientist probably is that of an activist. 
While there are obvious differences—training, modes of argumentation, social 
impact, etc.—, the borders between scientist and activist become blurred as soon as 
the phenomena at stake are not purely material but also social and human—thus 
having direct moral implications4. Despite this reflection, practitioners of human 
sciences—either collective or individual—certainly adhere and look to enact the 
previously mentioned image of the objective, aseptic scientist. Thus any roles that 
bring moral orientations, ethical choices, or political orientations into scientific 
activity are forbidden: being a good (human) scientist demands avoiding and 
rejecting all the latter, as they are personal elements that must not influence the 
scientific work (cf. Polanyi, 19685). It is difficult to conclude otherwise after 
looking at the methodological approaches and writing styles used by the 
sociologists, psychologists, and economists currently publishing in the American 
Journal of Sociology, Psychological Science, or the Journal of Political Economy—
all of them top-tier journals for these disciplines.  
Here the case of economics—and economists—becomes especially interesting since 
economic knowledge has been rarely detached from the socio-political realm—be it 
policy, polity, or politics. As a matter of fact, some of the most notorious 
economists in history, from Adam Smith (1776/1910) to David Ricardo (1821) to 
John Stuart Mill (1848/1884) to John Maynard Keynes (1936/2007), all published 
major works on political economy. In spite of this historical trend, there is a clear 
movement in economics of moving away from political issues and toward 
mathematical modeling, i.e. econometrics (see Qin, 2012). While this could be 
grasped in personal communications with—at least Chilean—economists (Carré, in 
preparation), it is also clearly expressed through the bibliographic data of the last 40 
years. As Kim, Morse, and Zingales (2006) comprehensively show, econometrics 
publications have overshadowed both micro and macroeconomics—among papers 
with more than 500 citations for the 1970-2005 period. Furthermore, according to 
																																																								
4 The activist position was purposefully chosen in the work mentioned (Carré, 2016) in order 
to take the argument to its polar opposite. Yet it is clear that a more balanced position—like 
citizen—expresses better the relation that human scientists establish with their phenomena of 
study. This is, being involved with these phenomena, committing to studying them 
exhaustively and caring about their implications; yet not compromising the inquiry for the 
sake of making the phenomena fit researcher’s expectations. 
5  "Besides, the relation of the scientist to his surmises is one of passionate personal 
commitment. The effort that led to a surmise committed every fiber of his being to the quest; 
his surmises embody all his hopes. The current theory that ignores the mechanism of tacit 
knowing must ignore and indeed deny such commitments. The tentativeness of the scientist's 
every step is then taken to show that he is uncommitted. But every step made in the pursuit of 
science is definitive, definitive in the vital sense that it definitely disposes of the time, the 
effort, and the material resources used in making that step" (Polanyi, 1968, p. 41) 
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these authors (pp. 15-16), 9 of the 20 most cited articles in economics have been 
published in Econometrica, the publishing outlet of The Econometric Society.  
Notwithstanding the unavoidable simplifications contained in the previous 
argument, there certainly is a historically grounded tension in the roles that a 
professional economist might assume: on the one hand, the ‘modern’ economist, 
who makes use of the most sophisticated mathematical techniques available to 
create systematic, objective evidence for scientific purposes only; on the other hand, 
the ‘classic’ economist, who looks for answers to contingent, pressing social issues 
in order to have a voice in the political arena. Thus, while for the former having a 
political orientation could be a main source of bias for economic research, for the 
latter it could appear as the necessary framework to make sense of any economic 
data. As the following case will show, the tension existing between these positions 
is anything but abstract, or purely bibliographic. On the contrary it appears as a 
compelling issue, in personal terms, for those who are initiating their careers as 
economists. Moreover, this example provides valuable ground to assess the 
usefulness of doublethink as an analytical approach. 
DOUBLETHINK IN ACTION: IDEOLOGY FOR A YOUNG 
ECONOMIST 
The case analyzed corresponds to a 27-year-old, male Chilean economist (M.Sc.), 
who worked as a full-time research assistant at the Latin American and Caribbean 
branch of a worldwide action-research center on poverty, located in Santiago de 
Chile. When the first interview was conducted, the participant had been working for 
6 months at the research center in a junior position, right after his graduation. The 
second interview was conducted 10 months later, when he had been promoted to 
senior research assistant—and had already applied to several Ph.D. programs 
abroad. Both interviews were guided through a semi-structured script, and lasted for 
around 50 to 60 minutes. They were conducted in person by the present author in 
Spanish, which is the native language for both interviewer and interviewee. Hence 
the excerpts provided in the following are all personal translations. 
At the beginning of the first interview, the participant is openly asked about the 
objectives of the research center where he works. About this he says that: 
The idea they [research center directors] have is, 
we have been doing a lot of public policies 
around the world to fight poverty, but truth is 
that we don’t have evidence about what works 
and what doesn’t. We have notions, many of 
them based in ideology…ideological thinking 
but we do not have evidence of what is useful, 
of what helps and what doesn’t. [00:01:06] 
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Here it is interesting to note the spontaneous wording used by him—particularly 
‘ideology’—, and also the relation he establishes: evidence is to be constructed in 
order to overcome ideological thinking. In this sense, he presents science as the 
opposite of ideology. Interestingly, this relation does not only pertain to the research 
center but it is also linked to his career choice as an economist6: 
I found it interesting to have an approach from 
social sciences that is more precise to 
understand problems. To understand problems 
beyond giving ideological interpretations of 
them, this [economics] is an approach that is 
more rigorous, more scientific. [00:08:48] 
Here the participant considers ideology-based thinking as a kind of limitation for 
understanding social problems; limitation that he wanted to overcome through 
learning economics and its rigorous approach. This excerpt, again, shows the 
opposed relation that he ascribes to science and ideology. This young economist, 
however, acknowledges that other fellow economists—at least in Chile—do not 
adhere to such standards. When he is asked about the prominent voice that 
economists typically have in Chile, he says that: 
There are a lot of people that are prone to use 
that technical recognition [having a Ph.D. in 
economics] to, instead of talking about technical 
things, talk in ideological terms about what is 
technical. And I do think that in Chile that 
definitely happens. [00:17:14] 
In this excerpt, the participant again opposes a scientific, technical stance with a 
position based in ideology. Moreover, he calls out the misconduct of those who try 
to hide their ideological positions behind a technical façade—like having doctoral 
studies in economics. 
 So far, the position of the participant seems clear and consistent: politics and 
ideology must give way to technical knowledge, as the former is a limitation for 
understanding social issues. To a certain extent, this could be paralleled to the 
abovementioned tension between scientific–mathematic and politico–normative 
economics, with the participant clearly endorsing the former. Yet, as the interview 
																																																								
6 In Chile there is no bachelor-level education in economics, but it is offered as a major 
option to those who completes a bachelor on business and administration. It is important to 
note that, typically, only a minor fraction—less than 20%—of students choose to follow 
economics; usually those with better grades. Notwithstanding its academic prestige, the 
major—and subsequent master—in economics tends to be discarded by students as it is 
considered a winding path to the job market, with no significant influence on the future wage 
compared to other easier major alternatives. In this scenario, those who pursue the ‘academic 
track’ of economics after the master are a minority inside a minority. 
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advances, he shares his vision of economics as a very narrow-minded discipline. A 
discipline that focuses in only one way of looking at social issues, and so it requires 
other disciplines to properly inform social initiatives, or public policies. When asked 
about such specific approach of economics, he says:  
Economics usually does not assume that there is 
a certain ideology in its own way of looking at 
things. I mean, when I decide to look at an 
outcome it is because I have certain values. I’m 
not saying that this is bad or negative, but it just 
is. Economics does have certain values that 
sometimes it’s hard, that sometimes it doesn’t 
acknowledge. Economics does have a value; it 
puts efficiency above everything else. Is this 
something good or bad? It’s neither good nor 
bad, it just is. It’s something normative, where 
certain outcomes have been put above other 
equally useful outcomes. [00:21:22] 
This opinion certainly represents a sharp turn from the previous excerpts, as the 
participant now refers to ideology as something ubiquitous in economics work, 
instead of a limitation or scientific misbehavior, as previously asserted. 
Furthermore, he says that these value-orientations are something normative that 
should not be judged. Something that stands in stark contradiction to labeling them 
as opposed to scientific work. Interestingly, he goes on over this idea with no further 
questions:  
I think that we [economists] are missing a little 
bit of self-criticism, of acknowledging that 
we’re doing those value judgments. We are 
missing taking a step back and saying: despite 
being a serious science, etc. economics also has 
value judgments when it makes its analyses. 
Like this critique of Heisenberg’s uncertainty, 
where he says that if I observe an object I will 
necessarily modify that phenomenon. To a 
certain extent economics could also have the 
same, and I’m not sure if we economists are 
humble enough to acknowledge that. [00:21:56] 
Surprising as it may be, in the two last excerpts the participant assumes a stance that 
is critical about the position he endorsed a couple of minutes ago. If he previously 
considered ideology as a limitation to overcome, now refers to it as something 
unavoidable despite economists’ unwillingness to acknowledge it. Following-up on 
this, he is asked about how is it for him to work in an academic environment where 
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that self-criticism is mostly absent—as in the position he assumed at the beginning 
of the interview. To this he replies:  
It is a dialogue that sometimes creates friction, 
but the world is changing in that direction. All 
the social policies that the students’ movement, 
the social movements [in Chile] are raising 
nowadays don’t have so much to do with 
efficiency but with normative positions. For 
example, profit on education, I’m sure that is 
way more efficient to have for-profit schools. 
But normatively people don’t want schools to be 
for-profit. Why? I have no clue. People just 
don’t want see somebody profiting from 
education. And I don’t know whether that is 
good or bad, but people just don’t want it. And 
that becomes an element at the moment of 
making policies. This is valid, and economists 
from now on will have to start considering this 
as part of the equation. [00:24:48] 
As the last excerpt shows, the participant moves a step forward into his new position 
by acknowledging that the ideological-normative positions from citizenry are 
elements that are becoming increasingly more relevant for economics. Even if he 
personally does not agree with some of them, the participant says that economists 
cannot try to step over them and impose its own scientific, efficient logic. Again, 
this claim goes further against his initial remarks on why he chose economics and 
what is the aim of the research center where he worked. Only a couple a minutes 
later, however, he is asked about whether he considers his personal research 
interests as having the ‘trademark’ of the center, and to this he replies:  
But, you know, [research center name] honestly 
does not have a political orientation, the only 
orientation is: let’s do scientific evidence. 
Scientific in what terms? In terms of measuring 
things through social experiments. And 
[research center name] doesn’t have a research 
program but a way of doing research. It’s just a 
network of researchers that basically have one 
common way of doing research: experimental 
method. That’s all. [00:26:58] 
Puzzlingly enough, the participant now expresses an opinion much more aligned 
with his initial stance rather than with the one discussed in the previous paragraph. 
Thus he goes back to exclude normative stances from economics work and putting 
forward the scientific rigor of the research center. By so doing, within 30 minutes, 
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the participant moved from: a stance where he considers economics as the key for 
overcoming ideological thinking; then to one in which ideology and normative 
positions are constitutive to economics—with this being considered as neither good 
nor bad—; to finally one that reassures that his—and the center’s—research work 
has nothing to do with normative, ideological orientations as it is pure scientific 
evidence. If anything, the trajectory made between different, contradictory 
narratives about economics and economists certainly resembles the cases discussed 
by El-Sawad and his collaborators (2004) as doublethink. 
Interestingly, instances of doublethink like these were not exclusive to the first 
interview. During the second conversation, it was possible to observe this 
phenomenon in a different fashion. Instead of several jumps between opposed 
positions, the participant now displayed an approach that is well summarized by the 
following quote: 
RCTs [methodology used at the research center] 
are empirical, real data, without an ideology 
behind it. I mean there is some [ideology] to a 
certain extent, but in a different sense. But it is 
not like someone thought of a certain 
[mathematical] model, wrote it in a given way, 
and it gave this or that result. [00:07:31] 
As seen, both the ‘scientific’ and the ‘ideological’ positions appear as opposed yet 
co-present—something that was not observed in the first interview. Far from a 
fluke, the same could be observed in a later answer, where the participant elaborates 
on how his research work as economist makes sense for him in personal terms: 
First, I don’t know what else could I do. I’m 
already into this like a lot, but I don’t see myself 
doing something as fun as this. Second, 
ideology makes me sick. I mean, no, I like 
ideology in the sense that we live…we all have 
a certain degree of ideology…we live in an 
ideological context…but arbitrary, nonsense, 
and ill-considered decisions makes me sick. For 
example, religious ideology makes me sick, I 
also detest political ideology…and I see that 
economics is a good answer to ideology. What 
does economics allow you to do? To say: the 
cost of your ideology is this. You don’t like for-
profit schools? Ok, your ideology is fine, but it’s 
going to cost you this. So it [economics] allows 
you to put a counterweight to ideology. 
[00:56:02] 
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This long excerpt does not only offer an instance of doublethink where opposite 
stances are co-present (“ideology makes me sick. I mean, no, I like ideology”); but 
also something that sheds light upon the core of the present article: the 
purposefulness of doublethink, understood as a lack of logical consistency. For here, 
it is possible to see how the participant entwines together two dimensions, scientific 
and ideological, within his personal take on the role of economist. And this 
articulation is made—as the latter excerpt shows—because both are important and 
necessary elements for him being an economist. As he expressed along both 
interviews, ideologies are ubiquitous in human life, as they give normative 
orientations to all of our actions; and he does not see economics as neutral on 
ideological grounds either, as it advocates for less costs—efficiency, in his words—
in a normative rather than an empirical way. This standpoint on ideology, and its 
deep implications for economics and economists, however, does not lead him to 
blindly embrace any form of it either. He declares to detest political or religious 
orientations that lead to “arbitrary, nonsense, and ill-considered decisions”. 
Moreover, this position does not bar him either from being aware that normative 
orientations do have economic, monetary implications on the social world, 
something he defines as “costs”. And, for him, economics is the most accurate 
approach to assess these costs; but not to determine which costs should be assumed, 
as this is normative ground—like the debate of for- or non-profit schools. It is in this 
sense that economics is a counterweight to ideology and vice versa.  
Thus presented, it seems quite reasonable for human scientists that inform social 
debates and public policies, like economists, to have a broader scope than scientific 
arguments only—something that, as mentioned above, was clear to early 
economists. Yet the personal articulation made by the participant, which assumes 
that economics has normative orientations, is made in spite of the contemporary, 
front-office economist role; which longs for empirical scientism—viz. reveal what 
data says—and rejects any form of ideological thinking—as current trends in 
publications in top economic journals make clear. Furthermore, presenting 
economics just as a consulting voice, among others, informing social decision 
makers is especially controversial for Chilean economists, whom—at least for the 
last 40 years—have had a major, overt impact on public policy decisions—and even 
politics—precisely by endorsing a technocratic stance (for historical reviews see 
Markoff & Montecinos, 1993, and Silva, 2009; for a contemporary example see 
Larroulet, 2016). Considering this cultural background, while it might seem 
reasonable for outsiders, it does not seem feasible for academic and professional 
Chilean economists to hold such an integrative stance—particularly for somebody 
that is looking to make his way into academia. And here is where doublethink, for 
this example, does not appear as a mere illogical way of thinking, but rather as a 
useful approach. 
To make this point clearer it is necessary to go back to El-Sawad, Arnold, 
and Cohen’s (2004) previous ideas. As these authors note: “participants in our study 
have more than one personal narrative” (p. 1198); which, as seen, is the case of the 
participant analyzed. Additionally, they claim that: “whilst each individual narrative 
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may be internally consistent and coherent, it frequently conflicts with and 
contradicts other narratives which the individual articulates” (p. 1198), something 
that the first interview clearly portrays. And, more importantly for the aim of the 
present work, these authors see: “security as deriving from keeping separate or 
bracketing these contradictory and conflicting dimensions” (p. 1198, emphasis 
added) rather than confronting them to ‘reduce cognitive dissonance’. For the 
participant analyzed, this security seems to be no other thing than the possibility of 
tailoring his role of economist, following both his own particular view of the 
discipline and the role that is culturally and institutionally presented to him as 
correct. Hence, doublethink appears here as a meaningful, personal way of both 
resisting the latter and endorsing the former. Furthermore, just as El-Sawad et al. 
propose (2004), the participant analyzed reaches such security by keeping these two 
dimensions of being economist, and its associated narratives, isolated and bracketed 
from each other; even when he tries to make himself clear to somebody else, and 
with minor exceptions—as excerpts from the second interview reveal. 
CONCLUSION: INCONSISTENCY FOR WHOM? 
As initially noted, the psychological implications of resistance span well beyond a 
plain, stubborn ‘no’. This idea, clearly portrayed by several works in the present 
volume (e.g. Cavada, this volume; Konwar & Bhargava, this volume; Sharma, this 
volume), could be elaborated through Valsiner’s (2014) A<>non-A principle. This 
principle poses that any meaning created and sustained around an element A is 
necessarily tied to all those elements we consider as opposed to it, i.e. non-A. Thus, 
as sometimes hooliganism reminds us, in order to stand for something, it is also 
required to stand against whatever is considered opposed to it. 
Interestingly, such resistance might take many forms, some of them even 
contradictory, as positions that are intended to be resisted are simultaneously 
endorsed. Looking for the purposefulness of such ‘inconsistent’ phenomena made us 
look beyond the abundant literature that flags as problematic any psychological 
action that does not conform to logical standards (e.g. Daniel, Schiefer & Knafo, 
2012; Festinger, 1962; Higgins, 1987). From this conceptual exploration two 
notions emerged as pointing to the usefulness of resisting but at the same time 
endorsing something: cognitive polyphasia (Moscovici, 2008) and doublethink 
(Orwell, 2013). The former, as part of the Social Representation Theory, provided a 
general perspective of how often our ordinary, everyday thinking does not strictly 
follow the rules established by logic; and, given this, it could be—and usually is—
contradictory between its different discursive forms. Doublethink complemented the 
former by shedding light upon how—and why—contradicting oneself within the 
same account might not create any psychological or experiential uneasiness.  
In order to deepen why somebody might resort to doublethink, two interviews with 
a young economist were analyzed. This example brought forward what is expected 
from scientists in general, and economists in specific, thus revealing the tensions 
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existing between their public, ‘lab-coated’ presentation and the personal, committed 
nature of their everyday work. Regarding this tension, several interview excerpts 
showed how the participant shifted between endorsing an objectivistic, technocratic 
standpoint on economics, and a perspective that considers ideology and normative 
orientations as constitutive of the works of economics. These positions, clearly 
opposed to each other, reveal a quite particular standpoint of the participant 
regarding his discipline: both embracing its mainstream and making a fundamental 
critique to it. As shown by the excerpts, the way in which he held these stances was 
not a display of cynicism, as they appeared to be isolated from each other. By 
keeping them separated, it seemed possible for him both to comply with the formal 
requirements to succeed in economics’ academia, and also to imprint a personal 
perspective to this official role—by adding a normative insight into a technical 
discipline. 
Summarizing, I considered doublethink as a subtle, meaningful way of resisting 
certain dimensions of a role that must be accepted in order to properly enact that 
role. Following this, I propose that this process hints on how roles, like the one of 
economist, are not merely socio-institutional constructions to be unquestionably 
accepted and endorsed. Quite differently, they appear to be accepted and endorsed 
although in ways that are personally meaningful—as an active 
internalization/externalization process (Valsiner, 2006).  As shown by the 
participant, being an economist implies looking for the most precise—i.e. 
mathematic—ways of understanding and addressing social issues; which are 
undoubtedly part of the official economics manifesto. Yet, for him, the latter could 
not be done neglecting the normative, ideological orientations that these approaches 
to social matters imply—even though if this personal commitment is considered as a 
source of unscientific bias. A number of questions emerge out of this conclusion: 
first and foremost, to understand in which ways this personally-oriented 
construction of the scientific role has an impact in the scientific production, and 
therefore how the former shed lights on understanding the latter; also, where are the 
limits that keeps such personal, normative involvement away from turning the 
scientific activity in self-validation circle. Although relevant, all these inquiries 
ought to be addressed in future works, as they exceed the scope of the present 
chapter. 
In a previously mentioned article, Wagner et al. (2000) claim that: “It is in the 
context of different life-worlds that holding on to ‘contradictory’ representations 
make sense.” (p. 303) Looking at the case discussed, it is possible to say otherwise: 
within the same life-world, and even within the same role, it is possible, and 
sometimes very reasonable, to hold on to stances that oppose to each other. 
Therefore, for the study of resistance, doublethink offer an understanding of so-
called inconsistent positions, re-framing them as an alternative way of making sense 
about heterogeneous realms of the social world. Hence, resisting against something 
or somebody does not necessarily imply a dogmatic positioning, but also flexible, 
context-bounded stances where resistances are also present. For the study of science, 
especially those disciplines concerning human phenomena, doublethink appears as 
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another form of making knowledge—and its construction—personal (Polanyi, 
1974). 
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EITHER SCHOLAR OR ACTIVIST?  
THINKING CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND ACADEMIA 
David Carré 
 
Abstract 
Both Robert Innis’s and Svend Brinkmann’s works bring to the fore a notorious, but 
usually forgotten, topic on cultural psychology: the normative framework that 
regulates the relation between the researcher and the phenomena studied. Yet these 
models of human flourishing, using authors’ terminology, are scarcely discussed in 
comparison to theoretical, methodological, and empirical issues.  
In the present paper, a number of potential reasons for this omission are explored. In 
particular, it is argued that discussing the normative and pragmatic side of the 
discipline appears as risky in two directions: turning cultural psychology into 
activism, and conducting value-laden research. For this purpose, the controversial 
case of Arthur Jensen’s 1969 publication on IQ is discussed. This example is useful 
to reveal the challenges that cultural psychology must face in order to become more 
aware of its normative orientations; particularly the pragmatic, social impact 
associated to conduct research on human matters. Ultimately, it is shown that these 
apparent risks emerge from implicit, outdated conceptions of both activism and 
scientific activity. 
Keywords: value-orientation, normative framework, scientific role, activism, Arthur 
Jensen 
 
In his impeccable “Between philosophy and cultural psychology: Pragmatist and 
Semiotic Reflections on the Thresholds of Sense”, Robert Innis (2016) covers with 
unusual theoretical depth a number of the most challenging questions for the 
advance of cultural psychology 1 —from meaning, to affect, to semiosis, to 
materiality. As the title of his work indicates, Innis addresses these multiple issues 
																																																								
1 In this paper, the use of cultural psychology as a singular term follows the considerations 
proposed by Valsiner (2015). In brief, this means that the use of the singular form—cultural 
psychology—does not assume by any means the existence of a homogeneous unity among the 
manifold trends converging under the umbrella of ‘culture’. On the contrary, by 
acknowledging the existence of different cultural psychologies, the use of the generic term 
cultural psychology aims to appeal to any reader that feels identified with the ideas here 
expressed—rather than reinforce divisions. 
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through the concept of ‘thresholds of sense’, i.e. “the fundamental matrices in which 
meaning arises for human beings and gets embodied in cultural forms” (p. 9); which 
for the author also is “the principal theme of cultural psychology and of a 
philosophical semiotics.” (p. 9) Notwithstanding his minute attention to theory, 
Innis makes clear along his work that conceptual issues—especially the sometimes-
convoluted alleys of semiotics—are far from being the only knots that cultural 
psychology must face as a discipline centered in human matters. In fact, as he 
convincingly argues (pp. 7, 29, 41, et passim), one of the main challenges for the 
conceptualizations made by cultural psychology is dealing with “an essential tension 
between analysis and advocacy” (p. 21, emphasis added).  
Regarding this tension, Innis (2016) keenly claims that: “(…) cultural psychology as 
a companion human science is not, indeed cannot be, indifferent to human practices 
and should not consider them merely as exhibits in a kind of museum of curiosities, 
examined for our amusement or professional or political advancement” (p. 7). Thus, 
an analytic, distant position to human phenomena does not suffice as the general 
orientation of the discipline. However, the author also notes that: “(…) in light of 
the great variation in value schemes, which cultural psychology has studied and 
uncovered, it is problematic just where cultural psychology is to look for a 
normative frame or just what such a frame would look like.” (p. 7) In this sense, it is 
anything but clear what would be the exact set of values, and associated human 
practices, that cultural psychology should advocate for. Ultimately, this tension is 
summed-up by Innis in a striking question: “How, then, are we as reflective 
inquirers to balance tolerance and sympathetic understanding with critical recoil and 
disapproval when faced with the horrors of history’s butcher block, to allude to 
Hegel’s provocative remark?” (p. 8)  
Through this question, Innis (2016) fully exposes the complexities that cultural 
psychology faces when understanding and acting within the social world. First and 
foremost, as a human science, the discipline cannot stand apart, indifferent to the 
human practices and meaning-making processes that addresses. However, cultural 
psychology—in particular—has emphasized through its manifold research how 
diverse such phenomena can be2. Innis (2016), however, notes that within such 
diversity “(…) what matters for most is themselves and their conception of 
themselves as well as the conception others have of them” (p. 6); thus emphasizing 
the perennial relevance of phenomenology and self-interpretation for the discipline. 
Yet, as seen, validating and acknowledging the existence of diversity, i.e. an 
analytic-descriptive role, is far from unequivocally set what difference is cultural 
psychology trying to make in the world. 
																																																								
2 Diversity that could be observed from practices that heavily depend on the immediate 
situation (e.g. Mahli, Boon & Rogers, 2009), to meaning-making processes that remain stable 
over time (e.g. Manuti, Scardigno & Mininni, 2016), to semiotics resources that help in 
coping with change (e.g. Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie, Ivinson & Psaltis, 2003). In sum, human 
diversity that goes way beyond plain cross-national variation of a certain construct (viz. Buss 
et al., 1990) 
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Therefore, going back to Innis’s analysis-advocacy tension (2016), it seems aporetic 
to theoretically or empirically determine what should be the framework for the 
discipline to support and promote. Such impossibility, Innis claims, is based in a 
rather simple reason: determining the approach of the discipline to the multifarious 
nature of human, cultural life is a normative rather than a positive, empirical issue. 
In his words: “As I see it, the point of cultural psychology, and of a great part of 
philosophy, is not purely theoretical or contemplative, and it is not value-free.” 
(2016, p. 6, emphasis added) 
It is at this point—the normative nature of (cultural) psychology—where the ideas 
developed by Innis (2016) converge with those expressed by Svend Brinkmann in 
his Cultural psychology and its values (2016). There, he presents a thorough 
argumentation on why psychology at large—and cultural psychology in particular—
are ultimately normative disciplines. On this Brinkmann (2016) says that: “I agree 
with Innis that psychologists, cultural and otherwise, simply cannot do psychology 
without presupposing some ideal of human flourishing, or normativity more 
generally, which can of course be more or less implicit.” (p. 2) Furthermore, he 
presents the opposite case, namely what would be a psychology without a normative 
framework: “Without moral normativity, psychology degenerates into physiology or 
perhaps neuroscience. The organs of the body simply function or not, and the 
synapses of the brain simply fire or not; they have no reason for doing what they do 
(and thus demand causal explanation).” (p. 6) In brief, as also noted by Innis (2016, 
p. 6), the author makes clear that any attempt to strip (cultural) psychology out of 
any normative framework will lead the discipline astray—into a purely 
contemplative role. Following this, Brinkmann (2016) proposes two universal, yet 
thin sources of normativity for the discipline: Holiday’s core-language games (p. 
10), namely truth-telling, justice, and ritual language games; and Løgstrup’s ethical 
demand (p. 12).  
Summarizing, both Innis’s (2016) and Brinkmann’s (2016) reflections are inviting 
us to think and discuss cultural psychology outside its usual academic box—into 
pragmatic and normative terms. This does not mean to abandon theories, 
methodologies, and empirical data, in the least. It rather stands as a reminder that all 
the latter necessarily exist in connection to broader ethical, social perspectives 
toward the phenomena studied, which ultimately express the interest and personal 
commitment of the practitioners behind the discipline3. This is even clearer in 
Innis’s remark (2016, p. 7) on how cultural psychology does not seem—nor want—
to follow the path that Wittgenstein drew for analytic philosophy4, namely just 
																																																								
3 Even though this idea will not be further elaborated here, it should be given the utmost 
consideration. In this sense, the discussion on how cultural psychology inserts in the social 
world bypasses the whole question for cultural psychologists, i.e. how is it that, in the first 
place, a number of persons become interested and devote most of their professional careers to 
this approach. Taking this issue for granted must not be read as downplaying it—yet another 
time—, but just as a way for keeping the scope for this article manageable. 
4 Incidentally, the spirit of Innis’s paper resembles a different assertion from Wittgenstein, 
namely: “Our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a 
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clearing conceptual confusions and leaving everything in the world as it is. Innis 
(2016), on the contrary, places cultural psychology along a pragmatist orientation of 
philosophy, in which: “The ‘problems of philosophy’ should be, and are, our 
problems, vitally important issues embedded in what John Dewey called 
‘problematic situations’ that bear upon what for the pragmatist tradition are the 
defining matrices for ‘the conduct of life.’” (p. 1, emphasis in the original) 
Furthermore, considering that: “The cultural psychologist, as inquirer, is also 
informed by a world-picture and a self-picture and a schema of values, which 
informs inquiry in its role as a proponent and model of human flourishing.” (Innis, 
2016, pp. 5-6, emphasis added), it is puzzling to think how seldom open discussions 
on such model(s) are hold. Although, as Brinkmann (2016) notes, normative 
perspectives toward human flourishing “can of course be more or less implicit” (p. 
2), the question remains: why it has been so complicated for cultural psychologists 
to overtly discuss the impact that the discipline is ultimately trying to make in the 
world through its research?  
Such difficulty is probably related to the concerns that this question likely arises: 
“does it imply that cultural psychology is a covert form of activism?” Or maybe, “is 
this a form of advocating for doing biased, value-laden research where the ends 
justify the means?” In the following I look to tackle these concerns in order to show 
that discussing on the pragmatic side of cultural psychology, and its potential social 
impact is definitely necessary—and probably overdue. For this purpose, it becomes 
necessary to complement the ideas presented by Innis (2016) and Brinkmann 
(2016), specifically by thinking on cultural psychology’s normative framework as 
something tightly connected to the multiple social worlds where the discipline 
exists—as it might have concrete impact on those environments. 
HUMAN SCIENTISTS: EITHER SCHOLARS OR ACTIVISTS? 
The first of the concerns mentioned above, the risk of activism, is an issue that does 
not haunt cultural psychology only but social sciences and humanities at large5. In 
brief, this relates to the reasonable suspicion on whether social research is being 
conducted to reveal something unknown from the human-cultural world, or just to 
give support to a certain group of interests—through the rhetorical power that 
science gives (see Hilgartner, 2000). In terms of Innis (2016) and Brinkmann 
(2016), for cultural psychology this could represent the risk of a normative 
																																																																																																																																		
particular bit the value we give it” (1969, p. 52, §410). If anything, through his article Robert 
Innis has brought ‘the knowledge system’ of cultural psychology into debate. And he 
succeeds in this precisely by thinking outside of the common, academic concerns of the 
discipline in order to discuss its general direction. 
 
5 In fact, this matter spans way beyond ‘soft’ sciences like arts or humanities. As 20th century 
history shows, disciplines like biology or medicine might become political instruments 
considerably more sharp and dangerous—as during the Nazi regime (see Haas, 2008). 
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framework that does not orient or complement the inquiry anymore, but rather turns 
the latter into a mere instrument for spreading the former. 
For instance, let us consider the paper written by Arthur Jensen in 1969: “How 
Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?” Despite its apparent 
educational title, in this paper Jensen (1969) put forward the controversial argument 
that the observed IQ gap between white-skinned and black-skinned school-aged 
children is ultimately based on genetic rather than environmental factors. Two 
implications, according to him, follow from this finding: first, there is no point in 
making any instructional, pedagogical effort to shorten this gap, like the US Head 
Start Program (see Bierman et al., 2008); secondly, white-skinned people have an 
overall greater IQ, and therefore are essentially more intelligent than black-skinned 
persons. As expected, social and academic outrage broke out against Jensen’s 
(1969) ideas—even more so in a decade marked by the Civil Rights Movement in 
the United States. Thus in a case like this the question emerges naturally: did Jensen 
just present his findings based on available psychometrical data? Or was he rather 
trying to defend an alleged racial superiority of white-skinned people based on 
resources that he knew would be appealing to the public debate? 
On this, Jensen promptly reacted by claiming that he was presenting unbiased 
research. Accordingly, he actively defended his postulates against its critics, 
claiming that, in fact, they were the ones conveying an obscured political agenda—
particularly Stephen J. Gould and his ‘Marxist sociology of science’ (see Jensen, 
1982). As of 2006, six years before passing, he kept his position almost untouched 
(Rushton & Jensen, 2006). However, according to Miller (1994), Jensen received 
major funding over three decades from the Pioneer Fund. This grantor has been 
highlighted as a common funding source for research oriented to promote studies on 
race and biological determinism, which usually show how white-skinned 
populations excel above those black-skinned. Altogether, there is reasonable 
evidence for considering any of the two positions as viable options. Hence, it does 
not seem possible to determine for certain what was the role actually played by 
Jensen: either a truth-seeker human scientist or an interested activist. Not unless we 
read between the lines of this dichotomy. 
In order to be presented as dichotomic, the former roles—scientist and activist—
must firstly be established as contradictory positions. Being or acting like one needs 
to make impossible be or act like the other. Yet, why do we promptly assume that 
the role of scientist is mutually exclusive to the role of an activist? While I certainly 
agree with the distinction between what a scientist—human or otherwise—does, and 
the preparation required for becoming one, from what activism involves, it is clear 
that this is not the same of assuming them as opposites. This is why mutual 
exclusiveness, i.e. having absolutely nothing in common, is crucial for this matter. A 
strong reason for assuming such relation for activists and scientists is the lay image 
we have of them. For the former, it is likely to portray them as a crowd of people 
carrying signs in a demonstration, pushing forward an idea or cause with absolute 
certainty—if not fanaticism. For the latter, on the other hand, we probably think in 
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phlegmatic persons that speak only through the results of their research—
acknowledging its potential limitations and completely open to change their minds. 
If so depicted, there is little doubt that they should be seen as complete opposites. 
However, if less cartoonish images are presented both for scientists and activists, 
this absolute opposition becomes less evident. For instance, taking into the account 
the thorough work made by Shapin (2008) in his “The Scientific Life”, we come to 
learn that the uptight, composed image of the scientist is mostly a necessary public 
projection. Which does not make it false by any means, but it certainly reveals how 
incomplete it is in relation to the considerably messier backstage work that leads to 
neat, publishable results. Interestingly, a relevant part of this backstage is subtly 
captured by Shapin’s book (2008) subtitle —“A Moral History of a Late Modern 
Vocation”. Doing a similar exercise with the case of the activist, the 
abovementioned image of an unthinking demonstrator just does not make justice to 
the achievements that activist movements have reached. What connects, for 
example, movements like the US Civil Rights with South Africa’s Anti-apartheid 
are not only exceptional leaders—King and Mandela—but also that those who 
participated in them remained adamant behind the (normative) idea of considering 
all persons as equals, regardless of their skin color. In the opposite direction, it is 
worth noting how many communist activists in France changed their views after 
coming to know the atrocities of Stalin’s regime (see Judt, 2010). This latter case 
shows that advocating for an idea does not equal either to be blind to its 
consequences or becoming unable to change positions about it over time. Thus 
presented, activism could also be associated to social change rather than an 
uncritical stand toward social issues. Hence, the previously mentioned ‘risk of 
activism’ for cultural psychology might be such only if only an extreme form of 
activism is assumed. 
When all the former is taken into account, thus seeing scientists as not so aseptic 
and activists as less radical, it becomes interesting to go back to the controversial 
work of Jensen (1969) and think again about his role. Looking from the more 
nuanced perspective presented, it does not appear as contradictory—or mutually 
exclusive—to think about a scientist whose work is done according to a given 
normative framework. On the contrary, it becomes odd to think about a human 
scientist that conducts his or her research with no interest, or position towards the 
phenomena at stake; which, as seen, does not equate to take a radical position that 
involves making up data and conclusions in order to validate such perspective. 
Ultimately, the former was exactly the point made both by Brinkmann (2016) and 
Innis (2016): it is not possible to think human sciences—and therefore human 
scientists—without a normative frame orienting them. Therefore, the second of the 
risks mentioned at the beginning of this section, namely promoting value-laden 
research, appears as a reminder of an aseptic view of the scientific activity (cf. 
Shapin, 2008) rather than a reasonable concern for cultural psychology.  
However, the Jensen’s controversy presents even another angle, which should not be 
left out of consideration: the fact that the set of values endorsed by Jensen, in one 
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way or another, promoted racism. This is a necessary reminder that the effort made 
in this article, namely showing that human scientists are—and should be—involved 
and partake in the social environments they dwell, does not imply that any form of 
participation must be uncritically supported—regardless of its pragmatic 
consequences. Yet where should that line exactly be drawn for cultural 
psychologists, is something that escapes this work. Therefore, and regrettably, the 
question that puzzled Innis (2016), and for which Brinkmann (2016) offered thin 
guidelines—what is the normative framework for cultural psychology to endorse—, 
remains unanswered in this article. However, a new element has been added to this 
question: there is no possibility for discussing such set of values without looking at 
its concrete effects in the social world. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Why to bring forth the case of Arthur Jensen? What has to do a 45 years old 
controversy that involved an IQ psychometrist with contemporary cultural 
psychology? While the example presented is certainly distant from cultural 
psychology in many respects, it is undoubtedly helpful for looking at the challenges 
implied in making our discipline more aware of its models of human flourishing—
as proposed by Brinkmann (2016) and Innis (2016)—but also of its social 
implications. As a whole, the case of Jensen presents a mixture where the social 
influence of human sciences, the values orienting this research, and the pragmatic 
consequences implied of it, all converge at the same time. It certainly is an extreme 
case, where all the later is polarized—high influence, racism, and notorious 
consequences—; but it is precisely this what should make easier for cultural 
psychologists to look at the stakes involved in this activity. Even if, at the moment, 
cultural psychology has an ephemeral value at the epistemic market6 (Valsiner, 
2009). 
In sum, and contrary to the popular belief, it seems that there is no—and never has 
been—such thing as an ivory tower. At worst, it might be a metaphor for the 
disconnection between academia and the issues that are pressing for the social 
world. But presenting members of academia—cultural psychologists included—as 
persons that are not related to any worldly matters is definitely misleading of how 
contemporary science works. In this sense, looking for a normative framework for 
cultural psychology is, at the same time, a search for a reference for conducting 
research, and also guidelines on how to make a difference in the social word. As 
noted by Brinkmann (2016), moral orientations are not just rules to know observe, 
but the basis for conducting in everyday life.  
																																																								
6 Given the scope of this article, it is not possible to expand on the sociological aspects of the 
knowledge crafted by different cultural psychologies. Regrettably, there has been little 
attention to this beyond Valsiner’s “A Guided Science: History of Psychology on the Mirror 
of Its Making” (2012). 
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CHAPTER 8. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
In this final chapter I elaborate on the general ideas that stem from this research 
project as a whole. In this sense, while I begin with an integrative summary of the 
manuscripts presented in the previous chapters, I aim to go beyond this. Therefore, 
after the recapitulation of the main ideas presented thus far, I elaborate on three 
aspects that concern these ideas directly. The first of them are two critiques, which 
question, first, to what extent human and social sciences are really capable of 
conducting studies on disciplines that are not their own, and, second, whether a 
person-centered approach—like the cultural psychology of science proposed—
promotes an elitist perspective, which obscures the view of scientific activity or not. 
After addressing these sharp critiques, I discuss an underlying social risk involved in 
conducting research like science studies. Even though psychological ideas have 
‘little value in epistemic markets’ (Valsiner, 2012), and thus they have a very 
limited impact beyond academia, the possibility of considering this thesis as fuel for 
the contemporary ‘people have had enough of experts’ motto needs to be 
addressed—and dispelled—head-on. Finally, the closing remarks of this thesis are 
devoted to the limitations and future directions of the ideas here presented. Thus, I 
first discuss the possibility of addressing the concepts and results exposed in this 
dissertation through alternative approaches, in an effort to connect this work to other 
forms of psychological inquiry. After this, I explore in which directions these ideas 
could make further progress in future studies. 
SUMMARY 
As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, Chapter 3, Looking for happiness, 
finding economic growth: The Chilean transition to democracy presented the 
historical contextualization in which the present research is embedded. Through a 
detailed account of the major social and political events from 1965 to the current 
days in Chile, this chapter is essential to understand the very particular 
circumstances in which economists became central actors for the country. This 
context was a contingent dictatorship that had as its main goal ousting a communist 
government. Once it accomplished that—breaking the democratic rule of the 
country in the process—it lacked any further plans for the country regarding social 
or economic development. In this particular situation of full control over the country 
with lack of governance direction, just as a participant described in Chapter 5, 
economists—with the explicit support of the regime—took over almost every 
intellectual and government space. From there, they imprinted an economic, for-
profit rationality to social areas that ranged from utilities, to infrastructure, to 
healthcare, to pensions, to urban planning. One of the main conclusions that Chapter 
3 presents is that, even if the origin of the massive influence of economists was 
connected to the 1973–1990 dictatorship, it certainly did not stop with the return of 
democratic governments to the country. In this sense, the ‘pragmatic’ agenda that 
organized 20 years of Concertación governments (1990–2010) clearly reflects how 
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economic criteria remained as the golden rule of governance. In one sentence: 
economic growth before human development. As noted, this trend remained stable 
until 2011, when massive grassroots movements ultimately demanded to change the 
core of this principle, thus asking to return to state-provided social services that do 
not depend of the wealth of the beneficiary. Moreover, this chapter also explored the 
implications that this over expanded economic logic has had for the democratization 
of the social debate in Chile. This point is of special relevance to contextualize the 
discussion of Chapter 7. At the same time, Chapter 3, as a whole, provides an 
essential background for fully grasping many of the elliptical references contained 
in the excerpts of Chapter 5.  
In a very different tone from the previous chapter, Chapter 4 elaborates the main 
theoretical grounds of this dissertation. For this purpose, an extended literature 
review of the main approaches to the phenomenon of science is first presented: 
namely, the philosophy, sociology, and psychology of science. This analysis of the 
literature reveals that through the different emphasis of these ways of studying 
science—epistemological, social, cognitive and individual, respectively—there has 
been a consistent downplaying of the role of the scientists, as purposeful persons, on 
the creation of novel scientific knowledge. The reasons for this neglect, as is also 
shown in Chapter 5, revolve around the assumption that this personal participation is 
either a risk for the objective nature of science, or plainly something that could be 
subsumed into collective elements. In order to reveal the centrality of the scientist 
for scientific activity, a new theoretical approach was proposed: a cultural 
psychology of science. This approach, however, does not resort to the same 
individualistic psychological approaches used in previously psychological studies of 
science. For this purpose, a cultural psychological approach was used, given the 
socio-cultural sensitivity that it puts forward. The latter is complemented by the 
theory of personal knowledge, which emphasizes the central role of the personal 
commitments of scientists over the ways in which they construct knowledge—
without compromising or suspending the quest for objectivity. In sum, this cultural 
psychology of science proposes the centrality of an active, purpose-oriented 
scientist that constructively transforms culturally available meanings in order to 
create novel, objective knowledge; even if the former does not conform to the 
standards set by the socio-cultural environment. To a large extent, this literature 
review is a systematized presentation of my personal experience getting into and 
making sense the particular human phenomenon that scientific activity is, as initially 
described in Chapter 1. Moreover, Chapter 4 represents the theoretical backbone of 
the whole thesis, and so ideas and findings contained in other chapters should be 
understood from this perspective. 
Chapter 5 represents the main compendium of the empirical research conducted in 
the present thesis. While this chapter is a self-contained manuscript, it is certainly 
illuminated by the ideas presented in Chapter 2, as it provides further context about 
the research process behind these result.  The central element of Chapter 5 is the 
thematic analysis that systematized and organized my encounters and conversations 
with 25 economists in Chile. Through this analysis, three main themes were clear in 
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these conversations: the influence of economists in Chile, definitions of economics, 
and economics as personal activity. Quite contrary to the unitary portrayal of 
economists in Chile—which could also be appreciated in the tone of the sources 
used in Chapter 3—, this analysis made clear the existence of an enormous diversity 
of perspectives among the economists interviewed. With the sole exception of the 
role of economists in Chile, which all but one participant deemed as massive. 
Regarding this diversity, it was also possible to observe a strong presence of self-
criticism of participants towards many aspects of how the discipline is done and 
used in Chile. Among these critiques, one emerged as the most notorious: the 
concerns of fellow economists letting their normative orientations influence their 
work, as this would make it politics rather than scientific economics. This point is 
crucial, as it directly points to the relevance of personal commitments for scientific 
activity outlined in Chapter 4. Furthermore, this imagined border separating the 
economist’s work from the citizen’s opinion is the main issue discussed in Chapter 
7. The relevance of this point led to the in-depth analysis of a particular case, which 
showed with special richness how normative elements, as personal commitments, 
weaved together social views of the participant, her research as economist, and the 
institution in which she worked. 
In a similar fashion, and directly connected to the latter topic, Chapter 6 focused on 
the analysis of a single and interesting case. This case provided a clear example of 
the abovementioned tension between normative elements, like ideological positions, 
and the aseptic, technical character for the interviewed economists. This tension, in 
particular, led to the participant analyzed to construct a dual position in which both 
elements were co-present, yet discursively separated. The latter was analyzed 
through the concept of doublethink, which ultimately emphasizes the constructive, 
meaningful character of this strategy—instead of bashing it as a logical 
inconsistency. Thus, the analysis conducted in Chapter 6 presents a good example of 
how the theoretical proposal of Chapter 4 could be applied to approach scientific 
activity in a psychological, yet not necessarily cognitivist way. 
Finally, Chapter 7 addressed a very specific issue in comparison to previous 
chapters: how to define the limit between a normative-oriented position, the 
‘activist’, and the scientific-oriented position, the ‘scholar’. In particular, this 
chapter discussed whether such distinction could—and should—be applied to social 
sciences, in which the researcher is in fact part of the phenomenon. To analyze this 
issue, this chapter described the popular views around scientists, i.e. the purely-
rational, lab-coated individual that only cares about yielding objective results. This 
rather mythical view is critically analyzed in an effort not for showing the lack of 
objectivity of scientists, but to have a perspective of scientific activity that is more 
grounded in concrete experiences of scientists—as this whole dissertation does. 
Therefore, this chapter shows how, for researchers of social and human sciences, it 
is pretty absurd to pretend that it is only possible to be a radical activist or an 
armchair scholar. This analysis is certainly connected to the concerns expressed by 
several participants in Chapter 5 regarding the ‘contamination’ of economic 
research with normative elements. Ironically, and following the ideas presented in 
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Chapter 7, these same participants did not see any problem in having very concrete 
personal interests and social concerns that they wanted to influence through their 
own research. In relation to the broader historical context of this thesis, described in 
Chapter 3, the ideas discussed here are a more general analysis of the social 
participation that economists have had in Chile during recent decades. 
As seen, the ideas, findings, and reflections presented along the previous chapters 
are tightly interconnected. Ultimately, from different perspectives and approaches, 
they all contribute to observe how relevant is considering the person of the scientist 
to properly understand the process of how scientific knowledge is created.  
POTENTIAL CRITIQUES TO THESE IDEAS 
In this sub-section, I address two critiques that, as noted at the beginning of this 
final chapter, could be directed to the conceptualizations and findings just 
summarized. The first critique concerns critical studies of science at large, while the 
second is specific to the person-centered approach to scientific activity proposed in 
this thesis. 
The first, more general critique could be based on the ideas of Bauer (2000), who 
basically questioned the aptitude of the social sciences and humanities for 
conducting any study of scientific activity beyond their own—our—disciplines. The 
rationale for this critique, according to Bauer (2000), is the fact these disciplines are 
inherently not unified in their theories, methodologies, and research practices. 
Therefore, they have trouble grasping the fundamental aspiration of physical and 
exact sciences for creating universal consensus, based on hard facts.  
It is necessary to note that this critique was made in the aftermath of the so-called 
‘science wars’ (Segerstråle, 2000). Thus, Bauer’s (2000) critique was specifically 
directed to the more radical forms of constructivism within science and technology 
studies, which basically proposed that science is a mere rhetoric fiction, not really 
different from witchcraft or common sense. Despite that more narrow focus, I 
consider this as an incredible strong critique to science studies at large regarding the 
issue of how we, as outsiders to a discipline, create a critical view of knowledge and 
practices that, in comparison, we barely understand.  
To address this critique, the first step is acknowledging this lack of belongingness; 
this is why I presented my personal experience of being an outsider to economics in 
Chapter 2. This step is essential to make us, as researchers inquiring other 
disciplines, reflect about the preconceptions and previous experiences that have 
shaped our understanding of what is science and how it is done. Otherwise, as Bauer 
(2000) noted, it is very likely to assume that every discipline and scientific 
community should work just as the one we come from. Moreover, this sensitivity to 
diversity only makes stronger the case for not imposing external, blanket views—as 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
	 141 
the ‘almighty’ economists (Heredia, 2011)—, but to build upon concrete, hands-on 
experiences of participants. 
The second critique comes from a Fuchs’ (2000) remark: “it may be the more 
personal, tacit, subjective, and emotional aspects of knowing that (…) are 
associated with elitism and social power. For the more personal and emotional 
one’s standpoint becomes, the less it remains subject to public inspection and 
critical appraisal.” (p. 166) Just by looking at the language used by Fuchs (2000), it 
is clear that the specific target of this critique is Polanyi’s personal and tacit 
knowledge ideas—which, as noted in Chapter 4, are central for the theoretical 
approach proposed. Furthermore, this critique also reaches to the whole project of 
having a more person-centered approach to scientific activity.  
Therefore, it results mandatory to explain why I do not consider that focusing on the 
personal experience of scientists is a promotion of secretive elitism in any form. In 
the first place, Fuchs’ (2000) assumption about the ‘personal and emotional’ 
dimensions of scientific activity as something inherently cumbersome does not seem 
to be based in any particular argument, for him it seems to be an ‘obvious’ fact. As 
this thesis has largely shown, if these aspects appear as mysterious and not related to 
scientific activity it is mostly because they have been consistently neglected and 
downplayed. Moreover, as proposed in Chapter 4, the presence of personal 
commitments and motivations in the doing of science it is something that promotes 
to quest for objective knowledge. While including the personal dimension certainly 
adds a layer of complexity, this is not a proper argument to discard it and assume 
that scientific activity is just composed by standard technical procedures. If 
anything, Fuchs’ (2000) critique hints in an important direction, namely the 
importance of making scientific activity open to be discussed and analyzed by 
people external to it, be it science scholars or the public. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
should economists in Chile have invited citizenry to discuss about their practices 
and findings, it is not very likely that the grassroots movements of 2011 had erupted 
as they did.  
UNDERLYING RISKS OF SCIENCE STUDIES 
As part of the closing remarks of this dissertation, I discuss a potential social risk 
underlying the ideas presented along this work, which also pertains studies of 
science at large. The core of this risk is the possibility of assuming that a person-
centered understanding of science ultimately aims to portray science as a completely 
biased, non-objective, and power-driven activity. Even if that was the spirit of the 
‘anti-science’ camp during the science wars (Segerstråle, 2000), it is definitely not 
the intention of the present dissertation—as repeatedly mentioned in previous 
chapters. 
Yet, I perceive that, despite this disclaimer, there is nonetheless a risk in these ideas 
given a particular context of the present times, the so-called ‘post-truth’ society. 
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This ‘society’ could be described as a collective zeitgeist of late-capitalist, Western 
societies in which, as the UK politician Michael Gove summarized: “people (…) 
have had enough of experts” (quoted in Mance, 2016). Thus, for different reasons, 
the expert advice of technical experts and scientists seems to be regarded as the 
source of many of the problems that citizens in these societies perceive as central. In 
fact, this very notion could be very well applied to the historical context of this 
thesis, namely the massive influence of economists in Chile, which have restricted 
the social debate only to those capable of elaborating ideas in terms of the language 
of economics, as described in Chapter 3. In this kind of social context, the ideas and 
findings here presented could well fuel the perception that experts, like economists, 
are ‘not so objective as they claim’ and thus their input should be discarded 
altogether from the social debate; placing in citizens the whole responsibility to 
decide the public policies that shape their lives. 
While I advocated for similar ideas in Chapter 3, in any case I considered that the 
work and research should be completely discarded. I rather proposed, for the case of 
Chile, to moderate an influence that has completely excluded citizenry from the 
social debate. Moreover, as noted in repeated occasions, the cultural psychology of 
science proposed is a way of understanding how the quest for objectivity is a crucial 
element for scientific activity, as scientists appropriate it as their own commitment. 
LIMITATIONS & FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF RESEARCH 
Regarding the limitations of the ideas presented here, I perceived them in two 
directions, theoretical and empirical. On the theoretical angle, the cultural 
psychology of science proposed, and the whole idea of making clear the 
involvement of the scientists into his or her scientific work, certainly fits the 
particularities of human and social sciences. In the case of these disciplines, as 
discussed in Chapter 7, the researcher is ultimately part of the object of study of his 
or her research, thus making it almost impossible to make a clear demarcation 
between them. However, I am not certain that the same applies for material and 
logical sciences, precisely because the object of inquiry could be perceived by 
researchers as something completely independent and detached from their own life. 
While Polanyi (1962) argues in extenso about how this is not the case for these 
disciplines, I think that such assumption should be tested through empirical means, 
i.e. through direct encounters with scientists creating knowledge in these fields.  
About the empirical work conducted in this thesis, I think that its main limitation 
relates to how generalizable are the findings presented. Even though the views and 
experiences described were triangulated among different participants in order to 
identify recurrent patterns, I still perceive there is a risk in assuming this work as 
sort of ‘census’ about economists in Chile. Just as one participant expressed at the 
end of an interview: “I hope you do not take my interview and then write about 
‘what all economists in Chile think’, because I talked to you about my very 
particular views, and nothing more”. While blanket conclusions about ‘economists 
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in Chile’, as a unitary group, have been avoided as much as possible, this is 
certainly a limitation of these results. 
I think that in between the limitations and the future directions of this thesis it is 
important to state that, by no means, the present work has intended to claim that this 
topic or these empirical results could only be understood through the approach 
proposed here. On the contrary, I consider that is certainly possible—and probably 
beneficial—to address this topic and data from different perspectives. For instance, 
Markova’s (2003) approach of dialogical triads between ego, alter, and an object 
could provide an understanding of scientific activity much more focused on the 
relational aspect of scientific activity. This, for instance, could complement the 
present approach by elaborating in further detail about how scientists engage in 
dialogical relation with fellow scientists. Similarly, as the work of Osbeck and her 
collaborators (2011) showed, activity theory could provide more detail about the 
everyday practices of science, rather the meaning constructions created about it. In a 
different way, a narrative approach like discursive psychology could offer a 
systematic way to approach the cases analyzed, thus providing a complementary 
development and biographical perspective that has been mostly absent from this 
work. Therefore, all these approaches could certainly create novel, complementary 
insights about the personal dimension of scientific activity. 
Finally, I conclude this thesis with potential, future directions for the ideas presented 
here as a whole—since Chapter 3 to 7 included future directions of their own. 
Regarding the theoretical angle of this dissertation, I am certain that the cultural 
psychology of science proposed requires much more refinement. One point in 
particular is especially pressing: elaborating in further detail whether, and how, 
innovative scientific ideas, i.e. ideas that depart from the established consensus in a 
scientific community, are driven by personal interests and motivations. This aspect 
was partially hinted in Chapter 4, but it could represent a central direction to be 
explored, given the major relevance that innovation has for science at large. As the 
flipside of this, the process by which scientists grew resistant to novel ideas could 
also be included into the cultural psychological approach elaborated. These 
resistances have been previously explored (e.g., Barber, 1961) but not much work 
has been done from a psychological perspective since. In relation to methodological 
advances, as noted in the previous paragraph, I think that novel data production and 
data analysis techniques could come from alternative psychological approaches to 
this topic. 
However, the exact directions in which this cultural psychological approach to 
economists in Chile should go in the future remains as an open question. Question 
that I prefer to ask to the reader instead of answer it. I am certain that the reader who 
became interested in this thesis will be avid to discuss how to further advance an 
understanding of science that acknowledges the full—but neglected—implications 
of a very simple principle: science is made by human beings. 
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The present thesis is an enquiry about two distinct but complementary is-
sues: the personal dimension of scientific activity, and the influential role that 
economists have had during the last decades in Chile. Regarding the former, 
this work complements existing philosophical, social, and psychological 
studies of science with a cultural psychology perspective. This perspective 
aims to be sensitive to the personal nature of the scientific activity but also 
to the cultural conditions in which scientific knowledge is constructed, with-
out subsuming any of these dimensions into the other. At the same time, 
this work offers a novel perspective on the notorious role that economists 
have had in contemporary Chilean society, a topic that has been mostly ad-
dressed as exclusively social and institutional. By focusing on economists’ 
experiences and views, this thesis shows that, while inserted in a particular 
historical background and a local scientific community, economists’ work 
is also driven by personal commitments and social interests. Far from an ef-
fort to undermine the work of economists, this thesis aims to provide a more 
grounded, human view of it.
